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A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1  INTRODUCTION TO EVIDENCE 
 
i. What is Evidence? 
 
1.1   Oxford English Dictionary 
 
1. The available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid. 
 
2. Information drawn from personal testimony, a document, or a material object, used to establish facts 
in a legal investigation or admissible as testimony in a law court. 
 
1.2  Murphy on Evidence 
 
Evidence is any material which has the potential to change the state of a fact-finder’s belief with respect 
to any factual proposition which is to be decided and which is in dispute. 
 
ii.   What is the Law of Evidence? 
 
1.3 Murphy on Evidence 
 
The Law of Evidence is a collection of rules governing what facts may be proved in court, what 
materials may be placed before the court to prove those facts, and the form in which those materials 
should be placed before the court. 
 
1.4 The Law of Evidence is not substantive law: it does not create causes of action, but rather regulates 
how the factual elements of substantive law (e.g. a breach of contract or a murder) may be established 
in a court of law. This is known as ‘adjective’ law, which also includes the rules of procedure and 
pleading etc. 
 
iii.   What are the Sources of the Law of Evidence? 
 
1.5 Apart from the rules and practices deriving from the common law and the Civil and Criminal Procedure 
rules, the Law of Evidence comes from a range of legislative sources. These might involve clear 
regulations which must be followed, and those which give a discretion to the judge (e.g. in deciding 
whether relevant evidence is unduly prejudicial the defendant). 
 
1.6 The statutes include: 
 
Civil Evidence Act 1995 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
 
iv.   The Function of the Law of Evidence 
 
1.7 Both the ancient rules of Natural Justice and the ECHR (as enshrined in the Human Rights Act 1998) 
lay down the foundations of the Law of Evidence, which is to ensure that any trial should be fair; that 
it should uphold the standards of a civilised society; and that it should achieve as accurate an outcome 
as possible. 
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1.8 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
ARTICLE 6 
 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law... 
 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... 
 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. 
 
ARTICLE 3 
  
No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
This can be relevant to the admissibility of confessions. 
 
ARTICLE 8 
 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
 
This can be relevant to the admissibility of evidence acquired by the unlawful violation of privacy. 
 
v.   The Operation of the Law of Evidence 
 
1.9 Although the need for a fair trial (and investigation) applies to both civil and criminal cases, most of 
the rules concern criminal cases, where there is obviously more at stake for the defendant. 
• His liberty and reputation are in jeopardy 
• The opposition (the state) is bound to be more powerful and has nothing to lose 
 
1.10 Most of the rules of evidence are exclusionary. They operate to filter out evidence that one of the 
parties might otherwise wish to present to the court. There are two reasons for needing such a filter:
  
PRACTICALITY 
 
There may be vast amounts of evidence which it would take an excessive time to present; which might 
not all be relevant; and which might simply confuse the issues. 
 
In a civil case, this may be managed by the judge simply limiting the time the parties have to present 
their case. 
 
FAIRNESS 
 
In a criminal case especially, there may be evidence which would be disproportionately prejudicial to 
the defendant, even if it does seem to have probative value. 
 
This might be to do with the nature of the evidence itself; or because of the way in which the evidence 
was obtained. 
 
1.11 In M v. R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996], Butler-Sloss LJ in the Court of Appeal cited with approval 
from the American Federal Rules of Evidence.  
 
M v. R (Child Abuse: Evidence) [1996]  
 
“We would draw attention to rules 102 and 403 of the American Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 102 
requires the trial judge, while securing fairness: ‘… to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay to the 
end that the truth may be ascertained and the proceedings justly determined.’ 
 
“Rule 403 provides: ‘Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’”    
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B TYPES OF EVIDENCE 
 
2 TYPES OF EVIDENCE 
 
i.   The Facts in Issue 
 
2.1 The claimant/prosecution must produce evidence to prove that the elements of the claim/offence are 
present. In a criminal case, this will usually mean establishing both the actus reus and mens rea of the 
crime. In a contract case, for example, it might be relevant to prove that a contract was made and what 
its terms were. 
 
ii.   Collateral Facts 
 
2.2 There may be facts to be established which are relevant to the case but which are not directly related 
to the allegations. For example, whether a witness is credible or competent. 
 
iii.   Direct Evidence 
 
2.3 This is evidence based on the first-hand knowledge of a witness. e.g. The store-detective saw Barrie 
place the camera into his bag and leave the store without paying for it. 
 
iv.   Circumstantial Evidence 
 
2.4 This is evidence which makes an allegation more or less likely to be true, but is not the fact in issue. 
e.g. Barrie started running away when the store-detective called out to him.  
 
2.5 Circumstantial evidence might be based on a generalisation about the accused which makes it more 
likely that he would commit the crime in question. For example, the fact that Barrie was a very keen 
photographer but could not afford to buy an expensive camera. It is a question of degree in each case 
as to whether such generalisations are really relevant or hold any weight,  
 
2.6 Barry George v. R. [2007] EWCA Crim 2722 
 
In this notorious case (which is discussed in detail later in the course) Barry George was wrongly 
convicted of murdering Jill Dando, a well-known television personality.  
 
Part of the evidence against him was that he was obsessed with the victim of the crime in that he had 
a large collection of photographs of her. The prosecution claimed that this made it more likely that he 
was involved in her murder. In fact, the only non-circumstantial evidence against him was a 
microscopic spec of material found in his coat pocket which might have been gunshot residue. 
 
Following the quashing of his original conviction, he was re-tried and found not guilty, having spent 8 
years in prison. 
 
v.   Real Evidence 
 
2.7 This relates to a physical object produced in evidence. e.g. The stolen camera discovered in Barrie’s 
office and covered in his fingerprints. 
 
vi.   Testimonial Evidence 
 
2.8 This is oral evidence given in court by a witness under oath (sometimes called ‘sworn evidence’). The 
oath may be religious or secular, but in either case it is perjury to lie in court under oath. 
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vii.   Hearsay Evidence 
 
2.9 This usually means the evidence of someone who is not in court, given by a third party. e.g. The store-
detective’s wife testifies as to what her husband told her about seeing Barrie steal the camera.  
 
2.10 The statutory definition is to be found in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.113 and 115 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
s.113 A statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings… 
 
s.115 A statement is any representation of fact or opinion made by a person by whatever means; 
and it includes a representation made in a sketch, photofit or other pictorial form… if (and only 
if) the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the person making the statement appears to the 
court to have been to cause another person to believe the matter, or to cause another person 
to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the matter. 
 
2.11 The main objection to permitting hearsay evidence is that the actual witness cannot be cross-examined 
as to the accuracy of the statement, and so it may be totally unreliable. Historically therefore such 
evidence was not permitted in court. 
 
2.12 However, the law has substantially altered in recent years. The rule no longer applies at all in civil 
cases; and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits hearsay evidence in criminal cases in certain 
specified situations, such as when the actual witness is dead, or when “the court is satisfied that it is 
in the interests of justice for it to be admissible” – which is obviously an extremely wide exception. 
2.13 This seems at first sight to conflict with the Article 6.3 requirement: 
Article 6 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination 
of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him. 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that States may reasonably depart from 
the strict letter of the Article without violating the ECHR.1  
viii.  Evidence of Good Character 
 
2.14 The defendant may wish to produce evidence of his sainthood in order to make his guilt seem less 
likely. This was permitted at common law, but only as evidence of his general reputation, rather than 
his propensity to commit the actual crime in question, though this was always something of a rather 
fine line. The problem for the defendant is that if he produces evidence of his good character, it gives 
the prosecution the licence to produce contradictory evidence about his bad character. 
 
2.15 The right for the defendant to produce good character evidence is specifically preserved in the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003. 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.118  
 
Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings evidence of a person's reputation is 
admissible for the purpose of proving his good or bad character. 
 
Note: The rule is preserved only so far as it allows the court to treat such evidence as proving 
the matter concerned. 
 
 
1 Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379. 
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ix.  Evidence of Bad Character 
 
2.16 The prosecution may wish to produce evidence of the defendant’s bad character – especially relating 
to previous convictions – to show that it is more likely that he has committed the crime now being tried. 
 
2.17 Under the old common law it was presumed that the prosecution could not bring up evidence of the 
defendant’s bad character (particularly previous convictions) unless either: 
i) The defendant had claimed to have no such antecedents; or 
ii) The facts of the instant case were unusually similar to the facts of a previous case involving the 
defendant. 
 
2.18 These rules were wiped away by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which shifted the presumption towards 
permitting evidence of bad character, subject to meeting certain criteria – known as ‘gateways’. 
2.19 Assuming that the evidence is permitted, there is then the question of what weight should be given to 
such evidence by the jury and how they should be directed. 
 
x.  Identification Evidence 
 
2.20 Following some scandalous miscarriages of justice caused through false identification evidence, the 
Devlin Committee was set up to investigate and review the procedures for identification evidence. It 
reported in 1976, leading eventually to Code D of PACE, which specifies how police identification 
procedures should be organised. 
2.21 Whilst the Devlin Committee was deliberating, the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) laid down certain 
guidelines which have become the benchmark for how a judge should direct a jury when identification 
evidence is key to the case. These are called the ‘Turnbull Guidelines’ after the name of the case: R. 
v. Turnbull [1977] QB 224 
xi.  Confessions 
2.22 Under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.82 (1) “confession”, includes any statement wholly 
or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made to a person in authority or not and whether 
made in words or otherwise. 
2.23 Whilst confessions are always likely to be relevant to the prosecution case, they may be excluded by 
the court, especially if they were made as a result of oppression or in circumstances which make them 
unreliable (such as under the influence of drugs). 
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C THE THREE PILLARS OF EVIDENCE 
 
3 RELEVANCE, ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT 
 
3.1 There are three key elements to consider with any piece of evidence: 
 
1. Is it relevant? 
2. Is it admissible? 
3. Does it have enough weight to tip the balance? 
 
i.  Relevance 
 
3.2 If evidence is not relevant to the matter in dispute, it will not be admissible, or, if it has already been 
heard, the jury may be told to disregard it. Producing relevant evidence will be part of the evidential 
burden.2 (See below) 
 
3.3 American Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 401 
 
 Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence. 
  
ii.  Admissibility 
 
3.4 Even if evidence is relevant, it may yet be ruled inadmissible, either at common law or under statute. 
For example, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, there is a general power for the court 
to exclude any prosecution evidence which is unduly prejudicial to the defendant. 
 
3.5 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
 78.— Exclusion of unfair evidence 
 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to 
rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. 
 
iii.   Weight 
 
3.6 Once the evidence is admitted, it is for the jury (or magistrates) to decide what weight to give it, though 
the jury may be influenced in this by the judge’s direction. 
 
3.7 If the evidence is very weak, this may affect whether the prosecution fulfils the evidential burden for 
the case to proceed at all. Where there is a particular piece of weak evidence, the judge may refuse 
to permit it to be presented to the jury if it is unduly prejudicial to the defendant. 
 
3.8 American Federal Rules of Evidence: Rule 403 
 
 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 See Part 5 below. 
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D BURDENS OF PROOF 
 
4 THE LEGAL BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
4.1 The legal burden of proof is the obligation placed on one of the parties to prove the case. It is “the 
obligation of a party to meet the requirement that a fact in issue be proved (or disproved) either by a 
preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt as the case may be.” (Cross & Tapper)  
 
4.2 The legal burden must be distinguished from the evidential burden3 of establishing that there is 
sufficient evidence from either the claimant or the prosecution for there to be any realistic possibility 
that they could win the case. This is not a test of whether the evidence is necessarily strong or credible. 
The issue is whether – assuming the facts alleged by the prosecution are proven – they would be 
enough to lead to a conviction. 
 
For example, if, in a criminal case, the prosecution’s evidence does not add up to the elements of the 
offence with which the defendant is charged – even if it all proves to be true – then there will be ‘no 
case to answer’ and the judge will order the trial to end. 
 
4.3 The general rule is that he who asserts must prove, so in a civil case this will usually be the claimant 
(or the appellant); and in a criminal case, it will usually be the prosecution (or the appellant).  
 
This is a long-established common law principle, most famously stated by Viscount Sankey in:  
 
 Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 
 
Reginald Woolmington was 21½ years old. His wife, who was killed, was 17½. They had known each 
other for some time and upon August 25 they were married. Upon October 14 she gave birth to a child. 
Shortly after that there appears to have been some quarrelling between them and she left him upon 
November 22 and went to live with her mother. Woolmington apparently was anxious to get her to 
come back, but she did not come.  
 
The prosecution proved that at about 9.15 in the morning of the 10th Mrs. Daisy Brine was hanging 
out her washing at the back of her house at 25 Newtown, Milborne Port. While she was engaged in 
that occupation, she heard voices from the next-door house, No. 24. She knew that in that house her 
niece, Reginald Woolmington's wife, was living. She heard and could recognize the voice of Reginald 
Woolmington saying something to the effect "are you going to come back home?" She could not hear 
the answer. Then the back door in No. 24 was slammed. She heard a voice in the kitchen but could 
not tell what it said. Then she heard the sound of a gun. Upon that she looked out of the front window 
and she saw Reginald Woolmington, whose voice she had heard just before speaking in the kitchen, 
go out and get upon his bicycle, which had been left or was standing against the wall of her house, 
No. 25. She called out to him but he gave no reply. He looked at her hard and then he rode away. 
 
According to Reginald Woolmington's own story, having brooded over and deliberated upon the 
position all through the night of December 9, he went on the morning of the 10th in the usual way to 
the milking at his employer's farm, and while milking conceived this idea that he would take the old 
gun which was in the barn and he would take it up that morning to his wife's mother's house where 
she was living, and that he would show her that gun and tell her that he was going to commit suicide 
if she did not come back. He would take the gun up for the purpose of frightening her into coming back 
to him by causing her to think that he was going to commit suicide. He finished his milking, went back 
to his father's house, had breakfast and then left, taking with him a hack saw. He returned to the farm, 
went into the barn, got the gun, which had been used for rook shooting, sawed off the barrels of it, 
then took the only two cartridges which were there and put them into the gun. He took the two pieces 
of the barrel which he had sawn off and the hack saw, crossed a field about 60 yards wide and dropped 
them into the brook.  
 
 
 
 
 
3 See Part 5 below. 
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Having done that, he returned on his bicycle, with the gun in his overcoat pocket, to his father's house 
and changed his clothes. Then he got a piece of wire flex which he attached to the gun so that he 
could suspend it from his shoulder underneath his coat, and so went off to the house where his wife 
was living. He knocked at the door, went into the kitchen and asked her: "Are you coming back?" She 
made no answer. She came into the parlour, and on his asking her whether she would come back she 
replied she was going into service.  
 
He then, so he says, threatened he would shoot himself, and went on to show her the gun and brought 
it across his waist, when it somehow went off and his wife fell down and he went out of the house.  
 
He told the jury that it was an accident, that it was a pure accident; that whilst he was getting the gun 
from under his shoulder and was drawing it across his breast it accidentally went off and he was doing 
nothing unlawful, nothing wrong, and this was a pure accident.  
 
The learned judge in summing-up the case to the jury said:- 
 
"If you accept his evidence, you will have little doubt that she died in consequence of a gunshot wound 
which was inflicted by a gun which he had taken to this house, and which was in his hands, or in his 
possession, at the time that it exploded. If you come to the conclusion that she died in consequence 
of injuries from the gun which he was carrying, you are put by the law of this country into this position: 
The killing of a human being is homicide, however he may be killed, and all homicide is presumed to 
be malicious and murder, unless the contrary appears from circumstances of alleviation, excuse, or 
justification. 'In every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances of 
accident, necessity, or infirmity are to be satisfactorily proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of 
the evidence produced against him: for the law will presume the fact to have been founded in malice 
until the contrary appeareth.' That has been the law of this country for all time since we had law. Once 
it is shown to a jury that somebody has died through the act of another, that is presumed to be murder, 
unless the person who has been guilty of the act which causes the death can satisfy a jury that what 
happened was something less, something which might be alleviated, something which might be 
reduced to a charge of manslaughter, or was something which was accidental, or was something 
which could be justified." 
 
At the end of his summing-up he added: "The Crown has got to satisfy you that this woman, Violet 
Woolmington, died at the prisoner's hands. They must satisfy you of that beyond any reasonable 
doubt. If they satisfy you of that, then he has to show that there are circumstances to be found in the 
evidence which has been given from the witness-box in this case which alleviate the crime so that it is 
only manslaughter or which excuse the homicide altogether by showing that it was a pure accident." 
 
The defendant was found guilty, and appealed on the basis that the judge had misdirected the jury: it 
was not for the defendant to prove his innocence, but for the prosecution to prove both the actus reus 
and the mens rea beyond all reasonable doubt. Allowing the appeal (and so overturning the conviction) 
the House of Lords gave its classic statement about the burden (and standard) of proof. 
 
“Juries are always told that, if conviction there is to be, the prosecution must prove the case beyond 
reasonable doubt. This statement cannot mean that in order to be acquitted the prisoner must "satisfy" 
the jury. This is the law as laid down in the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex v. Davies, the headnote 
of which correctly states that where intent is an ingredient of a crime there is no onus on the defendant 
to prove that the act alleged was accidental.  
 
“Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that 
it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt subject to what I have already said 
as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception.  
 
“If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence 
given by either the prosecution or the prisoner, as to whether the prisoner killed the deceased with a 
malicious intention, the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an 
acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove 
the guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can 
be entertained.” per Viscount Sankey at pages 481-48 
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4.4 The rule was enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, which came into force in 1953. 
Article 6.2 
 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law. 
4.5 The Human Rights Act 1998 has added an extra dimension to this, as it provides in s.3 (1) that, so far 
as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect 
in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. This has meant that the courts specifically 
need to consider whether statutory provisions which seem to place a burden of proof on the defendant 
are sufficiently just, reasonable and proportionate to be compliant with the Convention, 
4.6 On that basis, the defendant is under no obligation to produce any evidence at all, though this may be 
a rather bad tactic if the prosecution’s evidence is otherwise compelling. 
4.7 Perhaps the most notorious case of a judge misdirecting a jury on the burden of proof came in the 
case of R. v. Derek Bentley in 1952, which was overturned by the Court of Appeal 46 years later. It is 
worth reading the appeal case in full to appreciate the dramatic (and in this case fatal) influence that 
a rogue judge can have over a jury if he or she does not explain the operation of the legal burden 
correctly. 
4.8 R v. Derek William Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 21 
On the evening of November 2, 1952 Police Constable Sidney Miles was shot dead in the execution 
of his duty on the roof of a warehouse in Croydon. Two men were charged with his murder: Christopher 
Craig, who was then aged 16, and Derek William Bentley, who was 19. They were convicted on 
December 11, in Bentley's case with a recommendation to mercy. The trial judge passed on each the 
only sentence permitted by law: on Craig, because of his age, that he be detained during Her Majesty's 
pleasure; on Bentley, sentence of death. He was executed on January 28.  
 
The main thrust of the prosecution case was straightforward. Craig had deliberately and wilfully 
murdered P.C. Miles and the appellant had incited Craig to begin the shooting and, although 
technically under arrest at the actual time of the killing of Miles, was party to that murder and equally 
responsible in law. 
 
In order to prove the appellant's participation, the prosecution relied heavily on what counsel described 
as “the most important observation that Bentley made that night”, namely “Let him have it, Chris”. That 
was said to be a deliberate incitement to murder Detective Constable Fairfax, who had just arrested 
the appellant. It led, it was said, to Craig immediately firing at and wounding D.C. Fairfax.  
 
Bentley's case was that he had not incited Craig to fire the gun and had at no time been party to its 
use. He had not known that Craig had a gun until the first shot was fired and he had not used the 
words “Let him have it, Chris” or any words which amounted to an incitement to use the gun. He had 
been standing with D.C. Fairfax for an appreciable time, making no effort to get away from him and 
behaving in a wholly docile manner, when Craig had fired the fatal shot. He had not participated in the 
murder. 
 
In the posthumous appeal against Bentley’s conviction, the Court of Appeal found that there was no 
reliable evidence that Bentley had said “Let him have it”; nor that, even if he did, he meant Craig to 
shoot his gun at the policeman rather than to hand it over to him.  
 
Furthermore, the trial judge in his summing up and direction to the jury did not give the defendants’ 
case any appreciable weight, but rather suggested to the jury that unless they thought the defendants 
had established the killing was an accident, they must be found guilty of murder. He also did not 
properly explain the standard of proof required, but rather attempted to influence the jury against the 
defendants by emphasising the heroics of the victims. 
 
In this case the prosecution has given abundant evidence for a case calling for an answer, and 
although the prisoners do not have to prove their innocence, when once a case is established against 
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them, they can give evidence, and they can call witnesses, and then you have to take their evidence 
as part of the sum of the case. The effect of a prisoner's evidence may be to satisfy you that he is 
innocent, it may be it causes you to have such doubt that you feel the case is not proved, and it may, 
and very often does, have a third effect: it may strengthen the evidence for the prosecution… 
 
Extracts from the summing up of Lord Goddard, C.J. (the trial judge). 
 
“Gentlemen of the jury, I started by saying this was a terrible case. It is dreadful to think that two lads, 
one, at any rate, coming, and I dare say the other, from decent homes, should with arms of this sort 
go out in these days to carry out unlawful enterprises like warehouse-breaking and finish by shooting 
policemen. You have a duty to the prisoners. You will remember, I know, and realise, I know that you 
owe a duty to the community and if young people, but not so young—they are responsible in law—
commit crimes of this sort, it is right, quite independent of any question of punishment, that they should 
be convicted, and if you find good ground for convicting them, it is your duty to do it if you are satisfied 
with the evidence for the prosecution… 
 
“Now let us take first of all the case of Craig: it is not disputed, and could not be disputed, that he fired 
the shot which killed that Police Constable. You are asked to say that the killing was accidental, and 
that therefore the offence is reduced to manslaughter. Gentlemen of the jury, it is the prerogative of 
the jury in any case where the charge is of murder to find a verdict of manslaughter, but they can only 
do it if the evidence satisfies them that the case is properly reducible to one of manslaughter—that is, 
not with regard to any consequence that may happen, but simply whether the facts show that the case 
ought to be regarded as one of manslaughter and not of murder… In that case the only possible way 
of reducing the crime to manslaughter is to show that the act was accidental, and not wilful—the act.” 
 
“There is one thing I am sure I can say with the assent of all you twelve gentlemen, that the police 
officers that night, and those three officers in particular, showed the highest gallantry and resolution; 
they were conspicuously brave. Are you going to say they are conspicuous liars?—because if their 
evidence is untrue that Bentley called out ‘Let him have it, Chris!’, those three officers are doing their 
best to swear away the life of that boy. If it is true, it is, of course, the most deadly piece of evidence 
against him. Do you believe that those three officers have come into the box and sworn what is 
deliberately untrue—those three officers who on that night showed a devotion to duty for which they 
are entitled to the thanks of the community?...  Against that denial (which, of course, is the denial of a 
man in grievous peril) you will consider the evidence of the three police officers who have sworn to 
you positively that those words were said.” 
 
The Court of Appeal overturned the verdict. 
 
“The jury must be clearly and unambiguously instructed that the burden of proving the guilt of the 
accused lies and lies only on the Crown, that (subject to exceptions not here relevant) there is no 
burden on the accused to prove anything and that if, on reviewing all the evidence, the jury are unsure 
of or are left in any reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused that doubt must be resolved in 
favour of the accused. Such an instruction has for very many years been regarded as a cardinal 
requirement of a properly conducted trial. The courts have not been willing to countenance departures 
from it. We cannot regard the direction in this case as satisfactory. By stressing the abundant evidence 
calling for an answer in support of the prosecution case, and by suggesting that that case had been 
“established”, and by suggesting that there was a burden on Craig to satisfy the jury that the killing 
had been accidental (however little, on the facts of this case, the injustice caused to Craig thereby), 
the jury in our view could well have been left with the impression that the case against the appellant 
was proved and that they should convict him unless he had satisfied them of his innocence”.  
per Lord Bingham  
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5 THE EVIDENTIAL BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
i.  Introduction 
 
5.1 Separate from the legal burden of proof, is the evidential burden of establishing that there is sufficient 
evidence from either the claimant or the prosecution for there to be any realistic possibility that they 
could win the case. This is not a test of whether the evidence is necessarily strong or credible. The 
issue is whether – assuming the facts alleged by the prosecution can be proved – they would be 
enough to lead to a conviction. 
 
5.2 For example, if, in a criminal case, the prosecution’s evidence does not add up to the elements of the 
offence with which the defendant is charged – even if it all proves to be true – then there will be ‘no 
case to answer’. 
 
Examples 
 
(i) Barrie is charged with theft. The evidence is that he was shopping in Debenhams wearing a 
rucksack, and in turning round, he accidentally knocked an expensive vase off a display cabinet, 
smashing it into pieces. He refused to pay for it, claiming that it was not him who knocked it off. 
 
Even if the prosecution prove that he did knock the vase over, they will not have discharged the 
evidential burden for the offence of theft, so the judge should not let the case continue: it does not 
matter if all the prosecution evidence can be proved. There is simply no case to answer on the charge 
made. 
 
(ii) Barrie discovers a body in the woods whilst he is out walking his dog. As the murder has only 
recently occurred and no one else seems to be around, the police charge Barrie with the murder.  
 
Although Barrie’s presence at the murder scene is clearly a relevant piece of evidence, it would not, 
in itself, be enough to make a reasonable jury sure that he is the murderer. If that is all the evidence 
there is, the evidential burden on the prosecution would not be satisfied. 
 
 
ii.  Satisfying the Evidential Burden 
 
5.3 The evidential burden does not require the prosecution to establish their case to the judge beyond all 
reasonable doubt: that is the legal burden and relates to the outcome of the case as decided by the 
jury. To satisfy the evidential burden, the prosecution just needs to establish that it has a viable (though 
not yet proven) case, in the absence of any defence. 
 
5.4 R. v. Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 (CA) 
 
On November 20, 1978, at the Ranelagh Yacht Club, Putney Bridge, in the early hours of the evening 
a fight broke out in the bar. There were a number of people present, amongst them being Darke, 
Begbe, Bohm, Dennis and Bindon. Knives were used. At least three men were stabbed, Darke fatally, 
Bindon seriously, and Dennis less so. There was in these circumstances no doubt that there had been 
an affray. The only question for the jury to decide was whether it had been established with a sufficient 
degree of certainty that George Charles Galbraith had been unlawfully taking part in that affray. 
 
On November 13, 1979, at the Central Criminal Court, Galbraith, was convicted on an indictment 
charging that he fought and made an affray. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.  
 
The prosecution evidence showed that there had been an affray in a bar in which at least three men 
were stabbed, one fatally. There were passages in the evidence of two witnesses which tended to 
show that the applicant had taken an active part in the affray, although in a statement to the police the 
applicant had maintained that at the time the affray was in progress, he had not been in the bar but 
downstairs in the lavatory.  
 
At the close of the prosecution evidence a submission of no case to answer was rejected. Galbraith, 
who had made a statement from the dock, reiterating the self-exculpatory statement which he had 
made to the police, was convicted. 
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He appealed against the conviction on the basis that the judge was wrong to have permitted the case 
to proceed when the evidence that he was at the scene was too tenuous to be relied on. His appeal 
failed, and the Court of Appeal laid down the key principles. 
 
i. When a submission of no case was made, the case was to be stopped when there was no evidence 
that the person charged had committed the crime alleged and was also to be stopped if the evidence 
was tenuous and the judge concluded that the prosecution's evidence taken at its highest was such 
that a properly directed jury could not properly convict on it;  
 
ii. Where the prosecution's evidence was such that its strength or weakness depended on the view to be 
taken of the reliability of a witness or other matters which were, generally speaking, within the province 
of a jury and one possible view of the facts was that there was evidence on which they could properly 
conclude that the person charged was guilty, the matter was to be tried by them; that borderline cases 
were in the judge's discretion; and that, in the circumstances, the applicant's submission of no case to 
answer was properly rejected. 
 
“How then should the judge approach a submission of “no case”?  
 
(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no 
difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case.  
 
(2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence but it is of a tenuous character, for example 
because of inherent weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence. 
 
(a) Where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is 
such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission 
being made, to stop the case.  
 
(b) Where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the 
view to be taken of a witness's reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within the 
province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury 
could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the 
matter to be tried by the jury. It follows that we think the second of the two schools of thought is to be 
preferred. 
 
“There will of course, as always in this branch of the law, be borderline cases. They can safely be left 
to the discretion of the judge.”  per Lord Lane CJ 
iii.   The Crown Prosecution Service 
5.5 Since the advent of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1986, the task of filtering criminal cases where 
there is no case to answer has fallen to this organization, so far fewer such cases should actually get 
as far as the court. 
5.6 According to their website4, the CPS filters cases in two stages. The CPS will only start or continue a 
prosecution if a case has passed both stages. 
 
1. The evidential stage 
 
This is the first stage in the decision to prosecute. Crown Prosecutors must be satisfied that there is 
enough evidence to provide a "realistic prospect of conviction" against each defendant on each 
charge. They must consider whether the evidence can be used and is reliable. They must also consider 
what the defence case may be and how that is likely to affect the prosecution case. 
 
A "realistic prospect of conviction" is an objective test. It means that a jury or a bench of magistrates, 
properly directed in accordance with the law, will be more likely than not to convict the defendant of 
the charge alleged. (This is a separate test from the one that criminal courts themselves must apply. 
A jury or magistrates' court should only convict if it is sure of a defendant's guilt.) If the case does not 
pass the evidential stage, it must not go ahead, no matter how important or serious it may be. 
 
 
4 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/about-cps>. 
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2. The public interest stage 
 
If the case does pass the evidential stage, Crown Prosecutors must then decide whether a prosecution 
is needed in the public interest. They must balance factors for and against prosecution carefully and 
fairly. Some factors may increase the need to prosecute but others may suggest that another course 
of action would be better. 
 
The factors considered at this stage will include5: 
 
a) How serious is the offence committed? The more serious the offence, the more likely it is that a 
prosecution is required.  
 
b) What is the level of culpability of the suspect? The greater the suspect’s level of culpability, the 
more likely it is that a prosecution is required. Culpability is likely to be determined by the suspect’s 
level of involvement; the extent to which the offending was premeditated and/or planned; whether they 
have previous criminal convictions and/or out-of-court disposals and any offending whilst on bail or 
whilst subject to a court order; whether the offending was or is likely to be continued, repeated or 
escalated; and the suspect’s age or maturity. 
 
c) What are the circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim? The circumstances of the victim 
are highly relevant. The greater the vulnerability of the victim, the more likely it is that a prosecution is 
required. This includes where a position of trust or authority exists between the suspect and victim. 
 
d) Was the suspect under the age of 18 at the time of the offence? The best interests and welfare of 
the child or young person must be considered including whether a prosecution is likely to have an 
adverse impact on his or her future prospects that is disproportionate to the seriousness of the 
offending.  
 
e) What is the impact on the community? The greater the impact of the offending on the community, 
the more likely it is that a prosecution is required. In considering this question, prosecutors should 
have regard to how community is an inclusive term and is not restricted to communities defined by 
location.  
 
f) Is prosecution a proportionate response?  
 
g) Do sources of information require protecting? In cases where public interest immunity does not 
apply, special care should be taken when proceeding with a prosecution where details may need to 
be made public that could harm sources of information, international relations or national security.  
 
5.7 The public interest stage is not part of the evidential burden of the prosecution once the case has been 
approved by the CPS. 
iv.  Civil Cases  
5.8 In a civil case, the evidential burden will be on the claimant, and as in a criminal case the judge will 
stop the proceedings if the claimant does not produce sufficient evidence for the merits of the claim to 
be considered. One quirk of civil cases which does not apply in criminal proceedings is the possibility 
of counter-claims, so it is possible for the evidential burden (and sometimes the legal burden) to shift 
between the parties, depending on the issue being argued.6 
5.10 Another issue in civil cases is the use of the online Court Claim procedure for money claims up to 
£100,000. Under this procedure you may make a claim online and if the defendant does not respond 
within 14 days of service, you may claim judgment by default, even if you have submitted no evidence 
at all to support your claim.7 
 
 
 
5 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf> [4.12]. 
6 See Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd. v. Imperial Smelting Corporation [1942] AC 154. 
7 <https://www.gov.uk/make-money-claim>. 
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6 THE REVERSE BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
i.  Introduction 
 
6.1 Despite the general rule that it is for the prosecution to make the case, there are some cases where 
the defendant is required to prove or disprove something, which will otherwise be presumed against 
him. In criminal law, for example, there is a presumption that everyone is sane, so if a defendant 
wishes to rely on the common law defence of insanity in a murder case, he must prove that he was 
insane at the time of the homicide. However, the standard of proof in such a case will only be ‘on the 
balance of probabilities’. 
6.2 As indicated by Viscount Sankey in Woolmington, all other examples of the reverse burden are based 
on statutory provisions, which seem to require such an exception in particular cases. However, this is 
seldom straightforward, as the question as to whether the statute actually has that effect is one of 
statutory interpretation, and the courts have not been consistent as to which ‘rules’ of statutory 
interpretation to apply in such cases.  
6.3 In particular, the rule under the Human Rights Act 1988 that a statute must be presumed to be 
compatible with the ECHR has caused some debate, as art 6 specifically states that: “Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.” Does 
this mean that the legal burden – or even the evidential burden - can now never be placed on the 
defendant? Clearly it still can, but where is the line to be drawn? 
6.4 In Salabiaku v. France (1988) 13 EHRR 379, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
presumption of innocence under article 6 was not an absolute principle, and only needed to be applied 
within reasonable limits, subject to the test of proportionality. This gives leave to the domestic courts 
in the UK to reverse the burden within these limits. 
6.5 In a seminal article in the Criminal Law Review 20058, Ian Dennis surveyed the major cases in this 
area to detect what criteria the courts were using to decide whether to reverse both the legal and 
evidential burdens. He identified several factors which appeared to affect the decisions: 
• Judicial Deference to Parliament: If a statute makes it clear that Parliament intended to reverse the 
burden of proof, the courts will defer to this, though the question might still be open as to whether to 
reverse the legal burden or just the evidential burden. 
 
• Regulatory Offences: The burden was more likely to be reversed where the offence is ‘regulatory’ 
and the issue is simply whether the defendant has complied with the regulations. 
 
• Defence v. Element of the Offence: The defendant is more likely to be asked to prove a specific 
defence than to prove that an essential element of the crime has been committed, though sometimes 
the latter may happen, especially where the crime is to do an otherwise lawful act without the required 
permit. This overlaps with the next criterion. 
 
• Ease of Proof and Peculiar Knowledge: For the sake of practicality and common sense, if proving 
a defence is something the defendant could easily do (e.g. by producing the required licence), then it 
would not be unreasonable to ask him to do it. 
6.6 It is more common for the courts to find that just the evidential burden has been reversed by a statute, 
than to reverse both the evidential and legal burden. In such cases, the defendant may have to produce 
some palpable evidence to give rise to the claimed defence, but he does not have the legal burden to 
prove it. This is obviously more likely to be article 6 compliant. 
 
 
8 I Hunt, Reverse onuses and the presumption of innocence: in search of principle, Crim LR 2005, Dec, 901-936. 
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ii.  The Pre-Human Rights Act 1998 Cases 
6.7 R. v. Edwards [1975] QB 27 
 
The Court of Appeal held that where a statute prohibits an act except under certain conditions, 
the legal burden could fall on the defendant to prove that he has met those conditions. 
 
Errington Edwards was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor without a justices' licence contrary 
to section 160 (1) (a) of the Licensing Act 1964. He was unrepresented at the trial and did not give 
evidence, but made an unsworn statement denying the occupation of the premises. On his appeal 
against conviction on the ground that, since the prosecution had access to the register of licences 
under section 34 (2) of the Act, the prosecution should have called evidence to prove that there was 
no justices' licence in force:- 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal: 
 
(1) That there was an exception to the fundamental rule of the criminal law that the prosecution had to 
prove every element of the offence charged,  which was limited to offences arising under enactments 
which prohibited the doing of an act but subject to provisos or exemptions; and that its application was 
not dependent upon either the fact, or the presumption, that the defendant had peculiar knowledge 
enabling him to prove the positive of a negative averment  
 
(2) That if on the true construction of an enactment it prohibited the doing of a certain act, save in 
specified circumstances, it was not for the prosecution to prove a prima facie case of lack of excuse 
or qualification for the onus of proof shifted and it was for the defendant to prove that he was entitled 
to do the prohibited act and, accordingly, in the present case the defendant had to prove that he held 
a justices' licence  
 
“In our judgment this line of authority establishes that over the centuries the common law, as a result 
of experience and the need to ensure that justice is done both to the community and to defendants, 
has evolved an exception to the fundamental rule of our criminal law that the prosecution must prove 
every element of the offence charged. This exception, like so much else in the common law, was 
hammered out on the anvil of pleading. It is limited to offences arising under enactments which prohibit 
the doing of an act save in specified circumstances or by persons of specified classes or with specified 
qualifications or with the licence or permission of specified authorities. Whenever the prosecution 
seeks to rely on this exception, the court must construe the enactment under which the charge is laid. 
If the true construction is that the enactment prohibits the doing of acts, subject to provisos, exemptions 
and the like, then the prosecution can rely upon the exception. 
 
“In our judgment its application does not depend upon either the fact, or the presumption, that the 
defendant has peculiar knowledge enabling him to prove the positive of any negative averment. As 
Wigmore pointed out in his great Treatise on Evidence (1905), vol. 4, p. 3525, this concept of peculiar 
knowledge furnishes no working rule. If it did, defendants would have to prove lack of intent. What 
does provide a working rule is what the common law evolved from a rule of pleading. We have striven 
to identify it in this judgment. Like nearly all rules it could be applied oppressively; but the courts have 
ample powers to curb and discourage oppressive prosecutors and do not hesitate to use them. 
 
“Two consequences follow from the view we have taken as to the evolution and nature of this 
exception. First, as it comes into operation upon an enactment being construed in a particular way, 
there is no need for the prosecution to prove a prima facie case of lack of excuse, qualification or the 
like; and secondly, what shifts is the onus: it is for the defendant to prove that he was entitled to do 
the prohibited act. What rests on him is the legal or, as it is sometimes called, the persuasive burden 
of proof. It is not the evidential burden.” per Lawton LJ 
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6.8 R. v. Hunt [1987] AC 352 
 
The House of Lords held that where a statute prohibits the doing of a specific act, it is up to 
the prosecution to prove that all elements of the prohibited act have actually taken place: the 
defendant does not have to prove that the act has not taken place. 
 
Police officers found in Richard Hunt's home a paper fold containing 154 milligrams of a white powder 
which, when analysed, was found to be morphine mixed with caffeine and atropine. He was charged 
under section 5(2) of the Act of 1971 with unlawful possession of a controlled drug morphine.  
 
Under Regulation 4(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 1973, the Act does not apply to “any 
preparation of medicinal opium or of morphine containing ... not more than 0.2 per cent. of morphine.” 
 
The prosecution did not produce any evidence of the proportion of morphine in the powder the police 
had found, and the defendant submitted that there was no case to answer. When the judge would not 
allow this, the defendant pleaded guilty. 
 
The House of Lords held that the composition of the morphine was an essential element of the offence, 
which it was for the prosecution to prove, so the plea of no case to answer should have been 
upheld. 
 
“I would summarise the position thus far by saying that Woolmington [1935] A.C. 462 did not lay down 
a rule that the burden of proving a statutory defence only lay upon the defendant if the statute 
specifically so provided: that a statute can, on its true construction, place a burden of proof on the 
defendant although it does not do so expressly: that if a burden of proof is placed on the defendant it 
is the same burden whether the case be tried summarily or on indictment, namely, a burden that has 
to be discharged on the balance of probabilities. 
 
“The real difficulty in these cases lies in determining upon whom Parliament intended to place the 
burden of proof when the statute has not expressly so provided. It presents particularly difficult 
problems of construction when what might be regarded as a matter of defence appears in a clause 
creating the offence rather than in some subsequent proviso from which it may more readily be inferred 
that it was intended to provide for a separate defence which a defendant must set up and prove if he 
wishes to avail himself of it. This difficulty was acutely demonstrated in Nimmo v. Alexander Cowan 
& Sons Ltd. [1968] A.C. 107 . Section 29(1) of the Factories Act 1961 provides: 
 
"There shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, be provided and maintained safe means of access to 
every place at which any person has at any time to work, and every such place shall, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, be made and kept safe for any person working there." 
 
“The question before the House was whether the burden of proving that it was not reasonably 
practicable to make the working place safe lay upon the defendant or the plaintiff in a civil action. 
However, as the section also created a summary offence the same question would have arisen in a 
prosecution. In the event, the House divided three to two on the construction of the section, Lord Reid 
and Lord Wilberforce holding that the section required the plaintiff or prosecution to prove that it was 
reasonably practicable to make the working place safe, the majority, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn and 
Lord Pearson, holding that if the plaintiff or prosecution proved that the working place was not safe it 
was for the defendant to excuse himself by proving that it was not reasonably practicable to make it 
safe. However, their Lordships were in agreement that if the linguistic construction of the statute did 
not clearly indicate upon whom the burden should lie the court should look to other considerations to 
determine the intention of Parliament such as the mischief at which the Act was aimed and practical 
considerations affecting the burden of proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that the respective 
parties would encounter in discharging the burden. I regard this last consideration as one of great 
importance for surely Parliament can never lightly be taken to have intended to impose an onerous 
duty on a defendant to prove his innocence in a criminal case and a court should be very slow to draw 
any such inference from the language of a statute… 
 
“I have little doubt that the occasions upon which a statute will be construed as imposing a burden of 
proof upon a defendant which do not fall within this formulation are likely to be exceedingly rare... In 
the final analysis each case must turn upon the construction of the particular legislation to determine 
whether the defence is an exception within the meaning of section 101 of the Act of 1980 which the 
Court of Appeal rightly decided reflects the rule for trials on indictment.” per Lord Griffiths 
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iii.  The Post-Human Rights Act 1998 Cases 
6.9 The cases decided since the enactment of the HRA at first adopted a stricter approach to the 
presumption of innocence, but later cases seemed to be less dogmatic. In Sheldrake v. DPP9 however, 
the House of Lords said that all the major cases could be reconciled and were therefore not 
inconsistent with each other. 
6.10 R. v. Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] 2 AC 545 
 
The House of Lords stated obiter that the legal burden could only be reversed by statute where 
this was justified and proportionate. Otherwise, any statute which required such a reversal 
would be incompatible with the ECHR. 
 
Steven Lambert was found in possession of a duffle bag containing two kilograms of cocaine worth 
over £140,000. He was found guilty of possession with intent to supply, contrary to s.5 of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971 and sentenced to seven years in prison.  Lambert had relied on the defence under 
s.28 of the Act, that he did not believe or have any reason to suspect that the bag contained a 
controlled drug. 
 
The judge directed the jury that as long as it was proven that he was in possession of the drug, it was 
up to the defendant to prove – on the balance of probabilities - that he had the s.28 defence: in other 
words, that he had the legal burden of proving the defence. 
 
Lambert appealed on the basis that this interpretation of s.28 was incompatible with the presumption 
of innocence under Article 6, as enshrined into law by the HRA. 
 
The House of Lords held that the HRA did not apply to this case at all, as the incident took place before 
it was passed, so the appeal failed. 
 
However, Lord Steyn did discuss the effect of the HRA on the reverse burden of proof, and stated that 
the issue of compatibility should be approached with a three-stage test: 
 
i) Has there been a legislative interference with the presumption in Art 6 (2)? 
ii) If so, is there an objective justification for such interference? 
iii) If so, is the interference proportionate – i.e. no greater than necessary. 
 
In this case, Lord Steyn thought that although there was justification for the requirement that the 
defendant should prove that he was unaware of the contents of his bag (given that drug smugglers 
will typically hide drugs and so could always claim to be unaware of their presence), the serious nature 
of the offence – with a possible sentence of life imprisonment – meant that it was not proportionate to 
expect the defendant to have more than an evidential burden regarding his lack of knowledge: the 
legal burden must remain with the prosecution. 
 
6.11 R v. Davies (David Janway) [2002] EWCA Crim 2949 
 
In one of several cases involving the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the court held that it 
was justified, necessary and proportionate to the impose on the defendant the legal burden of 
proving he had taken all practicable steps to ensure the health and safety of people who might 
be affected by his undertaking. 
 
The factors considered included: 
• that it was a regulatory offence;  
• the potential defendants are people who have voluntarily entered upon risky enterprises for 
commercial gain;  
• the defence is only necessary once it has been shown that the defendant was in breach of a 
duty;  
• the facts relied on in support of the defence should not be difficult to prove because they will 
be within the knowledge of the defendant;  
 
9 [2005] 1 AC 264. 
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• to require the prosecution to prove that the defendant did not take the necessary steps – 
despite whatever tragedy has occurred - would thwart the purpose of Parliament in passing 
the statute. 
 
HSWA 1974 s.3(1) provides that: It shall be the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in 
such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who 
may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or safety. 
 
HSWA 1974 s.40 provides that: In any proceedings for an offence under any of the relevant statutory 
provisions consisting of a failure to comply with a duty or requirement to do something so far as is 
practicable or so far as is reasonably practicable, or to use the best practicable means to do something, 
it shall be for the accused to prove (as the case may be) that it was not practicable or not reasonably 
practicable to do more than was in fact done to satisfy the duty or requirement, or that there was no 
better practicable means than was in fact used to satisfy the duty or requirement. 
 
David Davies ran a plant hire firm from a yard and workshop near Neath. He had three employees and 
employed three self-employed subcontractors, one of whom was Mr Gardner. On 25 January 2000 Mr 
Gardner returned to the yard at about 3.30 p m and asked the defendant if there was any further work 
for him to do. The defendant was in the workshop working on a Volvo dumper truck. He told Mr Gardner 
that he should go home and then shouted to an employee, Mr Ralph, who was in the yard, to bring a 
JCB down into the workshop and park it tight up to the dumper. Mr Ralph reversed the JCB with its 
lights flashing down into the open workshop but as he approached the truck, he had to retract the 
machine's rear arm which left him with very little visibility to the rear. Mr Gardner was crushed between 
the two vehicles and sustained fatal injuries. Mr Ralph did not see Mr Gardner before the accident. T 
 
A Health and Safety Executive witness produced a leaflet entitled “Reversing vehicles”. This said that 
nearly a quarter of all deaths involving vehicles at work occur while the vehicle is reversing and that 
most happen at low speeds and could be prevented by taking some simple safety precautions. These 
included the use of a banksman to ensure safe reversing. The defendant and Mr Ralph said that they 
had never used a banksman and did not consider that one was required.  
 
The defence case was that by telling Mr Gardner to go home before the accident, by shouting an 
instruction to Mr Ralph which Mr Gardner should have been able to hear and by relying on the noise 
and lights of the JCB to alert Mr Gardner to the danger, the defendant had done all that was reasonably 
practicable. The Crown submitted he had not. He had not ensured that Mr Gardner was safely out of 
the way before returning to work on the truck and could have guided the JCB back himself. 
 
Davies, was convicted. He was fined £15,000 and ordered to pay £22,544.32 prosecution costs.  
 
Following a submission made at the close of the prosecution case, the judge, Judge Price QC, ruled 
that s.40 was compatible with the Convention and directed the jury that there was a legal (persuasive) 
burden on the defendant to prove (on the balance of probability) that it was not reasonably practicable 
for him to do more than he had in fact done.  
 
Davies appealed against this ruling – and the consequent misdirection of the jury - contending that 
s.40 is only compatible if it is read down so as to impose a mere evidential burden.  
 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that s.40 was Convention compliant as imposing a 
legal burden. 
 
“We have concluded that the imposition of a legal burden of proof in section 40 of the 1974 Act is 
justified, necessary and proportionate for the reasons which we set out below which take account of 
the various points we have discussed above. 
 
“First the Act is regulatory and its purpose is to protect the health and safety of those affected by the 
activities referred to in ss 2 to 6…   
 
“The reversal of the burden of proof takes into account the fact that duty holders are persons who have 
chosen to engage in work or commercial activity (probably for gain) and are in charge of it. They are 
not therefore unengaged or disinterested members of the public and in choosing to operate in a 
regulated sphere of activity they must be taken to have accepted the regulatory controls that go with 
it. This regulatory regime imposes a continuing duty to ensure a state of affairs, a safety standard. 
Where the enforcing authority can show that this has not been achieved it is not unjustifiable or unfair 
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to ask the duty holder who has either created or is in control of the risk to show that it was not 
reasonably practicable for him to have done more than he did to prevent or avoid it. 
 
“Before any question of reverse onus arises the prosecution must prove that the defendant owes the 
duty…  and that the safety standard… has been breached… 
 
“The reverse onus only applies to breach of the duties laid down by sections 2 to 6 of the Act. It does 
not apply to section 7 , so there is no reverse onus of proof where it is alleged that an employee has 
breached his duty. The same applies to section 37 where a company's officers may be convicted if the 
company has committed an offence and they are proved to have consented, connived at or contributed 
to it by neglect. This suggests that Parliament must have considered when a reverse onus was justified 
and when it was not. Due regard must be paid to its choice. 
 
“The facts relied on in support of the defence should not be difficult to prove because they will be within 
the knowledge of the defendant. Whether the defendant should have done more will be judged 
objectively. 
 
“If all the defendant had to do was raise the defence to require the prosecution to disprove it, the focus 
of the statutory scheme would be changed. The trial would become focused on what it was the 
enforcing authority was saying should have been done rather than on what the defendant had done 
or ought to have done which is what Parliament intended.” per Tuckey LJ paras 23-28 
 
6.12 R v. Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 
 
It is a defence for someone charged with trademark infringement to prove that he believed on 
reasonable grounds that he was not committing such an infringement. The House of Lords 
stated obiter that it was not incompatible with Article 6 to place the burden of proving this on 
the defendant, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove that he had no such grounds. 
 
Robert Johnstone was found guilty of trademark infringement having been discovered with over 1,000 
bootleg copies of recordings by well-known artistes with their names on the labels. 
 
He successfully appealed on the basis that he had not infringed the trademarks of the performers 
merely by having their names on the discs and tapes: their names were not their trademarks. 
 
The House of Lords considered obiter whether the defence afforded by the Trade Marks Act 1994, 
s.92 (5) was compatible with Article 6. This provides that: 
 
It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that he believed on 
reasonable grounds that the use of the sign in the manner in which it was used, or was to be used, 
was not an infringement of the registered trade mark. 
 
The requirement for the defendant to show what he believed seems to be a clear reversal of the burden 
of proof, and as such would prima facie be incompatible with the ECHR. However, Lord Nicholls opined 
that partly because the crime was so serious, it was fair and proportionate to place this burden on the 
defendant. (Contrast this with Lord Steyn’s logic in R. v. Lambert, Ali and Jordan [2002] 2 AC 545). 
 
“First, I entertain no doubt that, unless this interpretation is incompatible with article 6(2) of the 
Convention, section 92(5) should be interpreted as imposing on the accused person the burden of 
proving the relevant facts on the balance of probability. Unless he proves these facts, he does not 
make good the defence provided by section 92(5). The contrary interpretation of section 92(5) involves 
substantial rewriting of the subsection. It would not be sufficient to read the subsection as meaning 
that it is a defence for a person charged to raise an issue on the facts in question. That would not be 
sufficient, because raising an issue does not provide the person charged with a defence. It provides 
him with a defence only if, he having raised an issue, the prosecution then fails to disprove the relevant 
facts beyond reasonable doubt. I do not believe section 92(5) can be so read. I do not believe that is 
what Parliament intended. 
 
“The question which next arises is whether this interpretation, namely, that section 92(5) imposes a 
“legal” or “persuasive” onus on the person charged, is compatible with the presumption of innocence 
contained in article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Prima facie this interpretation 
derogates from that principle. That much is clear. On this interpretation section 92(5) sets out facts a 
defendant must establish if he is to avoid conviction. These facts are presumed against him unless he 
establishes the contrary. 
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“That is not the end of the matter. The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that the 
Convention does not, in principle, prohibit presumptions of fact or law. What article 6(2) requires is 
that they must be confined within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is 
at stake and maintain the rights of the defence: Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 , 388, para 
28. Thus, as elsewhere in the Convention, a reasonable balance has to be held between the public 
interest and the interests of the individual. In each case it is for the state to show that the balance held 
in the legislation is reasonable. The derogation from the presumption of innocence requires 
justification. 
 
“Identifying the requirements of a reasonable balance is not as easy as might seem. One is seeking 
to balance incommensurables. At the heart of the difficulty is the paradox noted by Sachs J in State v 
Coetzee [1997] 2 LRC 593, 677, para 220: the more serious the crime and the greater the public 
interest in securing convictions of the guilty, the more important the constitutional protection of the 
accused becomes. In the face of this paradox all that can be said is that for a reverse burden of proof 
to be acceptable there must be a compelling reason why it is fair and reasonable to deny the accused 
person the protection normally guaranteed to everyone by the presumption of innocence. 
 
“The relevant factors to be take into account when considering whether such a reason exists have 
been considered in several recent authorities, in particular the decisions of the House in R v Director 
of Public Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 and R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545. And 
there is now a lengthening list of decisions of the Court of Appeal and other courts in respect of 
particular statutory provisions. A sound starting point is to remember that if an accused is required to 
prove a fact on the balance of probability to avoid conviction, this permits a conviction in spite of the 
fact-finding tribunal having a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused: see Dickson CJ in R v 
Whyte (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 481, 493. This consequence of a reverse burden of proof should colour 
one's approach when evaluating the reasons why it is said that, in the absence of a persuasive burden 
on the accused, the public interest will be prejudiced to an extent which justifies placing a persuasive 
burden on the accused. The more serious the punishment which may flow from conviction, the more 
compelling must be the reasons.  
 
“The extent and nature of the factual matters required to be proved by the accused, and their 
importance relative to the matters required to be proved by the prosecution, have to be taken into 
account. So also does the extent to which the burden on the accused relates to facts which, if they 
exist, are readily provable by him as matters within his own knowledge or to which he has ready 
access. 
 
“In evaluating these factors, the court's role is one of review. Parliament, not the court, is charged with 
the primary responsibility for deciding, as a matter of policy, what should be the constituent elements 
of a criminal offence. I echo the words of Lord Woolf in Attorney General of Hong Kong v Lee 
Kwong-kut [1993] AC 951, 975: “In order to maintain the balance between the individual and the 
society as a whole, rigid and inflexible standards should not be imposed on the legislature's attempts 
to resolve the difficult and intransigent problems with which society is faced when seeking to deal with 
serious crime.” 
 
The court will reach a different conclusion from the legislature only when it is apparent the legislature 
has attached insufficient importance to the fundamental right of an individual to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty. 
 
“I turn to section 92 (1) Counterfeiting is fraudulent trading. It is a serious contemporary problem. 
Counterfeiting has adverse economic effects on genuine trade. It also has adverse effects on 
consumers, in terms of quality of goods and, sometimes, on the health or safety of consumers. The 
Commission of the European Communities has noted the scale of this “widespread phenomenon with 
a global impact”: Green Paper, Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Single Market, COM (98) 
569 final, para 1.1. Urgent steps are needed to combat counterfeiting and piracy: see the Green Paper 
and its follow-up, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the Economic and Social Committee COM (2000) 789 final. Protection of consumers and honest 
manufacturers and traders from counterfeiting is an important policy consideration. (2) The offences 
created by section 92 have rightly been described as offences of “near absolute liability”. The 
prosecution is not required to prove intent to infringe a registered trade mark. (3) The offences attract 
a serious level of punishment: a maximum penalty on indictment of an unlimited fine or imprisonment 
for up to 10 years or both, together with the possibility of confiscation and deprivation orders. (4) Those 
who trade in brand products are aware of the need to be on guard against counterfeit goods. They are 
aware of the need to deal with reputable suppliers and keep records and of the risks they take if they 
do not. (5) The section 92(5) defence relates to facts within the accused person's own knowledge: his 
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state of mind, and the reasons why he held the belief in question. His sources of supply are known to 
him. (6) Conversely, by and large it is to be expected that those who supply traders with counterfeit 
products, if traceable at all by outside investigators, are unlikely to be co-operative. So, in practice, if 
the prosecution must prove that a trader acted dishonestly, fewer investigations will be undertaken 
and fewer prosecutions will take place. 
 
“In my view factors (4) and (6) constitute compelling reasons why the section 92(5) defence should 
place a persuasive burden on the accused person. Taking all the factors mentioned above into 
account, these reasons justify the loss of protection which will be suffered by the individual. Given the 
importance and difficulty of combating counterfeiting, and given the comparative ease with which an 
accused can raise an issue about his honesty, overall it is fair and reasonable to require a trader, 
should need arise, to prove on the balance of probability that he honestly and reasonably believed the 
goods were genuine. 
 
“For these reasons, which are substantially the same as those given by Rose LJ in R v S (Trade mark 
defence) [2003] 1 Cr App R 602 , I consider the persuasive burden placed on an accused person by 
the section 92(5) defence is compatible with article 6(2).” per Lord Nicholls paras 46-53 
 
6.13 DPP v. Barker [2004] EWHC 2502 (Admin) Case Stated 
 
Where a statute prohibited driving without a valid licence, it was wholly proportionate to require 
the defendant to produce the licence. 
 
Barker was charged with driving a motor vehicle while disqualified contrary to s.103 of the Road Traffic 
Act 1988. On an earlier occasion he had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence 
for 12 months and further disqualified until he passed an extended driving test, pursuant to s.34 and 
s.36 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The 12 months had elapsed by the time of the offence, 
but he was still subject to the requirement to pass the test.  
 
At the magistrates' court, the justices found as a fact that the defendant had been driving. However, 
they ruled that the burden was on the prosecution to establish that the defendant had not obtained a 
licence and was not, in fact, driving in accordance with the terms of such a licence so as to fall within 
the exemption provided by s.37(3) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. The prosecution appealed 
by way of case stated. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal, the burden fell upon a defendant to show that he not only had a provisional 
licence, but was driving in accordance with the conditions of such a licence pursuant to s.37(3). Section 
101 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, which provided that if a defendant for his defence relied on 
any exemption the burden lay on him of proving that exemption, applied.  
 
That burden was wholly proportionate since: 
 
• It was one which was easily discharged by him producing the licence which had been issued.  
• it would be quite impossible in some cases for the prosecution to establish that any passenger 
was the holder of a licence himself and thus qualified to be supervising the driver.  
• In the absence of any information from the defendant as to the identity of the passenger, the 
prosecution would be in no position at all to know that.  
 
In the present case, the absence of any such evidence meant that, as the justices were satisfied that 
he was the driver, they should have convicted him. Accordingly, the matter was remitted back to them 
with a direction to convict. 
 
6.14 Sheldrake v. DPP [2005] 1 AC 264 
 
It is a defence for someone charged with being in charge of a vehicle whilst over the alcohol 
limit to prove that there was no likelihood of his driving the vehicle whilst over the limit. The 
House of Lords stated obiter that it was not incompatible with Article 6 to place the burden of 
proving this on the defendant, rather than requiring the prosecution to prove that there was 
such a likelihood. 
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The Road Traffic Act 1988, s 5 provides: 
 
Driving or being in charge of a motor vehicle with alcohol concentration above prescribed limit. 
 
(1) If a person— 
(a) drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, or 
(b) is in charge of a motor vehicle on a road or other public place, 
after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath, blood or urine exceeds the 
prescribed limit he is guilty of an offence. 
 
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1)(b) above to prove that at 
the time he is alleged to have committed the offence the circumstances were such that there was no 
likelihood of his driving the vehicle whilst the proportion of alcohol in his breath, blood or urine remained 
likely to exceed the prescribed limit. 
 
Sheldrake was convicted under s.5 (1)(b), and appealed on the basis that the defence under section 
5(2), which cast upon the defendant the burden of proving that there was no likelihood of his driving 
the vehicle while over the limit, was not compliant with the presumption of innocence guaranteed by 
article 6(2). 
 
It was held that it was so compliant. 
 
(1) The justifiability and fairness of provisions which imposed a burden of proof on a defendant in a 
criminal trial had to be judged in the particular context of each case, and the court's task was to decide 
whether Parliament had unjustifiably infringed the presumption of innocence; that the overriding 
concern was that a trial should be fair, and the presumption of innocence was a fundamental right 
directed to that end; that the Convention did not outlaw presumptions of fact or law but required that 
they should be kept within reasonable limits and should not be arbitrary; that it was open to states to 
define the constituent elements of a criminal offence, excluding the requirement of mens rea; but that 
the substance and effect of any presumption adverse to a defendant had to be examined on all the 
facts and circumstances of a particular provision and had to be reasonable; and that relevant to any 
judgment on reasonableness or proportionality would be the opportunity given to the defendant to 
rebut the presumption, maintenance of the rights of the defence, flexibility in application of the 
presumption, retention by the court of a power to assess the evidence, the importance of what was at 
stake and the difficulty which a prosecutor might find in the absence of a presumption. 
 
(2) That section 5(2) of the 1988 Act imposed a legal burden on a defendant who was charged with 
an offence contrary to section 5(1)(b) and was directed to a legitimate objective, namely the prevention 
of death, injury and damage caused by unfit drivers; that the offence under section 5(1)(b) did not 
require proof that the defendant was likely to drive whilst unfit, but the defendant was given the 
opportunity by section 5(2) to exonerate himself if he could show that there was no such likelihood; 
that the likelihood of the defendant driving was a matter so closely conditioned by his own knowledge 
and state of mind at the material time as to make it much more appropriate for him to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that he would not have been likely to drive than for the prosecution to prove, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that he would; that the imposition of a legal burden upon the defendant did 
not go beyond what was necessary and reasonable, and was not in any way arbitrary; and that, 
accordingly, the defendant's conviction of an offence under section 5(1)(b) resulting from a failure to 
establish a defence under section 5(2) could not be regarded as unfair. 
 
6.15 R v. Chargot [2009] 1 WLR 1 (HL) 
 
The case upheld the decision in R v. Davies (David Janway) (2002) (6.11 above) in holding that 
s.40 of the HSWA 1974 legitimately places the legal burden of proving the defence onto the 
defendant.  
 
It is interesting to note that by the time of this case, the maximum penalty for breach of the HSWA 
1974 had substantially increased since the time of R v. Davies, where the purely regulatory nature of 
the offence had been a key factor. It is now possible to get up to two years' imprisonment and an 
unlimited fine.10 However, Lord Hope did not think that significantly shifted the balance of 
proportionality. 
 
 
10 Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008, section 1(1) and (2) and Schedule 1 .  
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“The penalties that may be imposed on an individual have now been increased... But I do not think 
that, when account is taken of the purposes that this legislation is intended to serve, this alteration in 
the law renders what was previously proportionate disproportionate.” per Lord Hope, para 30 
 
On 10 January 2003 Shaun Riley was working for Chargot Ltd, at Heskin Hall Farm, near Chorley in 
Lancashire. Extensive works were being carried out on the farm, which was owned by the Ruttle group 
of companies. Ruttle Contracting Ltd, a member of the group, was the principal contractor. The works 
included the construction of a car park. This required the excavation from the site of a quantity of 
topsoil. A dumper truck was then used to move the spoil over a distance of about 500 yards to a 
depression in a field, beside which a ramp had been created to provide the dumper truck with a means 
of access. 
 
During the previous day and for part of the morning on the day in question the dumper truck was driven 
by another employee. But he left the farm after receiving a telephone call telling him that his mother 
had been injured in a road accident. Shaun Riley was asked by the foreman to take over the driving 
of it. He made two trips carrying spoil from the car park to the depression without incident.  
 
While he was making a further trip that afternoon he met with an accident. The dumper truck tipped 
over on its side and he was buried by the load of spoil that he was transporting. It was some time 
before he could be pulled out, and attempts to revive him were unsuccessful. He died the following 
day in hospital. 
 
Criminal proceedings were brought against Chargot Ltd, alleging a breach of section 2(1) of the Act. 
The case against it was that it had failed to ensure, so far as was reasonably practicable, the health 
and safety at work of its employees. As the operations were under its control, Ruttle Contracting Ltd 
was also prosecuted. In its case the allegation was that there had been a breach of section 3(1). This 
was because it had failed to conduct the undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as was 
reasonably practicable, that persons not in its employment who might be affected thereby were not 
exposed to risks to their health and safety.  
 
The defendants maintained, pursuant to section 40 of the Act, that they had done everything that was 
reasonably practicable to ensure the safety of the deceased and other workers. 
 
On 10 November 2006 the defendants were found guilty of the charges that had been brought against 
them. The Chargot Ltd was fined £75,000 and ordered to pay £37,500 costs. Ruttle Contracting Ltd 
was fined £100,000 and ordered to pay £75,000 costs.  
 
They appealed on the ground that the prosecution had failed to identify the scope of the duty alleged 
to have been breached by reference to criticisms of the way in which the work had been conducted. 
The appeals were dismissed by both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. 
 
On the issue of the reversal of the legal burden in s.40, Lord Hope said this: 
 
“Section 40 imposes a reverse burden of proof on the employer. In Sheldrake v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2005] 1 AC 264 , para 21, Lord Bingham of Cornhill said that the justifiability of any 
infringement of the presumption of any innocence cannot be resolved by any rule of thumb, but on 
examination of all the facts and circumstances of the particular provision as applied in the particular 
case.  
 
“He drew attention, in para 30, to the difference between the subject matter in R. v. Lambert [2002] 2 
AC 545 on the one hand, where it was held that the imposition of a legal burden on the defendant 
undermined the presumption of innocence, and R. v. Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 on the other, 
where it was held that there were compelling reasons why there should be a legal burden. In the former 
case, where section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 was in issue, a defendant might be entirely 
ignorant of what he was carrying. In the latter, offences under section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 
1994 are committed by dealers, traders and market operators who could reasonably be expected to 
exercise some care about the provenance of goods in which they deal. It seems to me that the situation 
in which the reverse burden imposed by section 40 of the 1974 Act arises is analogous to that in R. v. 
Johnstone . Sections 2 and 3 impose duties on employers who may reasonably be expected to 
accept the general principles on which those sections are based and to have the means of fulfilling 
that responsibility. 
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“In R. v. Davies (David Janway) [2003] ICR 586 the judge ruled against a submission that section 
40 was not compatible with the presumption of innocence in article 6(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights unless the section was read down so as to impose only an evidential burden on the 
employer. His decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. Delivering the judgment of the court, 
Tuckey LJ said that it had concluded that the imposition of a legal burden of proof was justified, 
necessary and proportionate. Regard had to be had to the fact that the Act's purpose was both social 
and economic, to the fact that duty holders were persons who had chosen to engage in work or 
commercial activity and were in charge of it and that in choosing to operate in a regulated sphere they 
must be taken to have accepted the regulatory controls that went with it. … 
 
“In my opinion the Court of Appeal reached the right decision in that case, and it did so essentially for 
the right reasons.” per Lord Hope, paras 28-30 
 
6.16 R. v. Williams (Orette) [2012] EWCA Crim 2162 
 
It is an offence to possess an imitation fire-arm without a licence if it is readily convertible into 
a live fire-arm. Under s.1(5) of the Firearms Act 1982, it is a defence to such a charge that you 
did not know and had no reason to suspect that it could be so converted.  
 
It was held by the Court of Appeal that this section imposed a legal burden on the defendant 
which was Convention compliant. 
 
Orette Williams was found guilty of possessing a prohibited weapon, contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the 
Firearms Act 1968 (as amended). He was sent to prison for five years.  
 
The relevant weapon was an imitation 9 mm calibre gun, capable of firing blanks, which was readily 
convertible into a live firearm.  
 
Under the Firearms Act 1982, there is a defence to a charge of possessing such a weapon, as follows: 
 
s.1. (5) In any proceedings brought by virtue of this section for an offence under the 1968 Act involving 
an imitation firearm to which this Act applies, it shall be a defence for the accused to show that he did 
not know and had no reason to suspect that the imitation firearm was so constructed or adapted as to 
be readily convertible into a firearm to which section 1 of that Act applies. 
 
The question arose as to whether this section legitimately imposed a legal burden of proof on the 
defendant, so that it was up to him to prove (on the balance of probabilities) that he did not know that 
the imitation firearm could be readily converted, rather than simply creating an evidential burden on 
him to show that such a defence might apply, which the prosecution would then have to refute. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the legal burden was indeed on the defendant. 
 
“In our judgment, there are compelling reasons for concluding that section 1(5) imposes a legal burden 
on the defendant. 
 
“Firearms offences—any firearms offences—are a very serious problem. Where those firearms stand 
to be lethal—as in the case of readily convertible imitation firearms—the need for protection of the 
public is obvious. That is reflected by the (legitimate) creation of a number of strict liability offences in 
this context… In circumstances where, nevertheless, Parliament has, by section 1(5) of the 1982 Act, 
considered it appropriate that a defence of lack of knowledge or reason to suspect in such cases be 
available it is, in our judgment, justified and proportionate that the legal burden of such defence—a 
defence made available as an exception or modification to the strict liability approach—be placed on 
the accused. 
 
“Further, the question of knowledge (or lack of it) involves facts readily available to the accused—he 
knows the circumstances in which and from whom he obtained the item. Likewise, as to the issue of 
whether he “had no reason to suspect” that the imitation firearm was so constructed or adapted as to 
be readily convertible. No great difficulty is placed in the way of a defendant in that regard. On the 
other hand, it could be very difficult indeed for prosecutors, and would be a real deterrent to 
prosecution let alone successful prosecution, if the burden were placed on the Crown to obtain the 
necessary evidence to disprove a case that the accused had neither knowledge nor reason to suspect. 
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“Moreover, if the prosecution have first proved to the criminal standard that a person was (in fact) in 
possession of an imitation firearm which was (in fact) readily convertible into a lethal firearm, that is a 
scenario sufficiently out of the norm such that there is no obvious unfairness or unreasonableness in 
then requiring the possessor to, as it were, justify himself for possessing such an item. 
 
“That the maximum sentence is (no more than) ten years is also at least consistent with a conclusion 
that the imposition of a legal reverse burden is, striking the balance, to be justified as a necessary, 
reasonable and proportionate derogation of the presumption of innocence. And that is our conclusion. 
Accordingly, the appeal on this ground fails.” paras 40-44 
 
6.17 Professional Standards for Health and Social Care v. Nursing and Midwifery Council [2018] 
EWHC 70 (Admin) 
 
Where there is readily available evidence to support an allegation, a claim of ‘no case to 
answer’ should not succeed if the prosecutor has simply not bothered to amass it. 
 
 This recent case raises the issue from a different perspective.  
 
A disciplinary body – the Nursing and Midwifery Council - operating under the National Health Service 
Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002, refused to proceed against a midwife in a fitness to 
practise hearing, claiming that there was insufficient evidence against her and that there was therefore 
no case for her to answer. This was despite the fact that the nurse in question was under suspicion of 
causing multiple fractures to her own baby. She had been suspended by the NHS Trust; and a Family 
Court hearing had found that both parents were potential perpetrators of the injuries, and that they had 
both failed to protect the baby.  
 
 The decision of the NMC not proceed was held to be wrong in law. There was clearly a case for the 
nurse to answer. The reason they did not have sufficient evidence to proceed with the case was that 
they had simply made no effort to collect any! 
 
6.18 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
 
Section 11: The “reasonableness” test. 
 
(5) lt is for those claiming that a contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness to 
show that it does. 
 
7 REVERSING THE EVIDENTIAL BURDEN 
 
i.  The Common Law Defences 
 
7.1 The evidential burden is usually on the person bringing the case, which in criminal cases will always 
be the prosecution. However, there is sometimes also an evidential burden on the defendant in relation 
to specific defences, which will only be entertained by the court if there is some evidence of them.  
 
7.2 This does not alter the evidential burden on the prosecution in establishing that a crime has been 
committed at all; nor does it alter the legal burden on the prosecution to prove the case against the 
defendant beyond all reasonable doubt, which may require them in practice to rebut the defendant’s 
claim with further evidence. 
 
ii.   Self-Defence 
 
7.3 In cases where the defences of self-defence or justification are raised the onus of proof of the guilt of 
the accused remains throughout on the prosecution. That does not mean that the prosecution must 
give evidence-in-chief to rebut a suggestion of self-defence before that issue is raised, or, indeed, 
need give any evidence on the subject at all.  
 
7.4 If an issue relating to self-defence is to be left to the jury there must be some evidence from which a 
jury would be entitled to find that issue in favour of the accused, but there is a difference between 
leading evidence which would enable a jury to find an issue in favour of the accused and in putting the 
onus upon him.  
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7.5 The jury must come to a verdict on the whole of the evidence that has been laid before them: if on a 
consideration of all the evidence the jury are left in doubt whether the killing or wounding may not have 
been in self-defence the proper verdict would be not guilty. 
 
7.6 R. v. Lobell [1957] 1 QB 547 (CA) 
 
The appellant, Harry Lazarus Lobell, was charged at Manchester Crown Court with wounding with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm. There had been bad blood and enmity between the appellant, who 
was a wholesale butcher and had a stall in a meat market, and the complainant, one Evans. There 
was evidence of threats which had been uttered by Evans against the appellant; he had on a previous 
occasion, with a knife in his hand, said he would kill Evans, who had retorted that if the appellant 
moved his arm, he would break it.  
 
On the day of the wounding, it was said that Evans approached the appellant uttering threats, that the 
latter then threw a brick at Evans who, however, continued to advance towards him in a threatening 
manner, whereupon the appellant picked up a knife, which he said he had brought for his protection, 
and stabbed him. He then drove off to the police station and said that he had stabbed a man in self-
defence. 
 
At the trial the sole defence set up by the appellant was that in inflicting the wound he was acting in 
self-defence.  
 
Jones J., summing up, directed the jury, and several times stressed, that it was for the defence to 
establish that plea to their satisfaction. The jury convicted the appellant and he appealed on the 
grounds that the judge's direction that the burden of proving this defence was on the accused was 
erroneous, and also that the judge did not direct the jury that the degree of proof required from the 
defence was of a less degree than that required from the prosecution. 
 
The conviction was quashed.  
 
The Court of Appeal held that a proper direction would have been to tell the jury that the burden of 
establishing guilt was on the prosecution throughout, but that they must also consider the evidence for 
the defence which might either convince them of the innocence of the accused or cause them to doubt, 
in which case he was entitled to an acquittal; or which might, as it sometimes did, strengthen the 
case for the prosecution; and that, as the court did not feel satisfied that if the correct direction had 
been given the jury would have been sure to have convicted, the conviction must be quashed. 
 
“In the opinion of the court the cases of Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
and Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions establish that in murder or manslaughter the rule 
that the onus is on the prosecution permits of no exception except as to proof of insanity…  
 
“It must, however, be understood that maintaining the rule that the onus always remains on the 
prosecution does not mean that the Crown must give evidence-in-chief to rebut a suggestion of self-
defence before that issue is raised, or indeed need give any evidence on the subject at all. If an issue 
relating to self-defence is to be left to the jury there must be some evidence from which a jury would 
be entitled to find that issue in favour of the accused, and ordinarily no doubt such evidence would be 
given by the defence.  
 
“But there is a difference between leading evidence which would enable a jury to find an issue in favour 
of a defendant and in putting the onus upon him. The truth is that the jury must come to a verdict on 
the whole of the evidence that has been laid before them. If on a consideration of all the evidence the 
jury are left in doubt whether the killing or wounding may not have been in self-defence the proper 
verdict would be not guilty.  
 
“A convenient way of directing the jury is to tell them that the burden of establishing guilt is on the 
prosecution, but that they must also consider the evidence for the defence which may have one of 
three results: it may convince them of the innocence of the accused, or it may cause them to doubt, in 
which case the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, or it may and sometimes does strengthen the case 
for the prosecution. It is perhaps a fine distinction to say that before a jury can find a particular issue 
in favour of an accused person he must give some evidence on which it can be found but none the 
less the onus remains on the prosecution; what it really amounts to is that if in the result the jury are 
left in doubt where the truth lies the verdict should be not guilty, and this is as true of an issue as to 
self-defence as it is to one of provocation, though of course the latter plea goes only to a mitigation of 
the offence.  
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“Had the judge in the present case gone on to say that it was not for the accused to establish his plea 
with the same degree of certainty as is necessary to establish a case for the prosecution it might have 
been that we should have had to consider whether this was a case for the application of the proviso. 
There was certainly here material on which a jury might have found self-defence. But that it was the 
duty of the accused to satisfy them on this point was on several occasions stressed in the summing-
up and we do not feel by any means satisfied that if what we now hold was the correct direction had 
been given the jury would be sure to have convicted. For these reasons we quashed the conviction at 
the close of the argument.” per Lord Goddard CJ 
 
iii.   Duress 
 
7.7 R. v. Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841 (Court of Criminal Appeal) 
 
Gill was a conspirator in a case involving the theft of a lorry and its load from his employer. His defence 
rested on a claim of duress, in that when he refused to cooperate with the other villains, they 
threatened physical violence both to him and to his wife, one of them flourishing a crowbar and another 
showing him a bottle of petrol, and in great fear for the safety of his wife and himself he obeyed their 
orders to accompany them to his employers' premises. 
 
The judge directed the jury as follows:  
 
“I must direct you that, in law, there is such a defence open to the defendant, but he has got to satisfy 
you that the threat was such and he was in such fear that he really lost all will of his own, that he was 
not acting of his own volition, of his own will… I have to remind you that the burden of proof remains 
throughout on the prosecution… If on the whole of the evidence, you are left in a real doubt about this 
you would find for the defendant and say ‘not guilty.’ If, on the whole of the evidence, you are satisfied 
that he did intend to do that act and his mind went with it, then he would be guilty.” 
 
Gill appealed on the basis that the judge had wrongly directed the jury that it was for the defence to 
establish that he was acting under duress and that it was therefore the defence rather than the 
prosecution which had the legal burden of proof. 
 
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that there was an evidential burden on the defendant in relation to 
this defence, and that the judge made this clear in his direction. 
 
“In our judgment, the law on this matter is to be found correctly stated in Dr. Glanville Williams' Criminal 
Law, 2nd ed. (1961), p. 762, in this way: “… although it is convenient to call duress a ‘defence,’ this 
does not mean that the ultimate (persuasive) burden of proving it is on the accused. … But the accused 
must raise the defence by sufficient evidence to go to the jury; in other words, the evidential burden is 
on him.” 
 
“The Crown are not called upon to anticipate such a defence and destroy it in advance. The defendant, 
either by the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by evidence called on his behalf, or 
by a combination of the two, must place before the court such material as makes duress a live issue 
fit and proper to be left to the jury. But, once he has succeeded in doing this, it is then for the Crown 
to destroy that defence in such a manner as to leave in the jury's minds no reasonable doubt that the 
accused cannot be absolved on the grounds of the alleged compulsion.” per Edmund Davies J. 
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E THE STANDARDS OF PROOF 
 
8  BEYOND ALL REASONABLE DOUBT 
 
8.1 Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 
 
“Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would 
fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the 
evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be 
dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible, but not in the least probable,” the case is proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.” per Lord Denning 
 
8.2 R. v. Yap Chuan Ching (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 7 (Court of Appeal) 
 
“Nevertheless, in most cases… judges would be well advised not to attempt any gloss upon what is 
meant by “sure” or what is meant by “reasonable doubt.” … Experience in this Court has shown that 
such comments usually create difficulties. They are more likely to confuse than help… We point out 
and emphasise that if judges stopped trying to define that which is almost impossible to define there 
would be fewer appeals.”  Lawton LJ 
 
8.3 Ferguson v. The Queen [1979] 1 WLR 94 [Privy Council: Grenada] 
 
“The time-honoured formula is that the jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. As Dixon C.J. 
said in Dawson v. The Queen (1961) 106 C.L.R. 1 , 18, attempts to substitute other expressions have 
never prospered. It is generally sufficient and safe to direct a jury that they must be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt so that they feel sure of the defendant's guilt. Nevertheless, other words will suffice, 
so long as the message is clear. In the present case, the jury could have been under no illusion. The 
importance of being sure was repeatedly emphasised. The judge thrust it home when, abandoning the 
language of the law for homely metaphors with which the jury would have been well familiar, he said 
that the prosecution had to satisfy them that the defendant's alibi could not “stand the light of day or 
hold water, or, if you prefer more dignified language, be entertained.” Lord Scarman p.98 
 
8.4 R. v. Abdul Majid [2009] EWCA Crim 2563 
 
“Any question from the jury dealing with the standard of proof is one that most judges dread. To have 
to define what is meant by “reasonable doubt” or what is meant by “being sure” requires an answer 
difficult to articulate and likely to confuse. No doubt that is why the Judicial Studies Board seeks to 
avoid it in the direction they give to judges.”  Moses LJ at para 12 
 
9 THE BALANCE OF PROBABILITIES 
 
9.1 Miller v. Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372 
 
“[The degree of cogency required to discharge a burden in a civil case] is well settled. It must carry a 
reasonable degree of probability, but not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is 
such that the tribunal can say: “We think it more probable than not,” the burden is discharged, but, if 
the probabilities are equal, it is not.”  per Lord Denning 
 
9.2 Re H (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] AC 56 
 
“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event occurred if the court 
considers that, on the evidence, the occurrence of the event was more likely than not.  When assessing 
the probabilities, the court will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the 
particular case, that the more serious the allegation the less likely it is that the event occurred and, 
hence, the stronger should be the evidence before the court concludes that the allegation is 
established on the balance of probability…  Built into the preponderance of probability standard is a 
generous degree of flexibility in respect of the seriousness of the allegation.  Although the result is 
much the same, this does not mean that where a serious allegation is in issue the standard of proof 
required is higher.” per Lord Nicholls 
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F CONFESSION EVIDENCE 
 
10  INTRODUCTION TO CONFESSIONS 
 
i.  Introduction 
 
10.1 Confession evidence can be vital to a prosecution. Indeed, it can (albeit rarely) be the only evidence 
leading to a conviction. However, there are various problems that can arise from confession evidence. 
Quite apart from the fact that a reported confession is technically hearsay, there is both the possibility 
that a confession may have been extracted from the defendant unlawfully; and that it might otherwise 
be unreliable, as people placed in extraordinary situations may well say extraordinary (and untrue) 
things, even if by doing so they implicated themselves in a crime. 
 
Lam Chi-ming v. The Queen [1991] 2 AC 212 (Privy Council) 
 
“Their Lordships are of the view that the more recent English cases established that the rejection of 
an improperly obtained confession is not dependent only upon possible unreliability but also upon the 
principle that a man cannot be compelled to incriminate himself and upon the importance that attaches 
in a civilised society to proper behaviour by the police towards those in their custody.”  
per Lord Griffiths at p.220 
 
ii.   The Judges’ Rules (Historical Background) 
 
10.2 One problem with confessions – and police evidence in general – was that different police authorities 
would use different methods of collecting evidence, which might well turn out to be inadmissible once 
it got to court. 
 
10.3 Although the first professional police force was established in Glasgow in 1800, it was not until Robert 
Peel’s Metropolitan Police Act 1829 that there was established a full-time, professional and centrally-
organised police force for the greater London area known as the Metropolitan Police. Legislation in the 
1830s introduced policing in boroughs and many counties and, in the 1850s, policing was established 
nationally. 
 
10.4 By the end of the 19th century, a wide divergence in practice had arisen among the different police 
forces, despite the best efforts of such people as Sir Howard Vincent, the first Director of Criminal 
Investigation in 1878, who published an informal guide to proper police behaviour called the Police 
Code and Manual of Criminal Law. 
 
10.5 In 1912, the Home Secretary requested the judges of the King’s Bench to give English police 
forces guidance on the procedures that they should follow in detaining and questioning suspects, 
which they did by way of publishing ‘The Judges’ Rules’. These were not rules of law, but rather rules 
of practice for the guidance of the police, setting out the kinds of conduct that could cause a judge to 
exercise discretion to exclude evidence, in the interests of a fair trial. 
 
10.6 R v. Voisin [1918] 1 KB 531 
 
The appellant, Louis Marie Joseph Voisin, a Frenchman, was tried at the Central Criminal Court before 
Darling J., for the murder of a woman named Emilienne Gerard.  
 
The trunk of the body of the murdered woman had been found in a parcel in Regent Square, a piece 
of paper with the words “Bladie Belgiam” upon it being also found in the parcel. The police, in the 
course of their investigations, requested the appellant to go to Bow Street Police Station and account 
for his movements at the supposed time of the murder. He made a statement which was taken down 
in writing.  
 
He was afterwards asked whether he had any objection to write the words “Bloody Belgian.” He said, 
“Not at all,” and then wrote the words “Bladie Belgiam.” The appellant was not cautioned by the police 
before he made the statement or wrote the words. At that time the head and hands of the murdered 
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woman had not been discovered and the trunk had not been identified, and the police, although they 
were detaining the appellant in custody for inquiries, had not decided to charge him with the crime.  
 
It was contended at the trial that the writing with the words “Bladie Belgiam” upon it was inadmissible 
in evidence on the ground that it was obtained by the police without having first cautioned the appellant 
and while he was in custody, the writing, however, was admitted as evidence. The jury found the 
appellant guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to death. 
 
On appeal, the Court found that the evidence was not obtained in a way which conflicted with the 
Judges’ Rules, and was therefore admissible. 
 
“It cannot be said as a matter of law that the absence of a caution makes the statement inadmissible; 
it may tend to show that the person was not upon his guard as to the importance of what he was saying 
or as to its bearing upon some charge of which he has not been informed. In this case the prisoner 
wrote these words quite voluntarily. The mere fact that the words were written at the request of police 
officers, or that he was being detained at Bow Street, does not make the writing inadmissible in 
evidence. Those facts do not tend to change the character of handwriting, nor do they explain the 
resemblance between his handwriting and that upon the label, or account for the same misspellings 
occurring in both. There was nothing in the nature of a “trap” or of the “manufacture of evidence”; the 
identity of the deceased woman had not at this moment been established, and the police, though they 
were detaining the prisoner in custody for inquiries, had not then decided to charge him with this crime; 
indeed, if the writing had turned out other than it did and other circumstances had not subsequently 
transpired, it is certain that he, like others who were similarly detained, would have been discharged. 
It is desirable in the interests of the community that investigations into crime should not be cramped. 
The Court is of opinion that they would be most unduly cramped if it were to be held that a writing 
voluntarily made under the circumstances here proved was inadmissible in evidence… 
 
“It may be, and often is, a ground for the judge in his discretion excluding the evidence; but he should 
do so only if he thinks the statement was not a voluntary one in the sense above mentioned, or was 
an unguarded answer made under circumstances that rendered it unreliable, or unfair for some reason 
to be allowed in evidence against the prisoner. Even if we disagreed with the mode in which the judge 
had in this case exercised his discretion, which we do not, we should not be entitled to overrule his 
decision on appeal. This was evidence admissible in law, and it could not be fairly inferred from the 
other circumstances that it was not voluntary. 
 
“In 1912 the judges, at the request of the Home Secretary, drew up some rules as guides for police 
officers. These rules have not the force of law; they are administrative directions the observance of 
which the police authorities should enforce upon their subordinates as tending to the fair administration 
of justice. It is important that they should do so, for statements obtained from prisoners, contrary to 
the spirit of these rules, may be rejected as evidence by the judge presiding at the trial.”  
per A.T. Lawrence J. 
 
10.7 These rules were finally replaced by the statutory Codes in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, 
though PACE s.82 specifically preserves certain common law protections. 
 
10.8 If the defendant has made a confession, there are four tests given in PACE 1984 under which it might 
be excluded as evidence. 
 
1. The oppression test: s.76 (2) (a) 
2. The reliability test: s.76 (2) (b) 
3. The fairness test: s.78 
4. The common law test: s.82 (3) 
 
10.9 In considering whether the confession has been properly obtained, one should have in mind Code C, 
as promulgated under the authority of PACE. This is the Code of Practice for the detention, treatment 
and questioning of persons by Police Officers, as last revised in February 2017. 
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11 THE DEFINITION OF A CONFESSION 
 
i.  What is a Confession? 
11.1 Murphy on Evidence 
“An adverse admission relevant to the issue of guilt in a criminal case.”  
11.2 The Oxford English Dictionary  
"Exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment 
of subjects, inferiors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens." 
11.3 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s.82 (1) “confession”, includes any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, 
whether made to a person in authority or not and whether made in words or otherwise. 
 
11.4 A confession need not be a full admission of guilt, just a statement with relevance to the issue of guilt, 
which is adverse to the maker. In other words, it may help to prove guilt rather than being a complete 
admission of guilt. It can be anything which would prejudice the defendant’s case. 
11.5  A statement which prejudices the defendant in a criminal case is called ‘inculpatory’ 
11.6  A statement which favours the defendant in a criminal case is called ‘exculpatory’ 
11.7 A statement will only count as a confession if it was adverse to the defendant at the time s/he made 
the statement. If it becomes adverse retrospectively (e.g. because s/he changes the story) the original 
statement does not become a confession. 
 
11.8 R. v. Hasan [2005] 2 AC 467 
 
Aytach Hasan had worked as a driver and minder for Claire Taeger, who ran an escort agency and 
was involved in prostitution. In about July or August 1999, according to the defendant, Sullivan became 
Taeger's boyfriend and also her minder in connection with her prostitution business. He had, the 
defendant said, the reputation of being a violent man and a drug dealer. 
 
On 29 August 1999 a man living in Croydon telephoned Taeger's agency asking for the services of a 
prostitute. Hasan went to the address with a prostitute. But the client had changed his mind and 
claimed that he had not made a telephone call. Hasan insisted that a £50 cancellation fee be paid, 
and forced his way into the house, producing a knife and demanding payment. The client went upstairs 
and opened a safe, whereupon the defendant took some £4,000 from it and ran from the house. This 
incident founded the first count of aggravated burglary in the indictment later preferred against the 
defendant. But his account of the incident was quite different. He said that he had been given the £50 
fee without any threat and had taken nothing from the safe.  
 
On 23 January 2000, Hasan forced his way into the same house, armed with a knife, and attempted 
to steal the contents of the safe, He confessed to this, but claimed that he had acted under duress 
exerted by Sullivan, who had fortified his reputation for violence by talking of three murders he had 
recently committed.  
 
On 26 June 2000 Hasan had an "off the record" interview with police officers who were involved in a 
separate murder inquiry. The reason for the confidential interview was that the defendant said that he 
was in fear of Sullivan. The police agreed not to question the defendant about the burglaries. He was 
not cautioned. There was no tape recording. The police prepared a report of the interview. In the 
context of the murder inquiry, the defendant said that Sullivan only told him about the murder in late 
February or early March 2000. When made the report of the confidential interview contained nothing 
adverse to the defendant's interest in respect of the second burglary. It was either entirely exculpatory 
or entirely neutral in effect. 
 
However, there were important differences between what the defendant had said during this 
confidential interview and what he was to say at his trial. In the confidential interview the defendant 
did not say that he had taken part in the second burglary because of threats made by Sullivan against 
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himself and his family. In accordance with the police report of the confidential interview the threats had 
not been made until late February or early March 2000, that is after the second burglary.  
 
In retrospect then, the confidential interview about the murder became adverse to Hasan’s case, as it 
was inconsistent with the defence of duress he raised at the burglary trial. Hasan claimed that the 
earlier interview was therefore a confession, which could not be admitted in evidence as it had not 
been properly obtained. Whilst the Court of Appeal agreed with him, the House of Lords did not. To 
fulfil the definition of an out-of-court confession, the statement must be wholly or partly adverse to the 
maker at the time it was made. 
 
“It is wholly implausible that the draftsman would have made express reference only to wholly or partly 
adverse statements if he also had in mind covering under the definition of "confession" wholly 
exculpatory statements…The plain meaning of the statute is against such a strange interpretation. 
And it is inconceivable, on policy grounds, that the legislature would have introduced such a 
fundamental change in the law by leaving the question whether an exculpatory statement is a 
confession to depend on developments at trial… 
 
“Properly construed section 76(1), read with section 82(1), requires the court to interpret a statement 
in the light of the circumstances when it was made. A purely exculpatory statement (e g "I was not 
there") is not within the scope of section 76(1). It is not a confession within the meaning of section 76. 
The safeguards of section 76 are not applicable. But the safeguards of section 78 are available.” 
 per Lord Steyn at paras 56-58 
 
12 CONFESSIONS OBTAINED BY OPPRESSION 
 
i.   Definition of Oppression 
 
12.1 According to R. v. Fulling [1987] QB 426, ‘oppression’ is to be given its normal dictionary meaning. 
 
12.2 oppression (noun) prolonged cruel or unjust treatment or exercise of authority. 
Synonyms: persecution, abuse, maltreatment, tyranny, despotism, repression, suppression, 
subjection, subjugation, exploitation. 
 
12.3 PACE 1984, s.76 (8) 
 
In this section “oppression” includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of 
violence (whether or not amounting to torture). 
 
12.4 It does not include the ordinary ‘oppression’ or distress of simply being under arrest, as that would 
render virtually all confessions inadmissible. There would normally have to be some extra act of bad 
will by the interrogator. 
 
12.5 R. v. Fulling [1987] QB 426 
 
Ruth Fulling was arrested as part of a large investigation into insurance fraud. She was put into a 
police cell next to a woman called Christine Judge, who it was revealed to her was having an affair 
with Ruth’s lover. Ruth confessed, but later claimed that this was only to get away from being near the 
cell where Christine was, and that her confession was therefore the result of oppression. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the word oppression meant something more than just the inherent 
oppression of being in custody, and was to be given its ordinary dictionary meaning of exercise of 
authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner, unjust or cruel treatment of subjects 
or inferiors, or the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens; and that circumstances could hardly 
be envisaged in which such oppression did not entail some impropriety by the interrogator. 
 
On 6 August 1986 in the Crown Court at Leeds, Ruth Susan Fulling, was convicted by a majority of 
10 to 2 of obtaining property by deception.  
 
In September 1981 the appellant claimed some £5,665 from her insurers in respect of what she 
claimed was a burglary at her flat in Leeds. The insurance company in July 1982 paid her £5,212 in 
settlement of the claim. 
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Many months later a man called Turnpenny, an acknowledged criminal, gave to the police a mass of 
information about the activities of other criminals, which resulted in a large number of people 
being arrested, among them being the appellant. Turnpenny gave evidence that the appellant had told 
him that her "burglary" was bogus; that a man called Maddon had committed it; that she knew the 
whereabouts of the stolen property. She gave him to understand that the idea of the bogus burglary 
had been initiated by one Drewery, with whom the appellant had been living and with whom she was 
infatuated.  
 
As a result of this information the appellant was arrested in the early hours of Friday 12 July 1985. 
Drewery was arrested at the same time. She was interviewed twice on that day, but exercised her right 
to say nothing despite persistent questioning by the police. She was interviewed again on the following 
day, Saturday. The interview was split into two, with a break in between, according to the police of 50 
minutes, according to her of about 5 or 10 minutes. 
 
The police witnesses described how, after initially refusing to answer questions, her attitude started to 
change. One of the officers, Detective Sergeant Beech, said: "You've obviously got a lot on your mind, 
are you finding it difficult?" "Yes." "Would I be right in saying that you want to talk about this but every 
bone in your body is telling you you shouldn't?" "Something like that" was the reply. Then came the 
break already described. 
 
When the interview was resumed, in answer to questions from the officer she admitted a number of 
offences. Amongst them was the setting up of the bogus burglary: "I approached a man in a pub 
because I was short of money and asked him if he would break in for me." She admitted obtaining the 
money from her insurers. She said that she had spent some of it on a holiday for herself and Drewery. 
She expressed her sorrow at having committed the offences and said she felt relieved that she had 
confessed. She sought, it should be added, to exculpate Drewery. 
 
She appealed against conviction on the ground that the judge erred in failing to exclude a confession 
on the basis that it might have been obtained by oppression within the meaning of section 76(2)(a) of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 . She claimed that her reason for making the confession 
was this. After the break in the final interview one of the police officers, Detective Constable Holliday, 
told her that Drewery, her lover, had been having for the last three years or so an affair with a woman 
called Christine Judge. Now Christine Judge was one of the many people who had been arrested as 
a result of Turnpenny's disclosures. She was in the next cell to the appellant and, said the appellant, 
Detective Constable Holliday told her so. These revelations, said the appellant, so distressed her that 
she "just couldn't stand being in the cells any longer."  
 
Then later in her evidence she said: "As soon as the matter about Christine came out, Detective 
Constable Holliday left the room and my head was swimming. I felt numb and after a while I said to 
Detective Sergeant Beech, 'Is it true?' and he said 'Ronnie shouldn't have said that, he gets a bit 
carried away. Look, Ruth, why don't you make a statement?'" 
 
The Court of Appeal did not think that this amounted to oppression. 
 
“This in turn leads us to believe that "oppression" in section 76(2)(a) should be given its ordinary 
dictionary meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary as its third definition of the word runs as follows: 
"Exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh, or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment 
of subjects, inferiors, etc.; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens." One of the quotations 
given under that paragraph runs as follows: "There is not a word in our language which expresses 
more detestable wickedness than oppression." 
 
“We find it hard to envisage any circumstances in which such oppression would not entail some 
impropriety on the part of the interrogator. We do not think that the judge was wrong in using that test. 
What, however, is abundantly clear is that a confession may be invalidated under section 
76(2)(b) where there is no suspicion of impropriety. No reliance was placed on the words of section 
76(2)(b) either before the judge at trial or before this court. Even if there had been such reliance, we 
do not consider that the policeman's remark was likely to make unreliable any confession of the 
appellant's own criminal activities, and she expressly exonerated - or tried to exonerate - her unfaithful 
lover. 
 
“In those circumstances, in the judgment of this court, the judge was correct to reject the submission 
made to him under section 76 of the Act of 1984. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.”   
per Edmund Davies LJ 
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ii.   Oppression by Words 
 
12.6 Oppression can be by words as well as deeds. 
 
 R. v Anthony Paris; R. v Yusuf Abdullahi; R. v Stephen Wayne Miller (1993) 97 Cr. App. R. 99 
 
It is oppressive for interviewing officers to shout, bully and hector the suspect in interview. An interview 
obtained in oppressive circumstances is unreliable and not admissible. Miller was charged, with four 
others, with the murder of a prostitute. The main evidence against M was his confession evidence 
which was ruled admissible at trial. M, and two other defendants implicated by M's confession, were 
later convicted of murder. All three appealed on the ground that the confession had been obtained in 
oppressive circumstances which rendered it unreliable and therefore inadmissible under the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.76(2) . 
 
Held, allowing the appeals, that the tenor and length of the interviews was oppressive for someone of 
normal mental capacity and M had been adjudged to be on the borderline of mental handicap. The 
interviewing officers could not have acted in a more hostile and intimidating manner. Interviewing for 
13 hours over 19 tapes, they had made it clear to M that they would continue to question him until they 
"got it right". In these circumstances the confession should not have been admitted. The jury might 
have been prejudiced by that confession evidence against the other appellants and so those 
convictions were also unsafe and unsatisfactory and would also be quashed. 
 
From the judgment of Lord Taylor, CJ 
 
Miller's case 
 
Against Miller the Crown relied essentially on three heads of evidence: (1) Vilday and Psaila, despite 
the extent to which they were discredited; (2) Miller's interviews, (3) His admissions to Mrs. Sidorak 
and Miss Taylor, who visited him in prison. Of these, the interviews were crucially important, not only 
in Miller's case but, as we shall indicate, in the cases of all three appellants. 
 
Miller was arrested on December 7 in London. He was taken to Cardiff and over five days, between 
December 7 and 11, he was interviewed for some 13 hours. All of the interviews were tape-recorded, 
and in total there were 19 tapes. Although a solicitor was engaged from the start, he was not allowed 
to be present during the first two interviews on December 7. From the third interview on December 8 
onwards he was present. On tapes 1, 2, 6 and 7, the interviewing officers were Detective Constables 
Greenwood and Seaford. On all the other tapes the interviewing officers were Detective Constables 
Evans and Murray, save for 16 and 17 when Detective Constable Toogood replaced Detective 
Constable Murray. 
 
In summary, Miller denied both participation and presence at the scene on tapes 1 to 7. On 8 and 9 
he began to accept he was present. Thereafter he was pressed to say who had stabbed Lynette and 
eventually to admit that he did. Having denied involvement well over 300 times, he was finally 
persuaded to make three admissions on which the prosecution particularly relied, in addition to his 
admission to being present. The first of those was on tape 18, where page 7 of the transcript records 
him as saying “Paris went crazy so I started stabbing.” Miller was speaking very fast at that point and 
the word “I” is by no means clear. It was certainly not taken up by the officers at the time as an 
admission that he had stabbed Lynette. 
 
Secondly, towards the end of tape 18 the officers put it to Miller that he was drugged and may have 
stabbed Lynette without knowing what he was doing. Thus, at page 81 of the transcript Detective 
Constable Murray said: “O.K., O.K. at least we can now say we've got it right, because even if you 
can't say yes I did, or no I didn't. You were so blocked up you didn't know what you were doing.” 
 
At page 84 Miller said, “That's what I say, I don't know. I might have done, I might have done.” Thirdly, 
on tape 19 at page 52 of the transcript the appellant said after a period of pressure, “I just stabbed 
her, not stabbed her just fucking thumped her in her face I mean.” 
 
Mr. Mansfield, who did not appear in the court below, submits that the interviews were oppressive and 
the whole course of questioning was such as to render Miller's admissions unreliable. He relies 
on section 76(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 , which provides as follows: “(2) If, in 
any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an 
accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained—
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(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or ( b ) in consequence of anything said or done which 
was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might 
be made by him in consequence thereof, the court shall not allow the confession to be given in 
evidence against him except in so far as the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt 
that the confession (notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.” 
 
Three points on that section require emphasis. First, the issue having been raised by the defence, the 
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that neither (2)(a) nor (2)(b) applied was on the Crown. 
Secondly, what matters is how the confession was obtained, not whether or not it may have been true. 
Thirdly, unless the prosecution discharged the burden of proof, the judge was bound as a matter of 
law to exclude the admissions. His decision was not discretionary… 
 
We have read the transcripts of the tapes and have heard a number of them played in open court. It 
became clear that the two pairs of officers employed different methods. Greenwood and Seaford were 
tough and confrontational. Evans and Murray were milder in manner, aiming to gain the appellant's 
confidence and persuade him to accept their version of the facts. 
 
We are bound to say that on hearing tape 7, each member of this Court was horrified. Miller was 
bullied and hectored. The officers, particularly Detective Constable Greenwood, were not questioning 
him so much as shouting at him what they wanted him to say. Short of physical violence, it is hard to 
conceive of a more hostile and intimidating approach by officers to a suspect. It is impossible to convey 
on the printed page the pace, force and menace of the officer's delivery, but a short passage may give 
something of the flavour: 
 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I wasn't there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “How you can ever …?” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I wasn't there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “How you … I just don't know how you can sit there, I …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I wasn't …” 
D. C. Greenwood: “Really don't.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there; I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “Seeing that girl, your girlfriend, in that room that night like she was. I just don't 
know how you can sit there and say it.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I wasn't there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “You were there that night.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “Together with all the others, you were there that night.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there. I'll tell you already …” 
D. C. Greenwood: “And you sit there and say that.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “They can lock me up for 50 billion years, I said I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “‘Cause you don't wanna be there.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “You don't wanna be there because if …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “As soon as you say that you're there you know you're involved.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “You know you were involved in it.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not involved and I wasn't there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “Yes you were there.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “You were there, that's why Leanne is come up now …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “No.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “‘Cause her conscience is …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “She can't sleep at night …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “No. I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “To say you were there that night …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “Looking over her body seeing what she was like …” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “With her head like she had and you have got the audacity to sit there and say 
nothing at all about it.” 
Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
D. C. Greenwood: “You know damn well you were there.” 
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Stephen Wayne Miller: “I was not there.” 
 
and so on for many pages. We have no doubt that this was oppression within the meaning of section 
76(2). 
 
iii. The Characteristics of the Defendant 
 
12.7 The characteristics of the individual defendant will be considered, as what may be oppressive to a 
scared, vulnerable person would not necessarily be oppressive to a hardened criminal. 
 
12.8 R. v. Heibner [2014] EWCA Crim 102 
 
Heibner had been convicted of a contract killing in 1978. He had confessed to being the look-out, but 
not the killer. 
 
37 years later he appealed on the grounds that his confession was based on oppression. Inter alia, he 
claimed that his confession had been made after a 50-hour detention and he had not been offered a 
solicitor.  
 
It was held that even if all that were true, as he was already a hardened criminal by then with 15 years’ 
worth of convictions, these defects in procedure would not have unduly bothered him to the point of 
feeling oppressed. 
 
“Heibner was held for 42 hours before interviews began. Although the Judges' Rules , which then 
governed the topic, did not prohibit detention for such a period, under the subsequently enacted Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”) the approval of a Superintendent would be required for 
anything exceeding 36 hours. No explanation was provided for the delay. Even leaving aside Heibner's 
complaints about sleeping, approaching 50 hours detention by the time exhibit 32 was written is likely 
to be relevant to its reliability. 
 
“In our view it is important to see this submission in context. That Heibner had been at the police 
station for a considerable period by the time of his statement was explored both on the voir dire and 
in front of the Jury. Heibner had previous convictions for serious offences, including armed robbery. 
He was no stranger to police stations or to the routine of arrest and interview. Custody for him was 
unlikely to have been as challenging as for a detainee unfamiliar with the system or familiar only with 
criminal allegations lower on the ladder of seriousness. We do not attach importance to this complaint.”  
per Rafferty LJ (Lady Justice Rafferty) at paras 31 and 32 
 
iv. The Effect of Oppression 
 
12.9 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (no.2) [2006] 2 AC 221 
 
“Evidence of a suspect or witness which had been obtained by torture had long been regarded as 
inherently unreliable, unfair, offensive to ordinary standards of humanity and decency and 
incompatible with the principles on which courts should administer justice, and that, in consequence, 
such evidence might not lawfully be admitted against a party to proceedings in a United Kingdom 
court, irrespective of where, by whom or on whose authority the torture had been inflicted.” per Lord 
Bingham 
 
12.10 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s. 76 Confessions 
(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in 
so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance 
of this section. 
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an 
accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained — 
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(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or 
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to 
render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, 
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the 
prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may 
be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.  
(3) In any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an 
accused person, the court may of its own motion require the prosecution, as a condition of allowing it to do 
so, to prove that the confession was not obtained as mentioned in subsection (2) above. 
 
v.  The Effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 
 
12.11 The Human Rights Act 1998 has had an impact on the interpretation of PACE s.76, because of ECHR 
Article 6, which states: 
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. 
 
12.12 R. v. Mushtaq [2005] 1 WLR 1513 
 
Ashfaq Mushtaq was on trial for conspiracy to defraud. He claimed that the admission he made to the 
police was a confession as a result of oppression and should be excluded as evidence.  
 
Following a voir dire, the judge allowed the evidence. In his summing up the judge directed the jury 
that if they were not sure, for whatever reason, that the confession was true, they must disregard it, 
but that if, on the other hand, they were sure that it was true, they could rely on it even if it had or might 
have been made as a result of oppression or other improper circumstances.  
 
The jury convicted the defendant. He appealed on the grounds that the judge should have directed 
the jury to disregard the confession if they found it to have been obtained by oppression and that the 
judge's direction was incompatible with the defendant's right against self-incrimination under article 
6(1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as scheduled 
to the Human Rights Act 1998  
 
The House of Lords held that the judge had given the wrong direction to the jury (but they upheld the 
conviction, as it was not unsafe). 
 
The judge's direction that the jury could take into account a confession which they considered was or 
might have been obtained by oppression or other improper means was an invitation to the jury to act 
in a way that was incompatible with Mushtaq 's right against self-incrimination implied into Art.6(1). 
 
Where a judge has ruled under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.76(2) that evidence of an 
alleged confession had not been obtained by oppression or other improper means and had allowed it 
to be given in evidence, he was required to direct the jury that, if they concluded that the alleged 
confession might have been so obtained, they must disregard it. 
 
Thus, if there is evidence that a confession might have been obtained by oppression (or any other of 
the excluding reasons in PACE s.76) then, even if the judge does not exclude the evidence, the jury 
should be directed to disregard the confession if they think that the way it was obtained was in violation 
of s.76. 
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13 UNRELIABLE CONFESSIONS 
 
i.  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.76 
 
13.1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s. 76 Confessions 
(1) In any proceedings a confession made by an accused person may be given in evidence against him in 
so far as it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings and is not excluded by the court in pursuance 
of this section. 
(2) If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession made by an 
accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may have been obtained— 
(a) by oppression of the person who made it; or 
(b) in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the 
time, to render unreliable any confession which might be made by him in consequence thereof, 
the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as the 
prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession (notwithstanding that it may 
be true) was not obtained as aforesaid.  
 
13.2 There are conflicting authorities on precisely what ‘anything said or done’ means. 
 
“...anything said or done...” is usually taken to mean OTHERWISE than by the defendant himself. 
 
In R. v. Goldenberg (1989) 88 Cr App R 285 the defendant was suffering from drug withdrawal 
symptoms when he confessed, but this was taken to be self-induced and not covered by s.76. 
 
However... 
 
In R v. Walker [1998] Crim LR 211 the Court of Appeal considered the fact that the defendant was 
high on cocaine when he confessed was a relevant factor under s.76. 
 
 
ii.  Tainting later confessions 
 
13.3 Where an initial confession was unreliable (e.g. because a vulnerable defendant was refused legal 
advice), subsequent confessions may also be unreliable, even if the interview is properly conducted, 
if the trauma of the first interview still has a causative effect on the second. 
 
13.4 R. v Cherie McGovern (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 228 
 
The appellant, aged 19, six months' pregnant and of limited intelligence, was arrested on a charge of 
murder the day after events leading to the death of the victim occurred. The appellant requested 
access to a solicitor pursuant to section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 , but was 
refused. The Crown subsequently admitted the unlawfulness of that refusal. The appellant was 
physically ill, emotionally distressed and unable to understand the caution until it was explained in 
simple language. During the first interview, in the absence of a solicitor, she confessed to having taken 
part in the homicide. No contemporaneous note was made of that interview, nor was the record later 
produced, read to or signed by the appellant as required by C. 11.3 and C. 11.6 of the Code of Practice. 
The following day she was interviewed again in the presence of a solicitor, when she again made 
admissions in a more coherent form.  
 
At her trial on a charge of murder with other defendants, a submission that the confession evidence 
against the appellant was inadmissible was rejected by the trial judge. The appellant was convicted of 
manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. 
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On appeal, it being contended that the confession evidence should have been excluded: 
 
Held, that the confession in the first interview was made in consequence of the appellant being denied 
access to a solicitor and was, in the circumstances likely to be unreliable, notwithstanding that it was 
later admitted to be true, which was not a relevant factor under section 76(2) of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 , and ought not to have been admitted. The first interview, made in breach 
of section 58 of the 1984 Act and the Code of Practice aforesaid, similarly tainted the second interview. 
As without that evidence there was no reliable evidence against the appellant the appeal would be 
allowed and the conviction quashed.  
 
13.5 R. v. Barry [1991] 95 Cr App R 384 
 
This case offers guidelines by the Court of Appeal to the application of the Reliability Test. 
 
The appellant was charged with conspiracy to steal with two co-accused. The prosecution alleged that 
they had devised a scheme to defraud a Swiss bank of £30 million. The appellant was arrested at 8.10 
a.m. on June 13, 1989 and taken to a police station.  
 
At the first interview at 13.57 that day he made no admissions. He was anxious to obtain bail because 
he had custody of his nine-year-old son and did not want custody to be transferred to his estranged 
wife. At 17.26 on that day he was charged. The next morning, he was advised by counsel to say 
nothing if interviewed further. Bail was refused by the magistrates.  
 
On June 14 three interviews were conducted with the appellant in breach of paragraph 16.8 of Code 
C in that they were neither recorded, nor any note taken of them. During those interviews the appellant 
offered evidence in return for assistance in obtaining bail.  
 
Subsequently a police officer wrote to the Crown Court judge setting out the appellant's agreement, if 
granted bail, to arrange a meeting with a fellow conspirator with a view to his being arrested.  
 
At 14.00 on June 14 the appellant made a full confession in a tape-recorded interview, although he 
was not asked whether he wanted his solicitor to be present as required by Code C.6.6. The 
unrecorded interviews did not come to light until halfway through the trial.  
 
The appellant invited the trial judge to exclude the evidence of the last interview under section 76(2). 
The judge refused to do so on the basis that the confession had not been induced by an offer of bail. 
He was convicted and appealed. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal, that the trial judge had given far too little weight to the numerous breaches 
of Code C which resulted in crucial evidence going unrecorded and only being revealed halfway 
through the trial. The evidence should not have been admitted. 
 
The Court of Appeal laid out the correct approach to questions of unreliability in a three-point test: 
 
1. Identify the relevant thing said or done, which requires the trial judge to take into account at least 
everything said and done by the police.  
 
2. Ask whether what was said and done was likely in the circumstances to render unreliable a 
confession made in consequence. The test is objective taking into account all the circumstances.  
 
3. Ask whether the prosecution have proved beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was not 
obtained in consequence of the thing said and done, which is a question of fact to be approached 
in a common-sense way. 
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14 UNFAIR CONFESSIONS 
 
i.   Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.78 
 
14.1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s. 78 Exclusion of unfair evidence 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to 
rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence. 
 
14.2 The most common ground of unfairness is a breach of Code C (see Part 15 below), especially if 
accompanied by bad faith on the part of the police. 
 
14.3 It is not enough that there has been such a breach: it must also have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that justice requires its exclusion. 
 
ii.  R. v. Mason 
 
14.4 R. v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 
 
Mason was suspected of involvement with an arson attack. The police falsely told him that his 
fingerprints had been found at the scene, and he confessed. It was held that the confession should 
have been excluded because of the deliberate and serious malpractice by the police. 
 
From the judgment of Watkins LJ 
 
“On 1 July 1986 a motor car belonging to a Mr. Askew was set on fire. It was very badly damaged. 
The cost of repairing the damage was something in the region of £1000. It was obvious to those who 
later went on to inspect the damage that the fire had been caused by an inflammable liquid thrown 
against the car and ignited. Before that incident there had been bad feeling between the appellant, 
who is 20 years of age, and Mr. Askew. Mr. Askew has a daughter who is 18 years of age. The 
appellant and this young lady had been going out together. She became pregnant by him. She was 
not willing to bear his child. She decided to have an abortion and she did. She also broke off her 
relationship with the appellant. He did not take that at all well. His erstwhile girlfriend's father and 
mother did not look upon what had happened with any great favour either; nor did they feel any 
pleasure in seeing the appellant any more. They began to receive midnight telephone calls. Upon each 
occasion they answered the telephone, whoever was at the other end put the receiver down. They 
suspected the appellant of making those calls. It may be that their suspicions were well-founded. 
 
“At two o'clock in the morning of 1 July 1986 Mr. Askew while in bed was woken up by a screech of 
tyres on the road outside his house. He thought no more of it then and went back to sleep, but a few 
minutes later he was again woken up, this time it was by a telephone call from a neighbour. As a result 
of that he ran to a window and saw that his motor car, which was parked outside, was on fire. There 
was nobody near the car. He had a foam fire extinguisher handy and with that he succeeded in putting 
out the fire. There were other parked cars nearby. If Mr. Askew had not succeeded in putting out the 
fire, it may well have been that the petrol in the car would have ignited and the fire spread to the other 
cars. 
 
“When the police came to the scene there was a lot of broken glass, as they discovered, about the 
place near the car. It was soon found that an inflammable liquid had been used, probably a 
combination of petrol and paint thinners. About 12 hours or so later the police paid a visit to the 
appellant. He denied having been involved in setting fire to the car. 
 
“On 10 July he was arrested. Be it noted that upon arrest the police had in their possession no evidence 
at all to associate him with the cause of the fire. Before arrest one or more police officers decided to 
invent evidence and to acquaint the appellant of that so-called evidence as though it was genuinely 
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possessed. What they decided to do was to tell the appellant that a fingerprint of his had been found 
in a very telling place. As to that Detective Constable Gunton said: “Detective Constable Walton and I 
set out deliberately to make the defendant believe we had a fingerprint on some of the glass fragments 
from the bottle that was used to perpetrate this crime. I agreed with the detective constable to this 
play-acting and it was a trick. The bottle, or the fragments of it, had not even been sent for fingerprint 
testing at that stage. We set about ‘conning’ the defendant. We had a suspicion, but only suspicion 
against him and we realised that we needed more proof … I felt the only way to get the truth from him 
was to do this...” 
 
“The law is, as I have already said, that a trial judge has a discretion to be exercised of course upon 
right principles to reject admissible evidence in the interests of a defendant having a fair trial. The 
judge in the present case appreciated that, as the quotation from his ruling shows. So, the only 
question to be answered by this court is whether, having regard to the way the police behaved, the 
judge exercised that discretion correctly. In our judgment he did not. He omitted a vital factor from his 
consideration, namely, the deceit practised upon the appellant's solicitor. If he had included that in his 
consideration of the matter, we have not the slightest doubt that he would have been driven to an 
opposite conclusion, namely, that the confession be ruled out and the Jury not permitted therefore to 
hear of it. If that had been done, an acquittal would have followed for there was no other evidence in 
the possession of the prosecution. 
 
“For those reasons we have no alternative but to quash this conviction. 
 
“Before parting with this case, despite what I have said about the role of the court in relation to 
disciplining the police, we think we ought to say that we hope never again to hear of deceit such as 
this being practised upon an accused person, and more particularly possibly on a solicitor whose duty 
it is to advise him unfettered by false information from the police.” 
 
15 THE COMMON LAW TEST 
 
i.  Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.82 
 
15.1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s.82 Interpretation 
(3) Nothing in this Part of this Act shall prejudice any power of a court to exclude evidence (whether by 
preventing questions from being put or otherwise) at its discretion. 
15.2 In other words, judges retain their common law discretion to exclude evidence – or to direct the jury to ignore 
it. 
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G ACCESS TO LEGAL ADVICE 
 
16 CODE C, PACE s.58 AND ARTICLE 6 
 
i.  Introduction 
 
16.1 The rules relating to access to legal advice are laid down in: 
 
1. Code C para 6; 
2. PACE s.58; and 
3. ECHR Article 6 
 
ii.   Code C 
 
16.2 CODE C 
 
6. Right to legal advice  
 
6.1 Unless Annex B applies, all detainees must be informed that they may at any time consult and 
communicate privately with a solicitor, whether in person, in writing or by telephone, and that free 
independent legal advice is available.  
 
6.4 No police officer should, at any time, do or say anything with the intention of dissuading any person 
who is entitled to legal advice in accordance with this Code, whether or not they have been arrested 
and are detained, from obtaining legal advice.  
 
6.6 A detainee who wants legal advice may not be interviewed or continue to be interviewed until they 
have received such advice unless Annex B applies 
 
16.3 CODE C: Annex B 
 
1.  The exercise of the rights in Section 5 or Section 6, or both, may be delayed if the person is 
in police detention... in connection with an indictable offence, has not yet been charged with 
an offence and an officer of superintendent rank or above... has reasonable grounds for 
believing their exercise will:  
 
(i) lead to interference with, or harm to, evidence connected with an indictable offence; or 
interference with, or physical harm to, other people; or  
 
(ii) lead to alerting other people suspected of having committed an indictable offence but not yet 
arrested for it; or  
 
(iii)  hinder the recovery of property obtained in consequence of the commission of such an 
offence. 
 
iii.   Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s.58 
 
 16.4 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
 
s.58 Access to legal advice 
(1) A person arrested and held in custody in a police station or other premises shall be entitled, if 
he so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, a request under subsection (1) above and the time at which 
it was made shall be recorded in the custody record. 
(3) Such a request need not be recorded in the custody record of a person who makes it at a time 
while he is at a court after being charged with an offence. 
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(4) If a person makes such a request, he must be permitted to consult a solicitor as soon as is 
practicable except to the extent that delay is permitted by this section. 
(5) In any case he must be permitted to consult a solicitor within 36 hours from the relevant time, 
as defined in section 41(2) above. 
(6) Delay in compliance with a request is only permitted— 
(a in the case of a person who is in police detention for an indictable offence; and 
(b) if an officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorises it. 
(7) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (6) above orally or in writing but, if he 
gives it orally, he shall confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable. 
(8) Subject to sub-section (8A) below, an officer may only authorise delay where he has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the exercise of the right conferred by subsection (1) 
above at the time when the person detained desires to exercise it— 
(a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected with an indictable offence or 
interference with or physical injury to other persons; or 
(b) will lead to the alerting of other persons suspected of having committed such an offence but 
not yet arrested for it; or 
(c) will hinder the recovery of any property obtained as a result of such an offence. 
(8A) An officer may also authorise delay where he has reasonable grounds for believing that— 
(a) the person detained for the indictable offence has benefited from his criminal conduct, and 
(b) the recovery of the value of the property constituting the benefit will be hindered by the 
exercise of the right conferred by subsection (1) above. 
(8B) For the purposes of subsection (8A) above the question whether a person has benefited from 
his criminal conduct is to be decided in accordance with Part 2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 
2002. 
(9) If delay is authorised— 
(a) the detained person shall be told the reasons for it; and 
(b) the reason shall be noted on his custody record. 
(10) The duties imposed by subsection (9) above shall be performed as soon as is practicable. 
(11) There may be no further delay in permitting the exercise of the right conferred by subsection 
(1) above once the reason for authorising delay ceases to subsist. 
(12) Nothing in this section applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions. 
 
iv.   ECHR, Article 6 
 
16.5  ECHR Article 6 (3) 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights... 
 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
 
16.6 Breach of any of these rules might lead to an accusation of unfairness in getting a confession, but only 
if there is a causal connection between the wrongful denial and the obtaining of the confession. 
 
16.7 R. v. Alladice [1988] 87 Cr App R 380 
 
A robbery took place at a post office when five men, one armed with a gun, terrorised the staff. Colin 
Alladice was interviewed by the police and according to them he admitted he was one of the robbers. 
There was further evidence that, immediately after the robbery, the appellant, aged 18 and 
unemployed, spent almost £3,000. He was asked if he wanted a solicitor and said he did although he 
refused to sign his name to that request.  
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The officer in charge of the investigation then asked Chief Inspector Corbett to authorise a delay in 
the implementation of the appellant's request. That authorisation was given. The chief inspector on 
the voir dire gave his reasons. The offence being investigated was a serious arrestable offence, 
robbery with firearms. Two men had already been arrested and charged. The appellant and one other 
had been detained. It was known that there were five men involved. One was therefore still at large, 
although his identity was known. None of the money had been recovered nor had the firearm been 
located. His experience led him to believe that in cases such as the instant one the criminals are apt 
to prepare contingency plans to be followed in the event of their arrest. These plans can be activated 
by conveying apparently innocent information or requests to a solicitor which could lead to the alerting 
of others or the disposal or redisposal of property, however innocent and respectable the particular 
solicitor might be. 
 
His written authorisation was as follows: “Access refused on the following grounds: firstly, other man 
to be arrested; secondly, large amount of property to be [re]covered. Delay access until further notice.” 
 
He was convicted of robbery and appealed on the ground that the evidence of his admissions was 
wrongly admitted because he had been denied access to a solicitor under section 58 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984.  
 
The Court of Appeal held there was no evidence of reasonable grounds for the necessary belief in 
delaying access to a solicitor. There was no suggestion that the solicitor requested might be knowingly 
involved in any dishonesty or malpractice. The man still at large had already been alerted by events. 
There was no reason to believe that the access to a solicitor would, or indeed could, lead to any more 
impediment than already existed to the recovery of the gun or the stolen money. There was no 
suggestion that there might be interference with evidence or persons. The robbery was a serious 
enough offence, but the appellant could scarcely on his record or antecedent history be classed as a 
sophisticated criminal. In short, if the chief inspector believed that access to a solicitor would have any 
of the unwelcome results in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c), there were no reasonable grounds for that 
belief. There was a breach of section 58. 
 
However, although there had been a breach of section 58, there was no suggestion of oppression or 
that the confession might have been obtained as a result of the refusal of access to a solicitor and in 
any event, there was no reason to believe that that fact was likely in all the circumstances to render 
the confession unreliable. The allegation by the defendant that his admissions had been invented was 
rejected by the trial judge and the presence of a solicitor would have added nothing to the appellant's 
knowledge of his rights. Thus, the breach of section 58 did not in the circumstances of the case require 
the Court to rule inadmissible subsequent statements made by the appellant. 
 
The appeal was dismissed. 
 
 
17  FRUIT OF THE POISONED TREE 
 
17.1 It may be the case that an inadmissible confession leads to the discovery of real evidence. For 
example, Barrie confesses to burying a body in the woods: the confession is ruled inadmissible, but 
the body is found where he said it would be. In such a case, the real evidence would usually be 
admissible, even though the confession is not.11 
 
17.2 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (no.2) [2006] 2 AC 221 
 
“I am prepared to accept… that the Secretary of State does not act unlawfully if he certifies, arrests, 
searches and detains on the strength of what I shall for convenience call foreign torture evidence. But 
by the same token it is, in my view, questionable whether he would act unlawfully if he based similar 
action on intelligence obtained by officially-authorised British torture. If under such torture a man 
revealed the whereabouts of a bomb in the Houses of Parliament, the authorities could remove the 
bomb and, if possible, arrest the terrorist who planted it. There would be a flagrant breach of article 3 
for which the United Kingdom would be answerable, but no breach of article 5(4) or 6.”  
 
 
11 see Director of Public Prosecutions v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574 ; R v Harz [1967] 1 AC 760 ; Lam Chi-ming v The Queen 
[1991] 2 AC 212; Lobban v The Queen [1995] 1 WLR 877; Lui Mei Lin v The Queen [1989] AC 288; Mirfield Successive 
Confessions and the Poisonous Tree [1996] Crim LR 554. 
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H CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
 
 
18 EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER: Introduction and History 
 
i.  Introduction 
 
18.1 The prosecution might wish to raise evidence of the defendant’s bad character (especially his previous 
convictions) either to impugn his credibility or to make it seem more likely that he committed the offence 
in question. 
 
18.2 The law relating to bad character evidence comprises a series of controversial provisions in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 which represent a sea-change to the old statutory and common law.  
 
18.3 Whereas at common law it was not permitted to reveal the accused’s previous convictions etc. to the 
jury except in very limited circumstances; the statutory rules presume that such evidence will be 
permitted as long as it meets the requirements of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
ii.  History of Bad Character Evidence  
 
18.4 Bizarre as it now seems, until 1898, the defendant in a criminal trial was not allowed to testify at all. 
He was therefore protected from being asked questions about his previous convictions. However, if 
his counsel gave evidence about the defendant’s good character, the prosecution was permitted to 
challenge it with evidence of his bad character. 
 
18.5 Under the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, the defendant was permitted to give evidence and the issue of 
bad character evidence was provided for as follows: 
 
18.6 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
  
s.1 Competency of witnesses in criminal cases 
 
Every person charged with an offence, and the wife or husband, as the case may be, of the person so 
charged, shall be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether the 
person so charged is charged solely or jointly with any other person.  
 
Provided as follows:—  
 
(a) A person so charged shall not be called as a witness in pursuance of this Act except upon his own 
application: 
 
(b) The failure of any person charged with an offence, or of the wife or husband, as the case may be, 
of the person so charged, to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by the 
prosecution: 
 
(c) The wife or husband of the person charged shall not, save as in this Act mentioned, be called as a 
witness in pursuance of this Act except upon the application of the person so charged: 
 
(d) Nothing in this Act shall make a husband compellable to disclose any communication made to him 
by his wife during the marriage, or a wife compellable to disclose any communication made to her by 
her husband during the marriage: 
 
(e) A person charged and being a witness in pursuance of this Act may be asked any question in 
cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to the offence charged: 
 
(f) A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked 
shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted 
of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad 
character, unless— 
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(i) the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to 
show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or 
 
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a 
view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature 
or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the 
witnesses for the prosecution; or 
 
(iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence. 
 
18.7 Any evidence given under subsection (f) (ii) would only be admitted as evidence of lack of credibility. 
 
18.8 Under the old common law, evidence of previous convictions was permitted under the ‘similar fact’ 
rule. This would apply if the defendant was guilty of, or implicated in, other offences which were 
strikingly similar to the current offence in some unusual way.  
18.9 R v. Boardman [1975] AC 421 
 
Derrick Rowland Boardman, aged 45, a language school headmaster, was tried and convicted on 
counts alleging buggery with S (a pupil aged 16) and inciting H (a pupil aged 17) to commit buggery 
on him. The evidence of S and H related to separate incidents but bore certain similarities, in particular 
that Boardman had encouraged both to play the active part in the sexual act.  
 
The judge ruled the evidence of S admissible upon the count involving H, and vice versa, and directed 
the jury, with a warning as to the possibility of conspiracy between S and H, that the evidence of each 
was capable of corroborating that of the other. Boardman appealed contending that such evidence 
was wrongly ruled admissible. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal, that although similar fact evidence should only exceptionally be admitted 
and requires a strong degree of probative force, the similarities in the evidence of S and H were such 
as to entitle the trial judge to use his discretion to admit the evidence in each case upon the count to 
which it did not directly relate, there being no distinction between cases where the defence is one of 
innocent association and where a complete denial is made. 
 
“If the crime charged is committed in a uniquely or strikingly similar manner to other crimes committed 
by the accused the manner in which the other crimes were committed may be evidence upon which a 
jury could reasonably conclude that the accused was guilty of the crime charged. The similarity would 
have to be so unique or striking that common sense makes it inexplicable on the basis of coincidence. 
I would stress that the question as to whether the evidence is capable of being so regarded by a 
reasonable jury is a question of law.  
 
“There is no easy way out by leaving it to the jury to see how they decide it. If a trial judge wrongly lets 
in the evidence and the jury convict, then subject to the proviso [to section 2 (1) of the Criminal Appeal 
Act 1968] , the conviction must be quashed. If, for example, A is charged with burglary at the house of 
B and it is shown that the burglar, whoever he was, entered B's house by a ground floor window, 
evidence against A that he had committed a long series of burglaries, in every case entering by a 
ground floor window, would be clearly inadmissible. This would show nothing from which a reasonable 
jury could infer anything except bad character and a disposition to burgle. The factor of unique or 
striking similarity would be missing. There must be thousands of professional burglars who habitually 
enter through ground floor windows and the fact that B's house was entered in this way might well be 
a coincidence. Certainly, it could not reasonably be regarded as evidence that A was the burglar.  
 
“On the other hand, if, for example, A had a long series of convictions for burglary and in every case 
he had left a distinctive written mark or device behind him and he was then charged with burglary in 
circumstances in which an exactly similar mark or device was found at the site of the burglary which 
he was alleged to have committed, the similarity between the burglary charged and those of which he 
had previously been convicted would be so uniquely or strikingly similar that evidence of the manner 
in which he had committed the previous burglaries would, in law, clearly be admissible against him.” 
per Lord Salmon 
 
18.10 The similar fact rule would also apply if the defendant seemed to have been the victim of a series of 
unfeasibly similar misfortunes.  
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18.11 The most famous example of ‘similar fact evidence’ is the ‘brides in the bath’ case. 
 
R v. George Joseph Smith (1916) 11 Cr. App. R. 229 
 
George Smith, although married to someone else, went through a form of marriage with Bessie 
Munday. (In fact, he had seven bigamous marriages). He appropriated all her money and deserted 
her. Eighteen months later they met accidentally, and a letter was written to her relations, in which she 
acquiesced, giving his reasons for leaving her, and having reference to her money, which she was 
said to have lent to him.  
 
A few months later they were at Herne Bay, living in a house alone together. Mutual wills were made, 
but as Munday had all the money and the appellant none, this was a mere blind. He then got counsel's 
opinion as to the effect of Munday's settlements; on the 2nd July he learnt that, with the exception of 
£8 a month paid her by her uncle, he could secure none of her money except by her death.  
 
On the 6th July he selected a bath, although they had got on without one for five or six weeks, and the 
particular bath chosen was of a most inconvenient size, and was put in a most inconvenient room far 
from the water supply; the door of the room had no lock. It had never been suggested that Munday 
suffered from any illness until after the bath was delivered, but then he took Munday to Dr. French, 
and described her symptoms in such a way as to induce Dr. French to think that she had had an 
epileptic fit, even though it was very unusual for a woman of that age to have a succession of epileptic 
fits.  
 
On the day before her death, Dr. French found Munday in perfect health though rather tired, this being 
caused by the very hot weather. According to the appellant's statement before the coroner, the couple 
got up together at 7.30 a.m.; it was 8.10 before the doctor was at the house, he having been sent for 
by the appellant. He found her dead in the bath, with her legs straight out with her soles up against 
the side of the bath. In no other position could a woman of that height be placed in that bath so that 
her mouth and nose should be under the water. According to the medical evidence the position of the 
legs was inconsistent with an epileptic fit.  
 
In the trial that led to his conviction, the prosecution was permitted to introduce evidence of how two 
other women known to George Smith had died. 
i. In December 1913, in Blackpool, one of his ‘wives’ - a woman named Alice Smith (née Burnham) – 
had died suddenly in a boarding house in that seaside resort while in her bathtub in an unlocked 
bathroom. Smith had taken out a hefty life insurance policy on her having had her diagnosed as 
epileptic. 
ii. In December 1914, a woman called Margaret Lloyd had also been found drowned in a bathtub in an 
unlocked bathroom, following an apparent fit. George Smith was a lodger in the same house. 
As the trial judge said:  “If you find an accident which benefits a person and you find that the person 
has been sufficiently fortunate to have that accident happen to him a number of times, benefiting him 
each time, you draw a very strong, frequently an irresistible inference, that the occurrence of so many 
accidents benefiting him is such a coincidence that it cannot have happened unless it was design.” 
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19 EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER: CJA 2003 Definitions 
 
i.  Introduction 
19.1 The confusions and complexities of the law in this area – combined with a desire to secure more 
convictions – led to a review of the legislation, and two reports from the Law Commission in which 
they identified the dangers of admitting evidence of the defendant’s bad character: the jury might give 
such evidence too much weight both in terms of reasoning prejudice and moral prejudice. 
19.2 In the event, Parliament legislated to admit character evidence more readily than the Law Commission 
had recommended. The shield of the CEA 1898 was replaced by the gateways of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. This presumes that bad character evidence will be admitted, rather than presuming that it 
will not. 
 
ii.   Abolition of the Common Law and Repeal of the CEA 1898 
 
19.3 CJA 2003, s.99   
 
Abolition of common law rules 
 
(1) The common law rules governing the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal 
proceedings are abolished. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) is subject to section 118(1) in so far as it preserves the rule under which in criminal 
proceedings a person’s reputation is admissible for the purposes of proving his bad character. 
 
iii. Definition of Bad Character 
 
19.4 CJA 2003, s.98   
 
“Bad character” 
 
References in this Chapter to evidence of a person’s “bad character” are to evidence of, or of a 
disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which—  
 
(a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or 
 
(b) is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence. 
 
19.5 CJA 2003, s.112   
 
Interpretation of Chapter 1 
 
(1) In this Chapter— “misconduct” means the commission of an offence or other reprehensible 
behaviour;  
 
19.6 Explanatory Notes to the CJA 2003 
 
a. S.98 defines the sort of evidence whose admissibility is to be determined under the new 
statutory scheme. The definition covers evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct. 
The term “misconduct” is further defined in section 112 as the commission of an offence or 
other reprehensible behaviour. This is intended to be a broad definition and to cover evidence 
that shows that a person has committed an offence, or has acted in a reprehensible way (or 
is disposed to do so) as well as evidence from which this might be inferred. 
 
b. The definition is therefore intended to include evidence such as previous convictions, as well 
as evidence on charges being tried concurrently, and evidence relating to offences for which 
a person has been charged, where the charge is not prosecuted, or for which the person was 
subsequently acquitted… Thus, if there were a series of attacks and the defendant were 
acquitted of involvement in them, evidence showing or tending to show that he had committed 
those earlier attacks could be given in a later case if it were admissible to establish that he 
had committed the latest attack.  
52 
 
 
c. Evidence not related to criminal proceedings might include, for example, evidence that a 
person has a sexual interest in children or is racist. 
 
d. The scheme does not affect the admissibility of evidence of the facts of the offence. This is 
excluded from the definition, as is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation 
or prosecution of the offence. This evidence is therefore not governed by the new statutory 
rules. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
iv. Reprehensible Behaviour 
 
19.7 The precise meaning of “reprehensible behaviour” has been the subject of some judicial debate. Not 
all unsociable or uncommendable behaviour will reach the threshold of being reprehensible. 
 
19.8 R. v. Gary Osbourne [2007] Crim LR 712 
 
Evidence that the defendant, on trial for the murder of a friend, had been aggressive towards 
and shouted at his partner over the care of their infant was inadmissible, as that behaviour did 
not amount to "reprehensible behaviour" within the meaning in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
s.112. 
 
The victim, a drug dealer with whom Osbourne, as a drug user, had been friendly for many years, had 
been fatally stabbed in his flat. Osbourne was charged with his murder. During the trial, the judge 
admitted evidence of Osbourne's statements to the doctor who had examined him following his arrest. 
The doctor stated that Osbourne had said he had suffered from paranoid schizophrenia for many years 
and referred to tablets he had previously taken. The judge also admitted the evidence of Osbourne's 
former partner (K) that Osbourne had been diagnosed schizophrenic and put on medication, and that 
if Osbourne did not take his medication, he was liable to snap at any time and be aggressive towards 
her and their young son, and shout at her, although he was never violent.  
 
The judge found that it was evidence of Osbourne 's bad character and was admissible as important 
explanatory evidence, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(c), without which the jury would 
have had difficulty properly understanding and evaluating the other evidence in the case.  
 
The judge had also rejected a submission that the evidence should be excluded under the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78. 
 
Osbourne contended that the admission of that evidence had rendered his conviction unsafe. He 
submitted that the evidence was not in law evidence of bad character and was not admissible. It was 
not "reprehensible behaviour", as defined in s.112 of the 2003 Act, nor was it admissible under any 
other rule of evidence.  
 
Osbourne argued that even if it had been, it ought to have been excluded under s.78 of the 1984 Act, 
as there was a real possibility that the jury might have used the evidence that Osbourne suffered from 
a mental illness in order to provide an explanation for an otherwise inexplicable murder, and that the 
jury had heard no expert evidence as to any connection between the symptoms of that illness and the 
act of killing, or as to the effect of Osbourne not taking medication. 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
(1) The evidence given by K about Osbourne 's behaviour was not admissible. However, once it had 
been admitted, the jury should have been directed that it was not relevant to the charge before them. 
In the context of the instant offence, shouting at a partner in the manner described by K could not 
amount to reprehensible behaviour within the meaning in s.112 of the 2003 Act. Shouting between 
partners over the care of a young child was not to be commended but in the context of a charge of 
murdering a close friend, it did not cross the threshold contemplated by the words of the statute. 
Further, it was not "important explanatory evidence" within the meaning of s.101(1)(c) or admissible 
as background history relevant to the offence charged. 
  
(2) In the circumstances, however, the wrongful admission of that evidence did not create any doubt 
about the safety of the conviction. In his summing up, the judge had summarised fairly, and in a way 
about which there could be no complaint, K's evidence, to the extent that, short of reversing his earlier 
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ruling, he could hardly have watered down its significance more than he had. Further, the prosecution 
case had been very strong and had several strands. 
Commentary 
"Reprehensible conduct". The facts of this case provide further illustration of the uncertain scope of 
the term "reprehensible behaviour", which is used in s.112 of the Act. In Renda, the court stated that 
there must be some element of blameworthiness or culpability in any behaviour before it could be 
considered "reprehensible" under s.112(1). The court in the present case found that the evidence of 
the appellant's partner that he became verbally aggressive when he had not taken his medication was 
not evidence of "reprehensible behaviour". The reasoning leading to this conclusion is less than clear. 
The court observed that "shouting between partners over the care of a very young child is not of course 
to be commended …".  
 
Munday suggests that the word "reprehensible" in ordinary usage may denote a range of misdoings, 
from the relatively serious through to "minor detours from perceived paths of righteousness" (R. 
Munday, "What Constitutes "Other Reprehensible Behaviour' under the Bad Character Provisions of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003" [2005] Crim. L.R. 24 at pp.31-34). The appellant's conduct might at first 
sight be thought to fall somewhere on this broad spectrum of conduct. However, whether or not oral 
aggression amounts to "reprehensible conduct" will depend both on the particular circumstances in 
which statements are made, and the motives of its maker. In some cases, for example where it is 
directed at an aggressor in order to avert a physical attack on the maker or another, it may be 
considered a morally justified, even virtuous act. In others, if made in order to provoke physical 
violence, for example, it would clearly amount to reprehensible conduct. In this respect the fact that 
the verbal aggression of the appellant in the present case was a response to what he perceived to be 
improper treatment by his partner of their child might have been relevant to the court's conclusion.  
 
The term "reprehensible" is particularly vague and the drafters of the Act have presented the courts 
with an enduring challenge. Until some general principles emerge the likelihood is that determining 
the type of conduct which falls within its scope will be the result of a rather arbitrary process. 
 
 
v. Bad behaviour other than previous convictions 
 
19.9 Bad behaviour includes, but is not limited to, previous convictions. 
 
19.10 R v. Lewis [2014] EWCA Crim 48 
 
In two trials for offences arising out of a serious incident of public disorder occurring at the time of the 
widespread riots in England in August 2011, the judge had been right to admit bad character evidence 
in the form of videos which suggested that certain of the defendants were involved with gangs.  
 
In assessing whether the admission of such evidence would have an adverse effect on the fairness of 
the trial, fairness to the prosecution, as well as to the defence, had to be considered. 
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20 EVIDENCE OF BAD CHARACTER: CJA 2003 Gateways 
 
i.  Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101 
 
20.1 CJA 2003, s.101  
Defendant’s bad character 
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant’s bad character is admissible if, but only if— 
 
(a) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible, 
 
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a question asked by 
him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it, 
 
(c) it is important explanatory evidence, 
 
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution, 
 
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the 
defendant and a co-defendant, 
 
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, or 
 
(g) the defendant has made an attack on another person’s character. 
 
(2) Sections 102 to 106 contain provision supplementing subsection (1). 
 
(3) The court must not admit evidence under subsection (1)(d) or (g) if, on an application by the 
defendant to exclude it, it appears to the court that the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
 
(4) On an application to exclude evidence under subsection (3) the court must have regard, in 
particular, to the length of time between the matters to which that evidence relates and the matters 
which form the subject of the offence charged. 
 
 
ii. First Gateway: s. 101(1)(a) 
“All parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible,” 
 
20.2 It may well serve the defendant to agree to admitting bad character evidence, especially if it would 
furnish him with an alibi. 
 
 
iii.  Second Gateway: s.101(1)(b) 
 
“The evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a question asked 
by him in cross-examination and intended to elicit it.” 
 
20.3 It might be tactical for the defendant to bring up his past convictions himself, perhaps to suggest that 
they are not relevant to the case. However, once he has mentioned them, he can be cross-examined 
on them, and the prosecution could use them to suggest either lack of credibility or propensity: a 
potential Pandora’s Box. 
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iv.  Third Gateway: s.101(1)(c) 
 
“It is important explanatory evidence.” 
 
20.4 Evidence under this gateway will be admitted if without it, the court would find it impossible or difficult 
properly to understand the evidence in the case, and its value for understating the evidence is 
substantial. 
 
20.5 One problem with this is that, if the evidence is vital to understanding the main evidence, it should 
come under s.98(a) as something which has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the 
defendant is charged – which is admissible anyway. However, as explained below, it is crucial that 
judges correctly identify which gateway they are going through! 
 
 
v.  Fourth Gateway: s.101(1)(d) and s.103 
 
“It is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution.” 
  
20.6 This is the successor to the similar fact rule, discussed above.  
 
20.7 The words used in s.101(1)(d) - it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant 
and the prosecution – are clarified in later sections. 
20.8 CJA 2003, s.103  
“Matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution” 
(1) For the purposes of section 101(1)(d) the matters in issue between the defendant and the 
prosecution include— 
 
(a) the question whether the defendant has a propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he 
is charged, except where his having such a propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the 
offence; 
 
(b) the question whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful, except where it is not 
suggested that the defendant’s case is untruthful in any respect. 
 
(2) Where subsection (1)(a) applies, a defendant’s propensity to commit offences of the kind with which 
he is charged may (without prejudice to any other way of doing so) be established by evidence that 
he has been convicted of— 
 
(a) an offence of the same description as the one with which he is charged, or 
 
(b) an offence of the same category as the one with which he is charged. 
 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply in the case of a particular defendant if the court is satisfied, by 
reason of the length of time since the conviction or for any other reason, that it would be unjust for it 
to apply in his case. 
 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (2)— 
 
(a) two offences are of the same description as each other if the statement of the offence in a written 
charge or indictment would, in each case, be in the same terms; 
 
(b) two offences are of the same category as each other if they belong to the same category of offences 
prescribed for the purposes of this section by an order made by the Secretary of State. 
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20.9  Explanatory Notes to the CJA 2003 
 
a. Section 103 relates to evidence of a defendant’s bad character that is admissible because it 
is relevant to an important matter at issue between the defendant and the prosecution 
(see section 101(1)(d)). Evidence might be relevant to one of a number of issues in a case. 
For example, it might help the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt of the offence by 
establishing their involvement or state of mind or by rebutting the defendant’s explanation of 
his conduct. Only prosecution evidence is admissible on this basis – section 103(6) – and the 
defendant may apply to have the evidence excluded under section 101(3). 
 
b. Section 103(1)(a) makes it clear that evidence that shows that a defendant has a propensity 
to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged can be admitted under this head. For 
example, if the defendant is on trial for grievous bodily harm, a history of violent behaviour 
could be admissible to show the defendant’s propensity to use violence. Evidence is not, 
however, admissible on this basis if the existence of such a propensity makes it no more likely 
that the defendant is guilty. This might be the case where there is no dispute about the facts 
of the case and the question is whether those facts constitute the offence (for example, in a 
homicide case, whether the defendant’s actions caused death). 
 
c. Where propensity is an issue, subsection (2) provides that this propensity may be established 
by evidence that the defendant has been convicted of an offence of the same description or 
category as the one with which he is charged. This is subject to subsection (3), which provides 
that the propensity may not be established in this way if the court is satisfied that due to the 
length of time since the previous conviction or for any other reason that would be unjust. 
 
d. An offence of the same description is defined by reference to how the offence appears on an 
indictment or written charge. It therefore relates to the particular law that has been broken, 
rather than the circumstances in which it was committed. An offence will be of the same 
category as another if they both fall within a category drawn up by the Secretary of State in 
secondary legislation. An order establishing such categories will be subject to the affirmative 
procedure (see section 330(5)). The categories must contain offences that are of the same 
type (section 103(4)), for example, offences involving violence against the person or sexual 
offences. 
 
e. Section 103(1)(b) makes it clear that evidence relating to whether the defendant has a 
propensity to be untruthful (in other words, is not to be regarded as a credible witness) can be 
admitted. This is intended to enable the admission of a limited range of evidence such as 
convictions for perjury or other offences involving deception (for example, obtaining property 
by deception), as opposed to the wider range of evidence that will be admissible where the 
defendant puts his character in issue by for example, attacking the character of another 
person. Evidence will not be admissible under this head where it is not suggested that the 
defendant’s case is untruthful in any respect, for example, where the defendant and 
prosecution are agreed on the facts of the alleged offence and the question is whether all the 
elements of the offence have been made out. 
 
Propensity to commit a similar crime 
 
20.10 CJA 2003, s.101(1)(d) enables the admission of more propensity evidence than the common law 
would have done. 
20.11 R. v Weir (Anthony Albert) [2006] 1 WLR 1885 (CA) 
The appellants Weir, Somanathan, Yaxley-Lennon, Manister and Hong appealed against their 
convictions in five separate cases that raised points in relation to the bad character provisions 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The defendant in the first case was charged with sexual assault by touching a girl under the age of 13, 
contrary to section 7 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  At the trial, the prosecution applied 
under section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to adduce evidence of the defendant's bad 
character relevant to, or having substantial probative value in relation to, a matter in issue between 
the defendant and the prosecution, which by section 103(1) of the Act included a propensity to commit 
offences of the kind with which he was charged.  
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The evidence adduced was a previous conviction for taking an indecent photograph of a child, contrary 
to section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 notwithstanding that such an offence had not been 
included in the category of offences listed in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) 
Order 2004 for the purpose of section 103(2).  
 
The defendant was convicted. 
 
The defendant in the second case was charged with rape. At trial the prosecution applied 
under section 101 of the Act to adduce evidence from two other women alleging that they had been 
subjected to sexually charged approaches by the defendant similar to those which the complainant 
said had been made to her. The judge granted the application notwithstanding that, before the 
implementation of the Act, the evidence would not have satisfied the test for the admissibility of similar 
fact evidence which balanced probative value against prejudicial effect. The defendant was convicted. 
 
The defendant in the third case was charged with assault. At trial the prosecution questioned the main 
defence witness about a previous caution for possession of drugs and then applied under section 
100(1) for that evidence to be left with the jury as evidence of her bad character. The defence applied 
for the jury to be discharged on the ground that questions of credibility could not fall within the ambit 
of evidence “having substantial probative value” within section 100(1)(b) . The judge refused but 
warned the jury to disregard the caution as it did not show that she had been lying when giving her 
evidence. The defendant was convicted. 
 
The defendant in the fourth case was charged with one count of rape and two counts of indecent 
assault. At the relevant time the defendant had been 39 and the complainant 13. The judge ruled that 
evidence which had been adduced of a previous sexual relationship between the defendant when 
aged 34 and a girl of 16 was admissible as bad character evidence under section 101; and, in relation 
to the charge of rape, allowed the jury, were it to decide that intercourse had taken place but be 
uncertain as to consent, to return instead a verdict of indecent assault on account of the girl's age, 
notwithstanding that an indictment for unlawful sexual intercourse would have been out of time. The 
defendant was convicted of indecent assault on all three counts. 
 
The defendants in the fifth case were charged with violent disorder. Neither gave evidence but a co-
defendant claimed that they had previously been victims of a knife attack but had refused to provide 
statements to the police and had also been arrested on suspicion of committing a serious assault but 
had been released without charge after the alleged victims refused to provide statements. The judge 
ruled that neither matter was misconduct so as to amount to bad character for the purposes of section 
101 but was admissible at common law as having probative value. The defendants were convicted. 
 
On appeal against conviction in each case— 
 
Held , (1) dismissing the appeals in the first two cases, that for the purposes of section 103(1) of the 
2003 Act evidence of propensity of a defendant to commit offences of the kind charged could include 
a caution for an offence of a similar character notwithstanding it was not included in the list of offences 
prescribed under section 103(4) or, in a trial for rape, evidence by other women of sexually charged 
behaviour by the defendant similar to that alleged by the complainant notwithstanding that it might not 
have satisfied the common law test for the admissibility of similar fact evidence, the common law rules 
governing admissibility of evidence having been abolished by section 99(1) of the Act; and that, 
accordingly, the evidence in each case had been admissible and the convictions would stand. 
 
(2) Dismissing the appeal in the third case, that although the evidence of the bad character of a person, 
other than a defendant, which could be admitted under section 100(1)(b) of the 2003 Act as having 
substantial probative value in relation to a matter in issue in the proceedings included matters relating 
to the credibility of that person, evidence that a witness for the defence had a previous caution for 
possession of drugs did not have substantial probative value in relation to the credibility of that person's 
account of an incident she had witnessed; that the evidence so disclosed in relation to the witness in 
the third case had therefore been inadmissible; but that the judge had given sufficient warning to the 
jury to have no regard to the caution; and that, accordingly, the conviction was not unsafe. 
 
(3) Allowing the appeal in the fourth case against the conviction for indecent assault as an alternative 
to rape, that it was impermissible to commence a prosecution for indecent assault by leaving it to the 
jury as an alternative to a verdict of rape when the indecent assault consisted of unlawful sexual 
intercourse and a prosecution for such an offence could not have been commenced as being out of 
time; and that, accordingly, the conviction on that count would be quashed. 
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(4) Dismissing the appeals against the other convictions in the fourth case and allowing the appeals 
in the fifth case, that where previous conduct of a defendant did not amount to bad character evidence 
and so fell outside the ambit of section 101, section 99(1) did not apply and the common law rules 
governing admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings remained applicable; and that, accordingly, 
in the fourth case the defendant's sexual relationship with the girl aged 16, being conduct that was not 
illegal, could not amount to evidence of bad character within section 98 of the 2003 Act and so fell 
outside section 101, but such conduct, by a defendant who was significantly older, had been 
admissible at common law as being of relevance to his denial of any sexual interest in the complainant, 
whereas in the fifth case the defendants' failure to give a statement to police after being attacked, and 
their arrest on suspicion but release without charge, also fell outside section 98 and thus section 
101 but could not be admitted under common law rules as being of probative value without suggesting 
bad character, thus making their convictions unsafe. 
 
20.12 R. v. D, P and U [2012] 1 Cr App R 8 
 
In three separate cases the defendants were charged with offences involving the sexual abuse of 
children which had occurred over a substantial period. Each defendant denied any sexual contact with 
the children. In each case the judge admitted evidence that the defendant had viewed and/or made 
indecent photographs of children, relying on the bad character provisions of section 101(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003. All three defendants were convicted. 
 
On the defendants' appeals against conviction— 
 
Held, dismissing the appeals, that, where a defendant was charged with any prohibited sexual activity 
involving children, evidence that he possessed the relatively unusual character trait of having a sexual 
interest in children made it more likely that the allegation of the child complainant was true. Therefore, 
evidence that a defendant to such a charge had viewed or collected child pornography was capable 
of being admissible pursuant to section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as evidence which 
was relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution, although it 
did not follow that it was automatically admissible; and that, in all the circumstances, in each case 
evidence that the defendant had viewed and/or made indecent photographs of children had been 
properly admitted against him pursuant to section 101(1)(d) of the 2003 Act as demonstrating a sexual 
interest in children. 
 
20.13 R v. Mitchell [2017] AC 571 
 
Where, in a criminal case, the Crown relied on several incidents to establish propensity on the 
part of the defendant, it did not have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that each incident had 
happened in the way alleged, and the jury did not have to consider the facts of each individual 
incident in isolation from one another. The jury had to consider the evidence in the round to 
determine whether propensity had been established to the criminal standard. 
 
The defendant admitted that she had killed her ex-partner by stabbing him with a knife but claimed 
that she had acted in self-defence. At her trial for murder the prosecution, pursuant to articles 6(1)(d) 
and 8 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004, adduced disputed evidence 
of other incidents in which the defendant was said to have attacked or threatened to attack a person 
with a knife but which had not been the subject of any criminal convictions. The prosecution relied on 
that evidence to show that the defendant had a propensity to use knives in circumstances where she 
had been neither provoked nor acting in self-defence.  
 
The defendant was convicted of murder but the Court of Appeal allowed her appeal on the ground that 
the judge ought to have directed the jury that, before they could take the disputed bad character 
evidence into account, they had to be sure of its truth.  
 
The Crown appealed, challenging the Court of Appeal's ruling that the non-conviction bad character 
evidence had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt if it were to be considered by the jury on the 
issue of propensity. 
 
On the appeal to the House of Lords— 
 
Held , dismissing the appeal, that the proper issue for the jury was whether they were sure that the 
propensity had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt; that when a sole incident was relied on as 
showing propensity the facts of that incident had to be proved to the criminal standard; but that, where 
there were several incidents relied on for that purpose, the jury did not have to be convinced of the 
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truth and accuracy of all aspects of each of the alleged incidents, and the facts of each individual 
incident did not have to be considered in isolation from the others. 
 
In such circumstances, the evidence about propensity should be considered cumulatively rather than 
each incident being regarded separately. Propensity was at most an incidental issue in a trial which 
could not alone establish guilt, and it should be made clear to the jury that the most important evidence 
was that which bore directly on the guilt or innocence of the defendant; and that, accordingly, since in 
the instant case the trial judge had failed to give adequate directions as to how the question of 
propensity should be approached by the jury, the conviction was unsafe and had been properly 
quashed. 
 
20.14 The Court of Appeal will not readily reverse the exercise of judicial discretion to admit evidence, but it 
has been known to do so. 
R. v. Tully and Wood [2006] EWCA Crim 2270 
 
Stephen Tully and Kevin Wood appealed against their convictions for robbery as a joint enterprise. A 
taxi-driver had been robbed by two men who had been passengers in his taxi. One had threatened 
him with a knife. He had called the police and waited for them outside the house into which the two 
men had gone. When police attended at the house, they found the stolen possessions, a knife wrapped 
in clothing and Wood hiding under a bed, with Tully face down under a duvet on a bed. Wood and 
Tully made no comment in interview and the taxi-driver failed to pick them out at an identification 
procedure.  
 
Tully and Wood appealed against their convictions for robbery as a joint enterprise. A taxi-driver had 
been robbed by two men who had been passengers in his taxi. One had threatened him with a knife. 
He had called the police and waited for them outside the house into which the two men had gone. 
When police attended at the house, they found the stolen possessions, a knife wrapped in clothing 
and Wood hiding under a bed, with Tully face down under a duvet on a bed. Wood and Tully made no 
comment in interview and the taxi-driver failed to pick them out at an identification procedure.  
 
The important issues to which the convictions were said to be relevant were:  
 
1. that Wood and Tully each had a propensity to commit the type of offences with which they 
were now charged;  
 
2. that they had committed offences jointly in the past and had that propensity as well.  
 
Whilst the Crown had intended putting in only the convictions for robbery and the jointly committed 
offence, the judge had encouraged them to put in all the offences of dishonesty, on the basis that 
s.103(2) of the Act provided that propensity to commit offences could be demonstrated by showing 
previous convictions of offences of the same description or category.  
 
Wood and Tully submitted that the judge had taken far too broad an approach to the issue of propensity 
and that he was wrong to say that it was sufficient for the Crown to show a propensity to obtain other 
people's property by one means or another. 
 
Held: The judge was wrong to hold, in effect, that a propensity to obtain other people's property by 
one means or another made it more likely that Wood and Tully would have committed the robbery in 
the instant case.  
 
However, the safety of the convictions was not in doubt. There was strong evidence in the case and 
had the previous robbery and joint enterprise convictions been properly admitted Wood and Tully 
would undoubtedly have been convicted. 
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Propensity to be untruthful 
 
20.15 The statute draws a distinction between propensity for untruthfulness and lack of credibility. 
20.16 The definition of untruthfulness has caused some problems. It apparently does not mean the same 
thing as dishonest. (See Explanatory Note at 4.9 (e) above.) 
 
20.17 R. v. Hanson [2005] 1 WLR 3169 
 
“As to propensity to untruthfulness, this, as it seems to us, is not the same as propensity to dishonesty. 
It is to be assumed, bearing in mind the frequency with which the words honest and dishonest appear 
in the criminal law, that Parliament deliberately chose the word "untruthful" to convey a different 
meaning, reflecting a defendant's account of his behaviour, or lies told when committing an offence.  
 
“Previous convictions, whether for offences of dishonesty or otherwise, are therefore only likely to be 
capable of showing a propensity to be untruthful where, in the present case, truthfulness is an issue 
and, in the earlier case, either there was a plea of not guilty and the defendant gave an account, on 
arrest, in interview, or in evidence, which the jury must have disbelieved, or the way in which the 
offence was committed shows a propensity for untruthfulness, for example, by the making of false 
representations. The observations made above in para 9 as to the number of convictions apply equally 
here.” per Rose LJ at para 13 
 
vi.  Fifth Gateway: s.101(1)(e) and s.104 
 
“It has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the 
defendant and a co-defendant.” 
 
20.18 The evidence must have substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between 
the defendant and a co-defendant, 
 
20.19 CJA 2003, s104  
 
“Matter in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant” 
 
(1) Evidence which is relevant to the question whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful 
is admissible on that basis under section 101(1)(e) only if the nature or conduct of his defence is 
such as to undermine the co-defendant’s defence. 
 
(2) Only evidence— 
 
(a) which is to be (or has been) adduced by the co-defendant, or 
(b) which a witness is to be invited to give (or has given) in cross-examination by the co-defendant, is 
admissible under section 101(1)(e).  
 
20.20 There is no exclusionary discretion under this gateway, so the courts have set a high threshold of 
admissibility. The underlying assumption is that if the evidence has ‘substantial probative value in 
relation to an important matter’, it would not be unfair to admit it anyway. 
 
20.21 R. v. Phillips [2012] 1 Cr App R 25 
 
It was the prosecution's case that Phillips and a number of co-accused - Thomas Scragg and Paul 
Scragg - had conspired with others to cheat the Revenue by paying a workforce without the deduction 
of tax and national insurance, failing to account for tax and national insurance, falsely representing 
that work had been subcontracted to companies for which payments including VAT had been made 
and failing to account for VAT. Phillips and Thomas Scragg accepted that a fraud had been in progress 
but each denied responsibility.  
 
At trial Phillips applied to adduce evidence of Scragg's bad character. The evidence Phillips sought to 
adduce was; (i) Scragg's previous conviction for conspiracy to defraud; (ii) Scragg's conviction for 
using threatening behaviour; (iii) previous investigations into Scragg whereby he was implicated in CIS 
Revenue fraud. That evidence related to events during the period before Phillips was alleged to have 
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formed or joined the conspiracy. Phillips also sought to adduce evidence from the post-indictment 
period whereby Scragg was implicated in fraud. The judge admitted the evidence of the conviction for 
conspiracy to defraud but refused to allow Phillips to adduce the other evidence. 
 
Phillips contended that the judge had wrongly refused him leave under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
s.101(1)(e) to adduce evidence of the bad character of Scragg. 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
(1) The statutory test for admissibility of evidence under s.101(1)(e) was that evidence sought to be 
adduced had to be of "substantial probative value". The principle factual issue raised by P and 
contested by S was that he was an innocent recruit to an existing dishonest scheme. The judge was 
not required, when assessing whether the probative value of the evidence was substantial, to examine 
each piece of evidence going to the same effect in isolation of the rest of the evidence. The main 
issues between P, S and the other co-accused was whether P was recruited by S to perpetuate an 
existing fraud and, if so, whether he was recruited as an innocent front man (see para.48 of judgment). 
The evidence implicating S in CIS fraud undoubtedly amounted to evidence of substantial probative 
value in relation to the issue whether S was, in the months preceding the instant fraud, engaged with 
others in the fraudulent use of CIS certificates. If P could persuade the jury that he was recruited to an 
existing fraud the thrust of S's denial might be undermined and the evidence should have been 
admitted. However, the judge was entitled to refuse to admit evidence of S's alleged involvement in a 
later fraud. The prosecution had adduced evidence that following P's departure from the firm the fraud 
had continued, which provided the strongest indication that contrary to S's case he was implicated in 
the fraud throughout. Further, the judge was correct to rule that the previous conviction for threats and 
intimidatory behaviour was not admissible. 
 
(2) The judge had no discretion to exclude the evidence once a defendant had established the statutory 
criteria (para.59). (3) Whilst the evidence should not have been excluded, it did not affect the fairness 
of P's trial or the safety of the verdict  
 
 
vii.  Sixth Gateway: s.101(1)(f) and s.105 
 
“It is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant.” 
 
20.22 CJA 2003, s.105   
 
“Evidence to correct a false impression” 
 
(1) For the purposes of section 101(1)(f)— 
 
(a) the defendant gives a false impression if he is responsible for the making of an express or implied 
assertion which is apt to give the court or jury a false or misleading impression about the 
defendant; 
 
(b) evidence to correct such an impression is evidence which has probative value in correcting it. 
 
(3) A defendant is treated as being responsible for the making of an assertion if— 
 
(a) the assertion is made by the defendant in the proceedings (whether or not in evidence given by 
him), 
 
(b) the assertion was made by the defendant— 
 
(i) on being questioned under caution, before charge, about the offence with which he is charged, or 
 
(ii) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it, 
and evidence of the assertion is given in the proceedings,  
 
(c) the assertion is made by a witness called by the defendant, 
 
(d) the assertion is made by any witness in cross-examination in response to a question asked by the 
defendant that is intended to elicit it, or is likely to do so, or 
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(e) the assertion was made by any person out of court, and the defendant adduces evidence of it in 
the proceedings. 
 
20.23 The court must take care to distinguish situations where the defendant is creating a ‘false impression’ 
from those where he is simply denying the offence. 
 
20.24 R v. Ovba [2015] EWCA Crim 725 
 
A conviction for assault was unsafe where a judge had wrongly admitted evidence of an 
offender's bad character in order to correct a false impression given by the offender about her 
character. The character evidence she introduced had been too unspecific and insubstantial 
to support the introduction of bad character evidence. 
 
The appellant appealed against her convictions for assault and dangerous driving. 
She had outstanding county court fines. The victim, a bailiff, spotted her car and blocked it in with his 
car, intending to clamp it. The appellant returned to her car, which she moved backwards and forwards 
in an attempt to drive away. The victim clung onto her bonnet, but fell to the ground injuring his elbow 
and back.  
 
The Crown's case had been that she deliberately and recklessly assaulted the victim by driving her 
car at him in a dangerous manner. She argued that the victim had not identified himself as a bailiff and 
that she had attempted to drive away because she feared for her own safety.  
 
The appellant had a previous conviction for robbery and a caution for battery. During cross-
examination she said that she was a "friendly person" and that she had witnessed the effect of 
domestic violence when she had been growing up. The Crown applied to introduce her previous 
convictions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(f) to correct the false impression that she 
was not capable of violence. The judge ruled that the appellant's remarks gave rise to the implied 
assertion that she was not the sort of person who would have committed these offences, and admitted 
her previous convictions. She was sentenced to a six-month suspended prison term of imprisonment, 
with an order that she complete 100 hours of unpaid work and ordered to pay a £250 compensation 
order. 
 
The appellant submitted that the judge should not have allowed evidence of bad character to be 
introduced during the trial. 
 
Held: Appeal allowed in part. 
 
The appellant's observations given in cross examination had been too fragile a foundation on which 
to allow the introduction of her bad character. What she had said did not amount to a factual statement 
that she was not the sort of person who would get into fights. The evidence given by her had been too 
unspecific and insubstantial to support the introduction of bad character evidence.  
 
The assault conviction was quashed, but the wrongful admission of bad character evidence had no 
impact on the conviction for dangerous driving. The suspended sentence and compensation order 
were quashed, and only the 100 hours community service element remained. 
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viii.  Seventh Gateway: s.101(1)(g) and s.106 
 
 “The defendant has made an attack on another person’s character.” 
 
20.25 CJA 2003 
 
s.106 “Attack on another person’s character” 
 
(1) For the purposes of section 101(1)(g) a defendant makes an attack on another person’s character 
if— 
 
(a) he adduces evidence attacking the other person’s character, 
 
(b) he (or any legal representative appointed under section 38(4) of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 to cross-examine a witness in his interests) asks questions in cross-examination 
that are intended to elicit such evidence, or are likely to do so, or 
 
(c) evidence is given of an imputation about the other person made by the defendant— 
(i) on being questioned under caution, before charge, about the offence with which he is charged, or 
(ii) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it. 
 
(2) In subsection (1) “evidence attacking the other person’s character” means evidence to the effect 
that the other person— 
 
(a) has committed an offence (whether a different offence from the one with which the defendant is 
charged or the same one), or 
 
(b) has behaved, or is disposed to behave, in a reprehensible way; 
 
and “imputation about the other person” means an assertion to that effect.  
 
(4) Only prosecution evidence is admissible under section 101(1)(g). 
 
20.26 R. v. Singh (James Paul) [2007] EWCA Crim 2140 gives guidance on this section. 
 
Singh was charged with robbery. There was a second charge of assault on the same victim about a 
month afterwards. The defendant and the victim lived in the same large block of flats. According to the 
victim the appellant, whom he did not know, had waylaid him in the lift, pressed a knife to his neck 
and, assisted by another youth who was neither identified nor caught, had taken his money and his 
phone from his pocket, together with a gold chain from round his neck. The victim could not tell the 
police who it was who had done it. However, according to him he subsequently saw the appellant in 
the area of the flats. Eventually, about a month later, there was the further incident in which, according 
to the victim's account, he was pushed at, threatened and spat upon.  
 
Immediately after that he was able to get the police to go to a flat which he believed he had seen his 
assailant enter and there on the stairwell outside it the police found and arrested the appellant. 
 
When he was interviewed the following morning, the appellant said that he did not know the 
complainant and he had never had anything to do with him. He suggested it was probably a case of 
mistaken identity. He said that he would have been either at his parents' home or at the bookmakers 
at the relevant time. There followed that afternoon a video identification procedure for the complainant. 
The complainant identified the appellant as the person responsible for both attacks upon him. 
 
At the trial the appellant's case was different to the one that he had advanced in interview. He said 
now that he did know the complainant, at least to this extent. On the occasion of the alleged robbery 
he, the appellant, had been with some friends. They had been approached by the complainant and 
his girlfriend. The complainant had asked the appellant and his friends if they had any crack cocaine 
to sell. That having drawn a blank, the complaint had successfully gone off and found a supplier of 
such drugs nearby. Having done that, said the appellant, the complainant had invited the appellant 
back to his flat to “chill out”. As a result, he and his two friends had spent three or four hours that 
afternoon drinking and smoking in the complainant's flat. The complainant had been smoking the crack 
which he had bought. There had been no robbery. What had happened, according to the appellant, 
was that as they were leaving one of his friends had quite independently of him helped himself to the 
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mobile phone and the chain which had been left lying about on an occasional table. The appellant 
contended that he had nothing whatever to do with that. The appellant accepted that he had lied in 
interview in saying that he did not know the complainant and he gave as a reason for that that he had 
been protecting the friend who had stolen the chain and, moreover, he had not wanted his girlfriend to 
know that he had spent the evening, among other things, smoking cannabis. 
 
As to the second assault the appellant's case was that it was pure invention and he had not seen the 
complaint at all on that day. 
 
That case was properly put to the complainant when the complainant gave evidence. The appellant 
was a man of bad character in that he had convictions for disorder, assaults on policemen, 
harassment, criminal damage and driving with excess alcohol. Those were offences committed over 
a period of about two-and-a-half years prior to the present allegations and within about three years or 
so of the trial. 
 
The Crown applied to adduce this evidence of bad character under section 101(1)(g) on the ground 
that the appellant had made an attack on the character of the complainant. On the appellant's behalf 
it was conceded that such an attack had been made and that accordingly the gateway was passed. 
The Recorder was, however, asked to exercise his discretion under section 101(3) not to admit the 
evidence. He rejected that submission. He concluded that the evidence would not have such an 
adverse effect upon the fairness of the proceedings that it should be excluded. He rightly observed 
that the case depended very largely on which of the complainant on the one hand and the appellant 
on the other was telling the truth. He went on, in giving his decision, to say this: 
 
“This is a case where the credibility of the prosecution's principal witness is plainly to the fore. It is 
going to come down to whether the jury are sure that he has told the truth when he says that the 
defendant robbed him … and assaulted him. … or whether they think it is or may be true, as the 
defendant now says, that the phone was simply taken by somebody else and all this has been made 
up to cover up what has occurred. 
 
“Plainly, the questions which were put to the victim about his interest in obtaining crack cocaine and 
having earlier that day crack cocaine were put to undermine the credibility of the victim, and to cast 
doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether they should believe him, if he was the kind of person, as 
they suggest, who was interested in obtaining Class A drugs and had earlier that day bought them. 
For what other reason can those questions have been put? 
 
“It seems to me that to admit these convictions, as the prosecution ask me to permit, would not have 
such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that I ought not to admit it, so that the jury 
may know the character of the person on whose behalf allegations — which were stoutly denied — 
but allegations which were made against the victim, plainly with the intention of damaging him in the 
eyes of the jury; and accordingly I admit his bad character.” 
 
In the unsuccessful appeal, Hughes LJ discussed the application of s.101(1)(g) 
 
“The purpose of gateway G is to enable the jury to know from what sort of source allegations against 
a witness (especially a complainant but not only a complainant) have come. 
 
“Gateway G does not depend upon propensity to offend as charged or upon propensity to be untruthful 
in the sense of having a track record for untruthfulness. The purpose that it has is the one which we 
have identified. Of course, it is well established that if a defendant's bad character admitted because 
gateway G has been passed does also go to show propensity to offend as charged or to be untruthful 
it is open to the jury to use it for the relevant purpose. That, however, is not this case and such has 
not been suggested. It does not, however, follow, that it is admissible only if it also shows one or other 
of those propensities. To say that would be tantamount to saying that evidence which is admissible 
through gateway G ought to be excluded as a matter of discretion unless it also passes gateway D. 
There is clearly no warrant in the statute for construing it in that way — just the reverse. The Act plainly 
demonstrates that the gateways are independent, although of course in some cases more than one of 
them may be passed. The argument which we are addressing would, if accepted, deprive gateway G 
of much of its application.” per Hughes LJ at paras 9 and 10 
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21 THE EXCLUSIONARY DISCRETION 
 
21.1 CJA 2003, s.101: Defendant’s bad character 
 
(3) The court must not admit evidence under subsection (1)(d) or (g) if, on an application by the defendant 
to exclude it, it appears to the court that the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse 
effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
 
(4) On an application to exclude evidence under subsection (3) the court must have regard, in particular, 
to the length of time between the matters to which that evidence relates and the matters which form the 
subject of the offence charged. 
 
21.2 Note that s.101 (3) and (4) only apply to the fourth and seventh gateway. 
 
21.3 “Fairness of the proceedings” includes fairness to the prosecution as well as to the defence.12 
 
22 THE CHILD DEFENDANT 
 
22.1 CJA 2003, s.108 : Offences committed by defendant when a child 
(2) In proceedings for an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant 
when aged 21 or over, evidence of his conviction for an offence when under the age of 14 is not 
admissible unless— (a) both of the offences are triable only on indictment, and 
(b) the court is satisfied that the interests of justice require the evidence to be admissible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 R. v. Lewis [2014] EWCA Crim 48. 
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I SILENCE 
 
23  SILENCE AS A CONFESSION 
 
23.1 The right to remain silent in the face of interrogation from an officer of state is a fundamental aspect of 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
23.2  However, remaining silent when accused of a crime might be taken to be a tacit acceptance of the 
allegation, especially when the accusation is made by someone on equal terms with the person they 
are accusing.  
 
23.2 Thus, silence may sometimes equate to a confession, and if such a ‘confession’ is to be admitted as 
evidence, it will be subject to the usual rules relating to confessions to be found in PACE 1984 – i.e.  
 
1. The oppression test: s.76 (2) (a) 
2. The reliability test: s.76 (2) (b) 
3. The fairness test: s.78 
4. The common law test: s.82 (3) 
 
UNDER STATUTE 
 
23.4 According to PACE 1984 s.82, a confession includes any statement adverse to the person who made 
it whether made in words or otherwise.13 Therefore, the accused may accept the accusation of another 
so as to amount to a confession not only by words, but also by conduct, demeanour or even by silence. 
 
AT COMMON LAW 
 
23.5  The common law rules relating to statements made in the presence of the accused have been   
preserved by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
s.118:  Preservation of certain common law categories of admissibility 
(1) The following rules of law are preserved… (5) Any rule of law relating to the admissibility of 
confessions or mixed statements in criminal proceedings. 
 
23.6 The common law principles governing the admissibility of confessions made indirectly by 
acknowledgement (whether by words, conduct or silence) were examined in R. v. Norton [1910] 2 KB 
496.  
 
23.7 R. v. Norton [1910] 2 KB 496 
 
Stephen Norton was convicted on a charge of carnally knowing a girl called Marjory Truman who was 
under the age of thirteen years. He was sentenced to ten years' penal servitude, He appealed against 
his conviction on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury as to the effect of this evidence. 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
The evidence against Norton was entirely circumstantial, with the exception of that relating to the 
statements of the girl and the answers of Norton. He appealed against his conviction on the ground 
that the judge had misdirected the jury as to the effect of this evidence. 
 
The evidence was that, on being asked by Norton who had done it, she said: “You,” and, on being 
asked by another person, she said: “Stevie Norton,” and pointed to Norton. 
 
Norton said: “No, Madge, you are mistaken”; and then she said: “You have done it, Stephen Norton,” 
and pointed to him again.  
 
 
13 PACE 1984 s.82(1). 
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According to one witness, he then lifted his arms and said: “If I have done it I hope the Lord will strike 
me dead,” and according to another witness: “If you say so I might as well put my clothes on and go 
home.”  
 
There was, therefore, nothing in his answers necessarily amounting to an admission of the girl's 
statements. 
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
The direction of the judge as to the effect of this evidence was as follows:  
 
“One starts with that. Maggie Truman comes back from that awful night at 9 o'clock the next morning. 
Something is seen trying to get over the wall of that field, and Travis runs up and brings her down to 
her mother. The prisoner is brought into the house, and then there comes the dramatic scene, which 
is so dramatic that one is afraid that it takes away one's power of accurately estimating it, in which the 
man solemnly swears that he did nothing to the little girl, and the little girl twice or thrice points at him 
and says ‘Stevie Norton, you did it.’  
 
“Gentlemen, you must consider that remark carefully. It is for you entirely, and anything I say as to fact 
you are to disregard if it does not agree with your own views; you are the judges of fact, and not I; you 
must consider this. Do you think, first of all, that after what she had gone through that night the little 
girl was in a condition to accurately remember, … but, gentlemen, at any rate the fact that the little girl 
did say so renders it necessary to very carefully consider what evidence is tendered on behalf of 
Stephen Norton.”  
 
“You have then got him telling lies as to where he was, and you will probably think, if that is the position, 
that confirms very much what the little girl says, because, is he were the guilty man, he would be very 
likely to try and explain where he was at a material time by making some statement which must have 
been untrue, because, if he were the guilty man, he was in the wheat field and not in some other place. 
Gentlemen, you have to consider all these matters and you have to consider what weight is to be 
attached to the statement of the little girl.” 
 
The Court of Criminal Appeal held that this was indeed a misdirection and quashed the conviction. 
 
Pickford J. made several propositions relating to such evidence. 
 
1. Statements made in the presence of the accused upon an occasion on which he might reasonably 
be expected to make some observation, explanation or denial are admissible in evidence if the 
judge is satisfied that there is evidence fit to be submitted to the jury that the accused, by his 
answer to them, whether given by word or conduct, including silence, acknowledged the truth of 
the whole or part of them. 
 
2. If the statements are admitted, the question whether the accused’s answer, by words, conduct or 
silence, did or did not amount to acknowledgment of them should be left to the jury. 
 
3. The judge should direct the jury that if they conclude that the accused acknowledged the truth of 
the whole or ay part of the statement, they may take the statement, or part of it, into consideration 
as evidence, but that without such an acknowledgement they should disregard the statement 
altogether. 
 
23.8 The guidelines in R. v. Norton were approved by the House of Lords in R. v. Christie [1914].  
 
23.9 R. v. Christie [1914] AC 545 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
Frederick Butcher, aged 5, went out to play in some fields at 10 o'clock in the morning and returned at 
10.30. He came back screaming and with his clothes disarranged. His mother took him across the 
fields and as she and her son were going towards Christie, Frederick said: “That is the man, mum”.  A 
police constable who was on the spot asked him: “Which man?” and made him go right up to the man 
and identify him by touching him on the sleeve.  
 
The little boy then said: “That is the old man, mum, who”— and then he described what Christie 
supposedly did to him. Christie replied: “I am innocent.”  
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Christie was convicted of an indecent assault upon the little boy. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed 
the conviction upon the authority of Rex v. Norton [1910] 2 K. B. 496, on the ground that evidence of 
a statement made in the presence of the accused was not admissible against him unless he 
acknowledged the truth of the statement. 
 
 The case went to the House of Lords on two questions of law. 
 
1. Whether the statement made by this Butcher in the presence and hearing of the accused and of 
a police constable was properly admitted in evidence; and  
 
2. Whether, the child having been permitted to give evidence without being sworn, the judge had 
misdirected the jury in telling them that the statement so made by the boy in presence of the 
accused was material evidence implicating the accused, in corroboration of the boy's testimony 
given at the trial. 
 
The House of Lords held that the evidence of identification was admissible, and with it the evidence of 
the defendant’s demeanour on being challenged. However, the conviction would stay quashed 
because the judge had misdirected the jury as to the significance they should place on the denial: 
although it was admissible without corroboration. 
 
“The rule of law undoubtedly is that a statement made in the presence of an accused person, even 
upon an occasion which should be expected reasonably to call for some explanation or denial from 
him, is not evidence against him of the facts stated, save so far as he accepts the statement, so as to 
make it, in effect, his own. If he accepts the statement in part only, then to that extent alone does it 
become his statement. He may accept the statement by word or conduct, action or demeanour, and it 
is the function of the jury which tries the case to determine whether his words, action, conduct, or 
demeanour at the time when a statement was made amounts to an acceptance of it in whole or in part.  
 
“It by no means follows, I think, that a mere denial by the accused of the facts mentioned in the 
statement necessarily renders the statement inadmissible, because he may deny the statement in 
such a manner and under such circumstances as may lead a jury to disbelieve him, and constitute 
evidence from which an acknowledgment may be inferred by them.”  per Lord Atkinson at p. 554 
 
23.10  Silence is most likely to be taken to amount to a confession when the accuser and the accused are on 
equal terms, as an accused party is more likely to stay silent for his own protection when challenged 
by someone in authority. 
 
R. v. Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox C.C. 503 
 
“Undoubtedly, when persons are speaking on even terms, and a charge is made, and the person 
charged says nothing, and expresses no indignation, and does nothing to repel the charge, that is 
some evidence to show that he admits the charge to be true.” per Cave J. at p.508 
 
23.11 The principle from R. v. Mitchell (1892) was applied in Donald Parkes v. The Queen (1976), where it 
was held that when an accusation is made to the defendant’s face by someone on equal terms, the 
fact that he does not respond by denying it might give the inference that he is admitting it. 
 
23.12 Donald Parkes v. The Queen [1976] 1 WLR 1251 (Privy Council: Jamaica) 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS  
 
Donald Parkes was convicted of murdering a young woman, Daphne Graham. The evidence against 
him was circumstantial and given mainly by Mrs. Graham, the mother of the deceased.  
 
Parkes and Daphne Graham lived in separate rooms of a house owned by Mrs. Graham. She lived in 
the adjoining house.  
 
According to her evidence Mrs. Graham left her house on the morning of September 14, 1971, at 
about 7.30 a.m. in order to go to work. She then saw her daughter standing at her room door. Before 
she left, she had seen the defendant standing on the veranda on to which the deceased's room 
opened. As soon as she had got on to the road outside the house, she was told something which 
caused her to return. She found her daughter in her room bleeding from two stab wounds from which 
she died three days later. 
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She was assisted to her bed and said something to her mother as a result of which Mrs. Graham went 
out of the room to the yard which was common to the two houses. There she found the defendant with 
a ratchet knife in his hand. The knife was at that time closed.  
 
Mrs. Graham said to Parkes: “What she do you — why you stab her?”  
 
Parkes made no reply, nor did he reply when she repeated the question.  
 
Mrs. Graham then boxed him twice and seized him by the waist-band of his trousers saying she would 
keep him there until the police came. Parkes then opened the knife and made to strike Mrs. Graham 
with it. She noticed that it had blood stains on the blade. She put up her arm to defend herself and her 
finger was cut requiring five stitches.  
 
Mr. Jarrett, the uncle-in-law of Parkes, who had by then arrived upon the scene, told Parkes to hand 
over the knife to him. Parkes did so, and Mr. Jarrett subsequently handed over the knife to the police. 
 
THE DEFENDANT’S TESTIMONY 
 
At the trial, Parkes made an unsworn statement from the dock. In the course of the statement he said 
that he had just woken up and gone out to wash his face in the yard when Mrs. Graham approached 
him and held him by the waist.  
 
In substance, he confirmed Mrs. Graham's account of what was then said and explained that he said 
nothing in reply because he did not know what she was speaking about. He denied that he had stabbed 
at Mrs. Graham and accounted for the cut on her finger by saying that she had searched his pocket 
for the knife, had found the knife in it, opened it and said that she was going to stab him with it because 
he had stabbed her daughter. He took the knife from her and while he was doing so, she cut her finger 
with it.  
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
Smith C.J. instructed the jury that the failure of the defendant to reply to the accusation twice made 
against him by Mrs. Graham that he had stabbed her daughter, coupled with his conduct immediately 
after that accusation had been made, were matters from which the jury could, if they thought fit, draw 
an inference that the defendant accepted the truth of the accusation.  
 
THE APPEAL TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
The court applied the dicta of Cave J. in Reg. v. Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox C.C. 503 to hold that in the 
circumstances, the Chief Justice was right to give this direction to the jury because the accused and 
the accuser were on an equal footing, and the defendant might have been reasonably expected to 
answer to the charge. 
 
“Here Mrs. Graham and the defendant were speaking on even terms. Furthermore, as the Chief 
Justice pointed out to the jury, the defendant's reaction to the twice-repeated accusation was not one 
of mere silence. He drew a knife and attempted to stab Mrs. Graham in order to escape when she 
threatened to detain him while the police were sent for. In their Lordships' view, the Chief Justice was 
perfectly entitled to instruct the jury that the defendant's reactions to the accusations, including his 
silence, were matters which they could take into account along with other evidence in deciding whether 
the defendant in fact committed the act with which he was charged. For these reasons their Lordships 
have humbly advised Her Majesty that the appeal be dismissed.”  per Lord Diplock at p.1254 
 
23.13 Even an interview with a police officer could be taken to be on equal terms in the right circumstances. 
 
R. v. Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585  
 
“We do not accept that a police officer always has an advantage over someone he is questioning. 
Everything depends upon the circumstances. A young detective questioning a local dignitary in the 
course of an inquiry into alleged local government corruption may be very much at a disadvantage. 
This kind of situation is to be contrasted with that of a tearful housewife accused of shoplifting or of a 
parent being questioned about the suspected wrongdoing of his son.” per Lawton LJ at p.589 
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23.14 R. v. Christie and R. v. Mitchell were applied by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 
585  
R. v. Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585  
On January 24, 1975, Roy Frank Chandler was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of conspiracy 
to cheat and defraud and was sentenced by Judge King-Hamilton to three years' imprisonment. 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
The prosecution's case against the defendant was that he was a member of a gang which had been 
formed to obtain colour television sets dishonestly. The co-defendants, Bernard Joy and Laurie 
Apicella, called on television hire shops giving false names, and dishonestly entered into hiring 
agreements without having any intention of paying the hire charges once they had obtained 
possession of a set. They got possession of a number and paid nothing.  
 
Sets were delivered to various addresses, including a house in which the defendant's wife was living. 
Thereafter the sets disappeared. The defendant had been living apart from his wife at the material 
times. There was some shadowy evidence that the defendant had helped the gang to remove a 
dishonestly acquired television set which had been sold to a dissatisfied customer, but the prosecution 
accepted that this evidence alone could not support the conviction.  
 
The only other evidence against the defendant came from a detective sergeant who spoke of an 
interview which he had had with him on November 23, 1973, at North Woolwich police station. The 
defendant's solicitor was present. 
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
The interview went thus: 
 
(Q) I am investigating the theft of a number of colour televisions. Some of these were delivered to 27, 
Eighth Avenue, a house of which you are part owner. I understand that you have not been residing 
there. When did you leave?  
 
(A) March.  
 
(Q) Have you visited?  
 
(A) No, not until the trouble my wife's in. I came back to take some control.  
 
(Q) You are actually saying you've never visited till …  
 
(A) About three weeks ago.  
 
(Q) You know there are some alterations being done in the house by a firm you're working for?  
 
(A) Yes.  
 
(Q) Have you done any work in the house?  
 
(A) No.  
(Q) I'm going to show you a hire purchase agreement in the name of Ward dated July 27 for the hire 
of a Spectra 26-inch colour television. It was delivered to 27, Eighth Avenue, on July 27, 1973. Certain 
identification details were seen by the firm, namely, a rent book in the name of R. C. Chandler of 116, 
Windsor Road, E.7; also a driving licence number. Can you tell me how these particulars got onto this 
agreement?  
 
(A) Not prepared to say anything on that.  
 
(Q) Do you know a man by the name of Laurie Apicella?  
 
(A) No comment.  
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(Q) Could this man have got hold of a driving licence or rent book in your name?  
 
(A) Don't wish to comment.  
 
(Q) Do you know a man by the name of Bernard Joy?  
 
(A) No.  
 
(Q) Could this man have got hold of a driving licence or rent book in your name?  
 
(A) I don't know whether he could or not.  
 
(Q) Do you know him?  
 
(A) No. In view of the circumstances, I suspect you may be concerned with these people I have 
mentioned in assisting them to steal rental televisions. 
 
At this stage the defendant was cautioned. The questioning continued. The defendant answered some 
questions and refused to make any comment when asked others. 
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
“Although it is absolutely true that even if a person has not been cautioned, if an accusation is made 
against him and he either says nothing at all or makes a comment to that effect, like ‘no comment,’ or 
‘I am not saying,’ you must not automatically say that that means he is guilty. That would be quite 
wrong. Nevertheless, it is for you — not for me or anybody else — to decide whether you think a series 
of answers like that do indicate in your view his guilt or innocence, or neither the one or the other but 
are completely neutral.  
 
“In considering that of course you must bear in mind two matters: that where a man has been cautioned 
— which means being told that he need not say anything unless he wishes to do so, and if he does it 
will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence — and thereafter he remains silent, that is 
absolutely within his right and he cannot be adversely criticised for so doing, because he accepts that 
part of the invitation in the caution to remain silent.  
 
“Even if he is not cautioned, as Mr. Philips rightly said, it is part of what is known as his common law 
right to decline to answer questions. In those circumstances you must ask yourselves whether he did 
so in the knowledge that he was exercising his common law right to remain silent, or whether he 
remained silent because he might have thought if he had answered he would in some way have 
incriminated himself.” 
 
Later, when reminding the jury of the detail of the detective sergeant's evidence about the interview, 
the judge interrupted the narrative with this comment: 
 
“From now on until a few answers later it is important to bear in mind, according to the prosecution, 
that no caution had been administered. According to Mr. Philips that is not important because, as he 
emphasised quite rightly, there is the common law right to refuse to answer questions.  
 
“According to me, and basing my decision on Rex v. Christie, it is a matter for you to determine, if 
you can, whether the refusal to answer questions was merely being evasive to protect his wife, evasive 
to protect himself, evasive because he did not know the answers, or evasive because he knew he was 
entitled to exercise his rights and not answer whether he knew the answer or not and was taking that 
stand upon the matter.” 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. Applying R v. Christie, the court held that the judge had 
misdirected the jury as to the weight of guilt they might attribute to the defendant’s silence, even before 
he had been cautioned 
“To suggest, as the judge did, that the defendant's silence could indicate guilt was to short-circuit the 
intellectual process which has to be followed. Phillips in A Treatise on the Law of Evidence pointed 
out this very error, at p. 334: “It very commonly happens, that evidence of the description referred to 
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has the effect of misleading juries, who are frequently influenced by it… and are unable, 
notwithstanding any directions from a judge, to regard it solely as exhibiting demeanour and conduct. 
In many instances, especially where no observation has been made by the party on hearing it, the 
evidence is particularly liable to produce erroneous conclusions. An acquiescence in the truth of the 
statement is frequently inferred, though the inference may, from a variety of causes, be incorrect. 
Thus, the evidence is not only fallacious with reference to its object, but in its collateral effect is 
prejudicial to the investigation of truth.” 
 
The same kind of error is seen in the comment which the judge made as to whether the defendant had 
been evasive in order to protect himself. He may have been; but that was not what the jury had to 
decide. It follows, in our judgment, that the comments made were not justified and could have led the 
jury to a wrong conclusion. 
 
“This is no legalistic quibble. We have looked closely at the evidence provided by the interview. There 
was no other as the defendant did not give any. Even if the comments had been made in accordance 
with Rex v. Christie, we should have quashed the conviction as being unsafe. The defendant, for 
example, refused to say anything about the fact that his name and driving licence number had got onto 
a hire-purchase document.  
 
“This could not amount to anything more than the acceptance by him that these particulars were where 
the detective sergeant said they were. Further, he made no comment when asked if he knew Apicella; 
at the most this could only amount to some evidence that he did know him. He lied when he said he 
did not know Joy; but proof that he lied did not amount to proof of any fact other than that he had lied. 
It is unnecessary to examine the interview in any more detail. It suffices to say that it did not provide a 
safe foundation for an inference that the appellant had been a member of the conspiracy alleged.” 
 per Lawton LJ at p.590 
 
23.15 The modern authority on confessions by silence is R. v. Osborne (2005) 
 
R. v. Stevie Osborne [2005] EWCA Crim 3082 
 
On 13 April 2005, Stevie Osborne was convicted of murder. He appealed against the conviction on 
the ground that the trial judge wrongly admitted in evidence a statement made in Osborne’s presence 
which was prejudicial to him and to which he did not object.  
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
At around 7.30pm on Wednesday 30 June 2004, Osborne was sitting with two friends, Luke Martin 
and Scott Cooper, on the pavement outside the Golden Lion Public House in Barking Road, Plaistow. 
Mohammed Omar, the deceased, was then 22 years old. He was accompanied by a young woman 
aged 17 who was related to him, Sahra Ali Hassain. As they walked along the pavement, they drew 
level with the appellant and his friends. Words were exchanged and a fight broke out, during which 
the deceased's tee-shirt was ripped, and during which he punched Osborne to the head. He and Sahra 
Ali Hassain then walked away from the incident. 
 
Osborne and his friends crossed the road. They walked along on the other side in the same direction 
as the deceased. They came upon a shop front that was being renovated and there they each picked 
up a piece of timber. Osborne ran across the road. He ran up behind the deceased, swung the piece 
of wood and hit him on the right side of his head. After that one blow he ran back to the other side of 
the road. 
 
The deceased was taken to hospital. He was found to have sustained a serious fracture of the skull. 
In due course it transpired that his skull was somewhat thinner than the norm. He died from that injury. 
 
THE DEFENCE 
 
There were several eye-witnesses to these events, including John Woolston, and Osborne admitted 
that he had hit the victim with a plank of wood.  
 
However, Osborne claimed that he did not intend to kill the victim and at the time believed that he was 
acting in self-defence. He claimed that he had intervened after the victim (a taller and older man than 
himself) had attacked another youth at the scene. He said that he was assaulted by the victim and 
was thrown to the ground and suffered concussion, and that when attacking the victim with the piece 
of wood, he believed that the victim was about to assault him again. 
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THE DISPUTED EVIDENCE 
 
In John Woolston's evidence, he said that two days after the deceased was killed, in company with his 
girlfriend Tiffany Lipper, they encountered Osborne and his two companions.  
 
Tiffany said to Osborne: “Oh, why did you hit him for? I bet he ain't done nothing to you”.  
 
One of Osborne’s companions replied: “Of course we don't like Asian people. They stink. Why do they 
come over to our country?” Osborne said nothing.  
 
Tiffany then screamed at the appellant and Mr Woolston dragged her away. The three youths walked 
off smirking. 
 
The judge permitted this incident to be put forward as a confession by Osborne. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had correctly admitted the evidence. 
 
“Where the defence challenges the prosecution's intention to put before the jury evidence of the 
defendant's reaction, or lack of reaction, to a statement made in his presence, three questions arise:  
 
(1) could a jury properly directed conclude that the defendant adopted the statement in question?  
 
(2) If so, (2) is that matter of sufficient relevance to justify its introduction in evidence?  
 
(3) If so, (3) would the admission of the evidence have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the judge ought not to admit it?”  per Lord Phillips CJ at para 19 
 
24 THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT: Introduction 
 
24.1 The ‘right to silence’ used to comprise two separate rights: 
• The privilege against self-incrimination 
• The right not to have adverse inferences drawn from refusing to answer questions 
 
24.2 Several propositions arose from these basic rights: 
• A suspect was under no obligation to assist the police with their enquiries 
• An accused was not obliged to give advanced notice of his defence 
• An accused was not a compellable witness 
• Although a judge might sometimes have been permitted to invite a jury to draw adverse inferences 
from a failure to testify, they could not be directed to assume guilt from such a failure. 
 
24.3 These rights were severely curtailed by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. In particular, 
although an accused retains the right to remain silent both at the interview and trial stage, ‘proper’ 
inferences may now be drawn from his failure to mention certain facts when questioned; and from his 
failure to give evidence at the trial. 
 
History of the Right to Remain Silent and the Caution 
 
24.4 There is a general right at common law not to incriminate oneself by answering inculpatory questions, 
and the idea that a suspect should be reminded of this right, and warned of the possibility that what 
he does say might be used to incriminate him, seems to date back to at least 1887, when it featured 
in the first Sherlock Holmes story, ‘A Study in Scarlet’, by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle: 
 
The official was a white-faced unemotional man, who went through his duties in a dull mechanical 
way. "The prisoner will be put before the magistrates in the course of the week," he said: "in the 
meantime, Mr. Jefferson Hope, have you anything that you wish to say? I must warn you that your 
words will be taken down, and may be used against you." 
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"I've got a good deal to say," our prisoner said slowly. "I want to tell you gentlemen all about it." 
"Hadn't you better reserve that for your trial?" asked the Inspector." 
 
24.5 Such a warning was also referenced by G. K. Chesterton in his 1909 novel, ‘The Ball and the Cross’. 
 
"No, sir," said the sergeant; "though most of the people talk French. This is the island called St. Loup, 
sir, an island in the Channel. We've been sent down specially from London, as you were such specially 
distinguished criminals, if you'll allow me to say so. Which reminds me to warn you that anything you 
say may be used against you at your trial." 
 
24.6 The caution was given legal form by the Judges’ Rules in 1912. These provided that, when a police 
officer had admissible evidence to suspect a person of an offence and wished to question that suspect 
about an offence, the officer should first caution the person that he was entitled to remain silent. 
 
24.7 R. v. Leckey (1944) KB 80  
 
A police officer making inquiries into the death of a woman, cautioned the appellant and said: "Do you 
care to give me an account of your movements late that day?"  
 
The appellant replied: "I was with the girl. I want to be fair to you and to myself, and before I make a 
statement, I should like to get advice."  
 
Later, the appellant, having been charged with the murder of the woman, was given a formal caution 
by a police officer to which, after some hesitation, he replied: "I have nothing to say until I have seen 
someone, a solicitor."  
 
At the trial of the appellant the judge commented adversely on the appellant's silence after he had 
been cautioned by the police officers, and indicated that the appellant's failure then to declare his 
innocence was a consideration for the jury tending to prove his guilt. 
 
Held by the Court of Criminal Appeal, that this comment was a misdirection which would justify 
quashing the conviction. 
 
“An innocent person might well, either from excessive caution or for some other reason, decline to say 
anything when charged and cautioned, and if it were possible to hold that out to a jury as a ground on 
which they might find a man guilty, it is obvious that innocent persons might be in great peril.”  
per Viscount Caldcote CJ   
 
24.8 A caution in the following form was typically used:  
 
You have the right to remain silent, but anything you do say will be taken down and may be 
used in evidence. 
 
24.9 In 1972, in its 11th Report, the Criminal Law Revision Committee proposed that where an accused fails 
to mention any fact relied on in his defence which he could reasonably have been expected to mention 
either before he was charged on being questioned by the police, or on being charged, the court should 
be entitled to draw such inferences as appear proper, and the caution should be replaced by a notice 
explaining the potentially adverse effect of silence. 
 
24.10 The proposals were widely criticised, but in 1976 were adopted in Singapore, and in 1988 were 
adopted in Northern Ireland. 
 
24.11 In 1988, Lord Lane CJ spoke strongly for their adoption in England and Wales. 
 
 R. v. Alladice (1988) 87 Cr App R 380 
 
“In many cases a detainee, who would otherwise have answered proper questioning by the police, will 
be advised to remain silent. Weeks later, at his trial, such a person not infrequently produces an 
explanation of, or a defence to the charge the truthfulness of which the police have had no chance to 
check. 
 
“Despite the fact that the explanation or defence could, if true, have been disclosed at the outset and 
despite the advantage which the defendant has gained by these tactics, no comment may be made to 
the jury to that effect. The jury may in some cases put two and two together, but it seems to us that 
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the effect of section 5814 is such that the balance of fairness between prosecution and defence cannot 
be maintained unless proper comment is permitted on the defendant's silence in such circumstances. 
It is high time that such comment should be permitted together with the necessary alteration to the 
words of the caution.” per Lord Lane CJ 
 
24.12 The recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee were implemented in the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.34. 
24.13 R. v. Hoare (Kevin) and Pierce (Graham) [2005] 1 WLR 1804 (see 5.5 below) 
 
“The whole basis of section 34 of the 1994 Act, in its qualification of the otherwise general right of an 
accused to remain silent and to require the prosecution to prove its case, is an assumption that an 
innocent defendant — as distinct from one who is entitled to require the prosecution to prove its case 
— would give an early explanation to demonstrate his innocence. If such a defendant is advised by a 
solicitor to remain silent, why on earth should he do so, unless because of circumstances of the sort 
aired by the court in R v Roble [1997] Crim LR 449 , R v Argent [1997] 2 Cr App R 27 and R v Howell 
[2003] Crim LR 405, he might wrongly inculpate himself?”  per Auld LJ at para 53 
 
24.14 The modern caution is as follows: 
 
You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when 
questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in 
evidence.15 
 
 
25 THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT WHEN INTERVIEWED 
 
25.1 The law relating to the inferences that may be drawn from not responding to police questions is now 
contained in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 
25.2 Inter alia, the jury is now entitled to infer that the accused fabricated the explanation at a later date, if 
he refused to provide the explanation during police questioning. The jury is also free to make no such 
inference.  
 
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
 
25.3 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s. 34  
Effect of accused’s failure to mention facts when questioned or charged. 
 
(1) Where, in any proceedings against a person for an offence, evidence is given that the accused— 
 
(a) at any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under caution by a 
constable trying to discover whether or by whom the offence had been committed, failed to mention 
any fact relied on in his defence in those proceedings; or 
 
(b) on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he might be prosecuted for it, failed to 
mention any such fact; or 
 
(c) at any time after being charged with the offence, on being questioned under section 22 of the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (post-charge questioning), failed to mention any such fact,  
 
being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time the accused could reasonably have been 
expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed, as the case may be, subsection (2) 
below applies.  
 
 
 
14 PACE 1984 s.58 (1) A person arrested and held in custody in a police station or other premises shall be entitled, if he 
so requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time. 
15 PACE 1984, Code C, paragraph 10.5. Minor deviations are permitted under paragraph 10.7 as long as sense of the 
caution is preserved. 
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(2) Where this subsection applies— 
b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused under paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and  
 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw 
such inferences from the failure as appear proper.  
 
(2A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the failure, subsections 
(1) and (2) above do not apply if he had not been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor prior to 
being questioned, charged or informed as mentioned in subsection (1) above. 
 
(3) Subject to any directions by the court, evidence tending to establish the failure may be given before 
or after evidence tending to establish the fact which the accused is alleged to have failed to mention. 
 
4) This section applies in relation to questioning by persons (other than constables) charged with the 
duty of investigating offences or charging offenders as it applies in relation to questioning by 
constables; and in subsection (1) above “officially informed” means informed by a constable or any 
such person. 
 
(5) This section does not— 
 
(a) prejudice the admissibility in evidence of the silence or other reaction of the accused in the face of 
anything said in his presence relating to the conduct in respect of which he is charged, in so far as 
evidence thereof would be admissible apart from this section; or 
 
(b) preclude the drawing of any inference from any such silence or other reaction of the accused which 
could properly be drawn apart from this section. 
 
(6) This section does not apply in relation to a failure to mention a fact if the failure occurred before 
the commencement of this section. 
 
25.4 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.35 
Effect of accused’s silence at trial. 
 
(1) At the trial of any person for an offence, subsections (2) and (3) below apply unless— 
 
(a) the accused’s guilt is not in issue; or 
 
(b) it appears to the court that the physical or mental condition of the accused makes it undesirable for 
him to give evidence; 
 
but subsection (2) below does not apply if, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, his 
legal representative informs the court that the accused will give evidence or, where he is 
unrepresented, the court ascertains from him that he will give evidence.  
 
(2) Where this subsection applies, the court shall, at the conclusion of the evidence for the prosecution, 
satisfy itself (in the case of proceedings on indictment with a jury, in the presence of the jury) that the 
accused is aware that the stage has been reached at which evidence can be given for the defence 
and that he can, if he wishes, give evidence and that, if he chooses not to give evidence, or having 
been sworn, without good cause refuses to answer any question, it will be permissible for the court or 
jury to draw such inferences as appear proper from his failure to give evidence or his refusal, without 
good cause, to answer any question. 
 
(3) Where this subsection applies, the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the 
offence charged, may draw such inferences as appear proper from the failure of the accused to give 
evidence or his refusal, without good cause, to answer any question. 
 
(4) This section does not render the accused compellable to give evidence on his own behalf, and he 
shall accordingly not be guilty of contempt of court by reason of a failure to do so. 
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(5) For the purposes of this section a person who, having been sworn, refuses to answer any question 
shall be taken to do so without good cause unless— 
 
(a) he is entitled to refuse to answer the question by virtue of any enactment, whenever passed or 
made, or on the ground of privilege; or 
 
(b) the court in the exercise of its general discretion excuses him from answering it. 
 
(7) This section applies— 
 
(a) in relation to proceedings on indictment for an offence, only if the person charged with the offence 
is arraigned on or after the commencement of this section; 
 
(b) in relation to proceedings in a magistrates’ court, only if the time when the court begins to receive 
evidence in the proceedings falls after the commencement of this section. 
 
25.5 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.36  
Effect of accused’s failure or refusal to account for objects, substances or marks. 
 
(1) Where— 
 
(a) a person is arrested by a constable, and there is— 
(i) on his person; or 
(ii) in or on his clothing or footwear; or 
(iii) otherwise in his possession; or 
(iv) in any place in which he is at the time of his arrest, 
 
any object, substance or mark, or there is any mark on any such object; and  
 
(b) that or another constable investigating the case reasonably believes that the presence of the object, 
substance or mark may be attributable to the participation of the person arrested in the commission of 
an offence specified by the constable; and 
 
(c) the constable informs the person arrested that he so believes, and requests him to account for the 
presence of the object, substance or mark; and 
 
(d) the person fails or refuses to do so, 
 
then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence so specified, evidence of those matters 
is given, subsection (2) below applies.  
 
(2) Where this subsection applies— 
 
(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused under paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and 
 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, 
may draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper.  
 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above apply to the condition of clothing or footwear as they apply to a 
substance or mark thereon. 
 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply unless the accused was told in ordinary language by 
the constable when making the request mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above what the effect of this 
section would be if he failed or refused to comply with the request. 
 
(4A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the failure or refusal, 
subsections (1) and (2) above do not apply if he had not been allowed an opportunity to consult a 
solicitor prior to the request being made. 
 
(5) This section applies in relation to officers of customs and excise as it applies in relation to 
constables. 
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(6) This section does not preclude the drawing of any inference from a failure or refusal of the accused 
to account for the presence of an object, substance or mark or from the condition of clothing or 
footwear which could properly be drawn apart from this section. 
 
(7) This section does not apply in relation to a failure or refusal which occurred before the 
commencement of this section. 
 
25.6 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.37 
Effect of accused’s failure or refusal to account for presence at a particular place. 
 
(1) Where— 
 
(a) a person arrested by a constable was found by him at a place at or about the time the offence for 
which he was arrested is alleged to have been committed; and 
 
(b) that or another constable investigating the offence reasonably believes that the presence of the 
person at that place and at that time may be attributable to his participation in the commission of the 
offence; and 
 
(c) the constable informs the person that he so believes, and requests him to account for that presence; 
and 
 
(d) the person fails or refuses to do so, 
 
then if, in any proceedings against the person for the offence, evidence of those matters is given, 
subsection (2) below applies.  
 
(2) Where this subsection applies— 
 
(b) a judge, in deciding whether to grant an application made by the accused under paragraph 2 of 
Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998; 
 
(c) the court, in determining whether there is a case to answer; and 
 
(d) the court or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, 
may draw such inferences from the failure or refusal as appear proper.  
 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply unless the accused was told in ordinary language by the 
constable when making the request mentioned in subsection (1)(c) above what the effect of this 
section would be if he failed or refused to comply with the request. 
 
(3A) Where the accused was at an authorised place of detention at the time of the failure or refusal, 
subsections (1) and (2) do not apply if he had not been allowed an opportunity to consult a solicitor 
prior to the request being made. 
 
(4) This section applies in relation to officers of customs and excise as it applies in relation to 
constables. 
 
(5) This section does not preclude the drawing of any inference from a failure or refusal of the accused 
to account for his presence at a place which could properly be drawn apart from this section. 
 
(5) This section does not apply in relation to a failure or refusal which occurred before the 
commencement of this section. 
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26 THE OPERATION OF SECTION 34 
 
26.1 In R. v. Brian Argent [1997] 2 Cr. App. R. 27, the Court of Appeal identified six conditions which were 
to be met under s.34(1)(a) before a jury could infer guilt from the previous silence of the defendant. 
 
1. There must be criminal proceedings. 
2. The silence must have occurred before the defendant was charged. 
3. The silence must have occurred during questioning under caution. 
4. The questioning must have been directed at trying to discover if the defendant committed the 
crime. 
5. The alleged failure by the defendant must be to mention any fact relied on in his defence in those 
proceedings. 
6. The defendant failed to mention a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time of the 
questioning he could reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned. 
 
26.2 R. v. Brian Argent [1997] 2 Cr. App. R. 27 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS  
 
Tony Sullivan was stabbed to death with a knife in the early hours of August 19, 1995, outside an East 
London nightclub, the Lotus Club. Brian Argent was arrested following an anonymous telephone call 
to the police which named him as the attacker.  
 
The prosecution case was that Argent became aware that the Sullivan (who was unknown to him) had 
asked Argent's wife to dance in the club and had later attacked him outside. At the time of the attack 
Sullivan was, as the evidence showed, very drunk. There were eye-witnesses to the fight between 
Sullivan and another man. One witness who knew Argent named him and two others picked him out 
on an identity parade. 
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
An interview was conducted by Detective Constable Armstrong on November 16, 1995, after an 
identification parade at which Argent had been identified. Argent was accompanied by an experienced 
solicitor, Mr Ryan, who gave the appellant certain advice.  
 
The advice had essentially three limbs: 
 
1. That in all the circumstances Argent was well-advised to remain silent;  
2. That if he declined to answer questions there was a risk that inferences adverse to him might be 
drawn at the trial; and  
3. That the decision whether or not to answer any questions was that of Argent. 
 
In the light of this advice, Argent elected to say nothing and he accordingly replied “no comment” to a 
series of questions put to him by the officer. 
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
At the trial, Argent raised several issues of fact in his defence, which he had not previously mentioned. 
In particular, he claimed: 
 
1. When he left the Lotus Club, he did not encounter Tony Sullivan; 
2. He did not have a knife in his possession; 
3. He did not inflict any knife wound upon Mr Sullivan; 
4. He had no blood on his hand; 
5. He met a friend Walter Lee on the way home who was able to confirm some of his account; 
6. There was a baby sitter at his home who could give further confirmation; and  
7. Throughout his journey from the club to his home he was accompanied by his wife who could 
support the entirety of his account. 
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THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
The judge directed the jury that they might draw adverse inferences from the fact that Argent did not 
mention these matters when questioned by the police, in accordance with section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
Argent was convicted, and appealed, inter alia, on the grounds that the judge erred in law and/or in 
the exercise of his discretion in failing to exclude the evidence of his interview with the police on 
November 16, 1995. That challenge was made under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, which entitles a judge to exclude evidence which has an unfair effect on the conduct of a 
trial. 
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, and examined the operation of section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. 
 
“It is in our judgment important to bear in mind the detailed terms of section 34. It is convenient to 
begin by considering subsection (2)(d) which reads: “Where this subsection applies—… (d) the court 
or jury, in determining whether the accused is guilty of the offence charged, may draw such inferences 
from the failure as appear proper.” 
 
The failure there referred to is a failure to mention at an earlier stage a fact relied on by the appellant 
in his defence, as is made plain by subsection (1)(a). 
 
“Subsection (2)(d) empowers a jury in prescribed circumstances to draw such inferences as appear 
proper. That must mean as appear proper to a jury because the jury is the tribunal of fact and the 
drawing of appropriate inferences from the facts is the task of the tribunal of fact. The trial judge is of 
course responsible for the overall fairness of the trial and it is open to him to give the jury guidance on 
the approach to the evidence. There will undoubtedly be circumstances in which a judge should warn 
a jury against drawing inferences, but the judge must always bear in mind that the jury is the tribunal 
of fact and that Parliament in its wisdom has seen fit to enact this section. 
 
“What then are the formal conditions to be met before the jury may draw such an inference? In our 
judgment there are six such conditions.  
 
“The first is that there must be proceedings against a person for an offence; that condition must 
necessarily be satisfied before section 34(2)(d) can bite and plainly it was satisfied here.  
 
“The second condition is that the alleged failure must occur before a defendant is charged. That 
condition also was satisfied here.  
 
“The third condition is that the alleged failure must occur during questioning under caution by a 
constable. The requirement that the questioning should be by a constable is not strictly a condition, as 
is evident from section 34(4), but here the alleged failure did occur during questioning by a constable, 
Detective Constable Armstrong, and the appellant had been properly cautioned.  
 
“The fourth condition is that the constable's questioning must be directed to trying to discover whether 
or by whom the alleged offence had been committed. Here it is not in doubt that Mr Sullivan was killed 
by someone. The Detective Constable was trying to discover who inflicted the fatal wound and whether 
the killing was murder or manslaughter, it being fairly clear that the offence must have been one or the 
other (unless the killer struck the fatal blow in the course of defending himself).  
 
“The fifth condition is that the alleged failure by the defendant must be to mention any fact relied on in 
his defence in those proceedings. That raises two questions of fact: first, is there some fact which the 
defendant has relied on in his defence; and secondly, did the defendant fail to mention it to the 
constable when he was being questioned in accordance with the section? Being questions of fact, 
these questions are for the jury as the tribunal of fact to resolve. Here it would seem fairly clear that 
there were matters which the appellant relied on in his defence which he had not mentioned.  
 
“These included the fact that he had had no quarrel with Mr Sullivan in the club; that he and his wife 
had left the club before the rest of the party; that he had not at any stage of the evening carried a knife; 
that he had not been involved in any altercation in the street in which Mr Sullivan was stabbed; that 
he saw and was a witness of no such altercation; that he saw Mr Lee in the street waiting for a cab; 
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that he went to a restaurant for a meal but found that he was too late and that the restaurant was 
closed; and that he returned home and saw his baby-sitter.  
 
“The sixth condition is that the appellant failed to mention a fact which in the circumstances existing at 
the time the accused could reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned. The time 
referred to is the time of questioning, and account must be taken of all the relevant circumstances 
existing at that time. The courts should not construe the expression “in the circumstances” restrictively: 
matters such as time of day, the defendant's age, experience, mental capacity, state of health, 
sobriety, tiredness, knowledge, personality and legal advice are all part of the relevant circumstances; 
and those are only examples of things which may be relevant. When reference is made to “the 
accused” attention is directed not to some hypothetical, reasonable accused of ordinary phlegm and 
fortitude but to the actual accused with such qualities, apprehensions, knowledge and advice as he is 
shown to have had at the time.  
 
“It is for the jury to decide whether the fact (or facts) which the defendant has relied on in his defence 
in the criminal trial, but which he had not mentioned when questioned under caution before charge by 
the constable investigating the alleged offence for which the defendant is being tried, is (or are) a fact 
(or facts) which in the circumstances as they actually existed the actual defendant could reasonably 
have been expected to mention. 
 
“Like so many other questions in criminal trials this is a question to be resolved by the jury in the 
exercise of their collective common-sense, experience and understanding of human nature. 
Sometimes they may conclude that it was reasonable for the defendant to have held his peace for a 
host of reasons, such as that he was tired, ill, frightened, drunk, drugged, unable to understand what 
was going on, suspicious of the police, afraid that his answer would not be fairly recorded, worried at 
committing himself without legal advice, acting on legal advice, or some other reason accepted by the 
jury. 
 
“In other cases, the jury may conclude, after hearing all that the defendant and his witnesses may 
have to say about the reasons for failing to mention the fact or facts in issue, that he could reasonably 
have been expected to do so. This is an issue on which the judge may, and usually should, give 
appropriate directions. But he should ordinarily leave the issue to the jury to decide. Only rarely would 
it be right for the judge to direct the jury that they should, or should not, draw the appropriate inference.”  
per Lord Bingham, CJ 
 
At any time before he was charged with the offence, on being questioned under 
caution… or on being charged with the offence or officially informed that he 
might be prosecuted for it… 
 
26.3 s.34(1)(a) only applies in the case of an accused who has not been charged and is being questioned 
under caution, so will not apply if he simply refuses to leave his cell to attend the interview. 
 
26.4 However, once the accused is charged, s.34(1)(b) will apply to have the same effect. Under Code C, 
para 16.2, the caution must also be given when someone is charged. 
 
26.5 If the interviews under s.34(1)(a) are inadmissible (perhaps because of a breach of the Code of 
Practice), inferences may still be drawn from the accused’s silence under s.34(1)(b), subject to the 
requirement of fairness. 
 
26.6 R. v. Dervish [2002] 2 Cr App R 105 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to be concerned in the supply of Class A drugs. 
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
At interview, after the involvement of an undercover police officer had been belatedly revealed to his 
representative by the police, he had made no comment in response to questions. When charged, he 
had likewise made no comment.  
 
 
 
82 
 
THE JUDGE’S RULING 
 
At trial, while the interviews were ruled inadmissible because of breaches of the PACE 1984 Codes of 
Practice, no objection was taken to the admissibility of the charging process.  
 
The trial judge was however invited to rule that the jury should not be permitted to draw any inference 
from the defendant's failure to mention at the time of charge facts he relied on at trial.  
 
The judge ruled that at the time of charge the defendant was in a position to understand clearly what 
was being alleged against him and was in a situation that called out for explanation, and that therefore 
the jury were permitted to draw such an inference.  
 
THE APPEAL 
 
On appeal it was contended, among other things, that the trial judge's ruling was in error. It was argued 
that adverse inferences could never be drawn in circumstances where the defendant had made no 
comment in interview and the interview had been excluded. If it were otherwise, the police would have 
a “back-up” inference in the event that the interview was excluded, which would have the effect of 
nullifying the safeguards contained in 1984 Act and the Codes. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal:  
 
(1)  that a judge could leave to the jury the possibility of drawing an inference from silence at interview 
or an inference from silence at the time of charge, or an inference from both, providing no 
unfairness was thereby caused to the defendant. It was consequently open to the judge to direct 
the jury that an inference might be drawn from a failure to mention at the time of charge facts later 
relied upon even in cases where no inference could be drawn from silence at interview.  
 
(2) The correct approach was adopted by the trial judge in reviewing thoroughly all the considerations 
which might have pointed to unfairness. If allowing the drawing of an inference would nullify the 
safeguards contained in the 1984 Act and the Codes of Practice, or there was bad faith on the 
part of the police, that would clearly be a basis upon which the judge should not permit the jury to 
consider drawing an inference. 
 
Failed to mention any fact … 
 
 Prepared statements 
 
26.7 It is common practice for an accused person (usually on the advice of his solicitor) to hand the police 
a prepared statement, and then to refuse to answer questions about it until the trial. In such 
circumstances, he has not ‘failed to mention’ the facts contained in the documents. 
 
26.8  Thus, where a defendant has made a prepared statement which is read out to the police before the 
interview, and which is wholly consistent with the testimony he later gives in court, no adverse 
inference can be made from the fact that he refused to answer any questions at the interview. 
 
26.9 R. v. Knight [2004] 1 WLR 340 (CA) 
 
Philip Knight was arrested on suspicion of indecently assaulting the ten-year-old daughter of a friend.  
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
On 28 October 2002, with her mother's consent Knight took the little girl for a walk in a wood where 
she had not been before. After half an hour or so the defendant stood in front of her and put his right 
hand down her trousers, to rest on the top of her leg. He did not touch her knickers or crotch. Then he 
put his hand under her T-shirt and touched her stomach just above her navel. She tried to get away 
but his hand around her stomach restrained her. Then they moved on. Shortly afterwards he stopped 
her again. He put his hand down her trousers a second time and touched the top of her leg. She felt 
frightened and said she was sleepy and wanted to go home.  
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THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
At the beginning of his interview with police, his solicitor read out a prepared statement giving the 
Knight's full account of what had happened on the day of the alleged assault. His version of events 
was that at one stage during the walk he had put his hands on the girl's shoulders to turn her round 
so that she could look at a deer. His hands never touched her skin, and he never touched her in the 
way she described. 
 
On his solicitor's advice, he thereafter responded to all questions with the words “No comment”.  
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
At trial, Knight's evidence was the same as the account contained in the prepared statement.  
 
The judge directed the jury that, the prepared statement notwithstanding, they were entitled to draw 
adverse inferences from the defendant's silence when questioned pursuant to section 34 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Knight was convicted:  
 
“Members of the jury, the weight to be given to that prepared statement is entirely a matter for you, 
but Mr Knight admits that thereafter he refused to answer any of the questions put to him by the police. 
He said, ‘No comment’ after each question was put. Members of the jury, this failure to answer police 
questions may count against him. This is because you may draw the conclusion from his failure that 
he did not want to allow the police to scrutinise the account given in the prepared statement with their 
own questions. If you do draw that conclusion, you must not convict him wholly or mainly on the 
strength of it, but you may take it into account as some additional support for the prosecution's case 
and when deciding whether his case about these facts is true. You may draw such a conclusion against 
him only if you think it is a fair and proper conclusion and you are satisfied about three things. First, 
that when he was interviewed, he could reasonably have been expected to answer the police 
questions. Second, that the only sensible explanation for this failure to do so was that he had no 
answers that would stand up to the scrutiny of police questioning. And, third, that apart from his failure 
to answer the police questions, the prosecution's case against him is so strong that it clearly calls for 
an answer by him.” 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. The end sought to be procured 
by section 34(1)(a) of the 1994 Act was no more than the early disclosure of a suspect's account and 
not, separately and distinctly, the subjection of that account to the test of police cross-examination in 
interview. Where a defendant had made a prepared statement at interview, giving a full account from 
which he did not depart at trial, there was no room for an adverse inference to be drawn against him. 
 
26.10 The danger of submitting prepared statements, is that the accused may discover at the trial that he 
has accidentally omitted to mention something significant, which might then be subject to a s.34 
direction if he relies on facts he has not previously mentioned. 
 
26.11 R. v. Turner [2004] 1 All ER 1025 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
Dwaine Turner was alleged to have driven his two co-defendants to a flat where all three jointly 
attacked the complainant.  
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
When he was interviewed by the police, Turner declined to answer any of the questions but read out 
a pre-prepared statement.  
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
This statement broadly accorded with his account in evidence at trial on a charge of wounding with 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm, that he did not inflict any injuries but tried to break up the fight 
between the complainant and one of the co-defendants.  
However, the statement was inconsistent with his evidence as to the purpose of his visit to the flat and 
whether he was aware of any of his co-defendants carrying a weapon.  
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THE APPEAL 
 
He was convicted and contended on appeal that in directing the jury, the judge wrongly stated that 
a s.34 inference could be drawn from his silence in the interview, when it could only have been drawn 
from his failure to mention facts. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal, that there was a basic deficiency in the judge's direction to the jury in that 
by emphasizing that the prepared statement was not a substitute for answering questions in interview, 
he gave the jury the message that it was the failure to answer questions that could justify the drawing 
of an inference under s.34, whereas the crucial issue was whether the appellant relied on matters at 
trial that he had not mentioned in the statement when he could reasonably have been expected to 
have done so; and that, accordingly, there was a real risk that the jury drew an adverse inference from 
the fact of the failure to answer questions alone. 
 
Per curiam: Where there are differences between what a defendant says in a pre-prepared statement 
and the evidence he gives at the trial, it may be that the jury would be better directed to consider a 
difference as constituting a previous lie, rather than as the foundation for a s.34 inference. It will 
depend on the precise circumstances. 
 
Statement of fact 
 
26.12 The Act only covers statements of fact, not theories, speculation or opinion. 
 
26.13 R. v. Nickolson [1999] Crim LR 61 
 
The defendant, who was charged with sexual offences against the complainant in her house, offered 
a theory at the trial as to how his seminal fluid might have got onto her nightdress.  
 
It was held that this did not amount to a statement of fact. 
 
26.14 However, where a speculation is based on a fact, s.34 might apply if the defendant could reasonably 
have been expected to mentioned both the fact and the speculation when questioned. 
 
26.15 R. v. B. (MT) [2000] Crim LR 181 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
The appellant was convicted on three counts of rape relating to his 14-year-old quasi-stepdaughter 
(S) and two counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 relating to a 15-year-old school 
friend of S (D). He was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.  
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
During interview the appellant was unable to put forward any motive for the two girls to "make up" the 
allegations against him.  
 
However, S herself provided a motive during her evidence at trial: she said that she hated the 
appellant, that she did not like him living with her mother and that he had come between her and her 
mother. S also gave evidence of an incident where she had entered her mother's bedroom whilst the 
appellant and her mother were engaged in sexual activity and had called her mother a slag and a tart. 
S went on to say that she did not like the fact that a sexual relationship existed between the appellant 
and her mother.  
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
In examination-in-chief the appellant said that he thought that S was jealous and that she did not like 
him being in a relationship with her mother.  
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THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
The judge gave the jury directions upon the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s.34. He told 
them that they could draw an adverse inference against the appellant if they were sure that he could 
reasonably have put forward the jealousy motive at the time of his interview.  
 
THE APPEAL 
 
The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed.  
 
Although in R. v. Nickolson [1999] Crim LR 61, the court held that a theory, a possibility or a 
speculation was not a fact for the purposes of section 34, that was not a complete answer. If the 
appellant did not know that the complainant was jealous of his relationship with her mother at the time 
of the interview, then he could not have been expected to mention that "fact" when questioned.  
 
On the other hand, if he did know and that knowledge was based on some specific incident, then such 
a motive would be based on fact and he could reasonably have been expected to mention both it and 
the causative event in interview.  
 
However, in the instant case, the prosecution had not asked the appellant in cross-examination 
whether he knew of the way S felt about him at the time of the interview and therefore they could not 
show that his answer was not mere speculation.  
 
Relied on in his defence… 
 
26.16 The facts about which the accused had remained silent at his interview must then be ‘relied on’ by him 
at the trial in his defence in order to raise the s.34 inference. However, the evidence thus ‘relied on’ 
may not come directly from the accused. It may be that his barrister calls witnesses to give evidence 
on his behalf (e.g. to provide an alibi) which the accused did not mention when questioned by the 
police. Such evidence would clearly fall within the ambit of s.34. 
 
26.17 This issue was discussed in the House of Lords in R. v. Webber [2004] 1 WLR 404. 
 
R. v. Webber [2004] 1 WLR 404 (HL) 
 
The certified question for the House of Lords was: “Can a suggestion put to a witness by or on behalf 
of a defendant amount to a fact ‘relied upon in his defence’ for the purpose of section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 if that suggestion is not adopted by the witness?” The short answer 
was: “Yes!” 
 
Robert Webber appealed against a decision to uphold his conviction for conspiracy to murder and 
possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life.  
 
During police interviews, Webber had either denied any involvement with the offences or simply 
refused to answer questions put to him. He also declined to give evidence at trial.  
 
Webber maintained that the trial judge erred in giving a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 s.34, as that provision could not apply when the matters which Webber had failed to 
mention were matters put to — but not accepted by — prosecution witnesses, or were matters in 
relation to which evidence had been given by a co-defendant which Webber had then adopted. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the word "fact" as given in s.34 should be given a broad meaning. It 
covered any alleged fact which was in issue and was put forward as part of the defence case. Thus, 
a defendant relied on a fact or matter not only when he gave or adduced evidence, but also when 
counsel, acting on his instructions, put a specific case to prosecution witnesses, as opposed to merely 
testing the prosecution case.  
 
If a trial judge was unsure as to whether counsel was testing the prosecution evidence or advancing 
a positive case, he should consult with counsel in the absence of the jury, since it could affect the 
direction to be given. Where, as in the instant case, Webber's counsel had adopted the evidence given 
by a co-defendant, Webber had relied on that matter in his defence and so rendered s.34 applicable. 
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A fact which, in the circumstances existing at the time, the accused could 
reasonably have been expected to mention. 
 
26.17 The fact relied on must be one “which in the circumstances existing at the time, the accused could 
reasonably have been expected to mention when so questioned, charged or informed.” 
 
26.18 “The circumstances existing at the time” include the particular characteristics of the accused. 
 
26.19 R. v. Brian Argent [1997] 2 Cr. App. R. 27 (above at para 4.2) 
 
“The courts should not construe the expression “in the circumstances” restrictively: matters such as 
time of day, the defendant's age, experience, mental capacity, state of health, sobriety, tiredness, 
knowledge, personality and legal advice are all part of the relevant circumstances; and those are only 
examples of things which may be relevant. When reference is made to “the accused” attention is 
directed not to some hypothetical, reasonable accused of ordinary phlegm and fortitude but to the 
actual accused with such qualities, apprehensions, knowledge and advice as he is shown to have had 
at the time…  
 
 “Like so many other questions in criminal trials this is a question to be resolved by the jury in the 
exercise of their collective common-sense, experience and understanding of human nature. 
  
“Sometimes they may conclude that it was reasonable for the defendant to have held his peace for a 
host of reasons, such as that he was tired, ill, frightened, drunk, drugged, unable to understand what 
was going on, suspicious of the police, afraid that his answer would not be fairly recorded, worried at 
committing himself without legal advice, acting on legal advice, or some other reason accepted by the 
jury.” per Lord Bingham CJ 
 
26.20  R. v. Howell [2005] 1 Cr App R 1 (CA) 
 
“What is reasonable depends on all the circumstances. We venture to say, recalling the circumstances 
of this present case, that we do not consider the absence of a written statement from the complainant 
to be good reason for silence (if adequate oral disclosure of the complaint has been given), and it does 
not become good reason merely because a solicitor has so advised. Nor is the possibility that the 
complainant may not pursue his complaint good reason, nor a belief by the solicitor that the suspect 
will be charged in any event whatever he says.  
 
“The kind of circumstance which may most likely justify silence will be such matters as the suspect's 
condition (ill-health, in particular mental disability; confusion; intoxication; shock, and so forth — of 
course we are not laying down an authoritative list), or his inability genuinely to recollect events without 
reference to documents which are not to hand, or communication with other persons who may be able 
to assist his recollection.” per Laws LJ at para 24 
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27 FOLLOWING LEGAL ADVICE TO REMAIN SILENT 
 
27.1 A particular issue has arisen in relation to defendants who claim that the reason they did not answer 
the questions in the police interview was because their solicitor advised them not to do so. 
27.2 In R. v. Betts and Hall, the Court of Appeal emphasised that there is a difference between a defendant 
who genuinely does not answer questions because he is following his solicitor’s advice not to do so; 
and one who is just using the solicitor’s advice to evade awkward questions to which he has no 
exculpatory answer. 
The Court of Appeal also provided a model direction for the judge to give in these circumstances. 
27.3 R. v. Raymond Christopher Betts and John Anthony Hall [2001] 2 Cr. App. R. 16 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
The prosecution case was that on January 25, 1999, two armed men - Raymond Christopher Betts 
and John Anthony Hall - attacked a man called Nigel Caris, breaking his arm, and then stole money 
from him. Mr Caris picked out the appellants as his attackers on identification parades. The 
prosecution further relied on evidence that one of the two attackers called the other “Bettsy” and on 
evidence that Hall had a possible motive. 
 
The defence of each man was a denial of any involvement and accordingly the issue for the jury was 
whether Mr Caris's evidence as to the circumstances of the attack and his identification of the 
attackers. 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
Both appellants denied involvement in the attack and did not answer further questions by the police in 
the interview, on advice from solicitors. 
Raymond Betts’ Interview 
 
Betts was at the time 17. He said that he knew nothing about the assault and that he had done nothing 
like that. Asked if he had been to the scrap yard that year (a period of five or six weeks), he said that 
he could not remember. He claimed that he had got a very bad memory. He agreed that he was called 
Bettsy, but said that was a common nickname for people called Betts.  
 
After some further questions his solicitor sought and obtained an opportunity to consult further with his 
client. When the interview resumed, his solicitor made clear that Betts would exercise his right not to 
answer further questions. He was asked about Nigel Caris, Alison Redman, Jason Wilson and the 
appellant Hall and the allegations were put to him, but as indicated by his solicitor he chose to say no 
more. He was reinterviewed after he had been picked out on the identification parade and he then 
admitted that he did know Mr Caris. 
 
John Hall’s Interview 
 
Hall was a man with a speech defect. He chose not to answer questions in the interview at all. His 
solicitor made clear that this was because of advice that he had tendered, since he considered that 
the police had not sufficiently disclosed the material in their possession. 
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
Both defendants gave evidence at the trial, raising matters that they had not mentioned when being 
questioned. Both claimed that they had good reason not to answer the police’s questions.  
 
• Betts said that he had made no comment because of the advice that he had been given by 
his solicitor.  
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• Hall also said that he had been given advice not to answer the questions, but added that he 
would have been unable to answer the questions in any event because of his speech 
impediment. 
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
“So you may ask yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, well what was it that they now rely on in court? 
Well I cannot give you a list of all the things that they have relied on in court, because it would be a 
rather long list, but I can highlight, I think five things in particular which they now rely on in court, none 
of which were mentioned in any interview.  
 
“First of all, that the defendant Mr Betts says that he knows Mr Caris well, and that Mr Caris knows 
him and that Mr Caris would recognise him. Now that is a fact Mr Betts now relies on in court.  
 
“Secondly, in the case of Mr Hall, he relies on the fact that he does not know Mr Caris, and that Mr 
Caris does not know him, and that, therefore, there can have been no recognition between Mr Caris 
and Mr Hall. That is another fact which Mr Hall relies on, again not mentioned in interview.  
 
“Thirdly, Mr Hall relies on the fact now, does he not, that he knows a man called Jason Wilson. He 
knows that Mr Caris was Jason Wilson's best friend, and he knows that Mr Caris had an affair with 
Jason Wilson's wife, Mrs Wilson. Again, he relies on those facts in his defence, but he did not mention 
them in any interviews.  
 
“Fourthly, there is, is there not, a connection between both these defendants and Messrs Caris and 
Wilson, because Mr Hall is friendly with Mr Betts, and Mr Hall knows Jason Wilson and he knows of 
the relationship between Jason Wilson's wife, and Mr Caris. So there is a connection between, as Mr 
Graham put it, the four players in this case, and that connection again was not mentioned in any 
interviews.  
 
“Fifthly, it is also relied upon by the defence, or suggested by the defence now, that Mr Caris has a 
grudge against Hall, because Mr Hall it was who tipped Mr Wilson about the affair, and has a grudge 
against Hall, and indeed his friend Mr Betts, and is falsely alleging he was assaulted by them in the 
Century Salvage yard. That is the defence case now. Again, that was not mentioned in the interviews 
which you have got before you.  
 
“The prosecution say simply, ladies and gentlemen, that the defendants declined to reveal all these 
matters which they now rely on, because they wanted to hide the connection between them and Mr 
Caris and Mr Wilson in the hope that the police would never discover any connection between them 
and Mr Caris and Mr Wilson and that they did that because they are guilty of this assault and that there 
can be no other logical reason why they should behave in that way. That is what the prosecution says 
about it, and that is the inference that they ask you to draw from their failure to answer these questions. 
 
“Well the defendants say that that, first of all, is not the right inference to draw. Secondly, that there 
were, so far as they are concerned, good reasons, or valid reasons, why they did not answer questions 
in interview.  
 
“First of all, they said their solicitors, or legal representatives, advised them not to answer these 
questions, on the grounds of there having been inadequate disclosure of the facts of the offence.  
 
“Secondly, it is advanced, is it not, by Mr Hall that he finds it quite difficult to answer questions anyway, 
because he has a speech impediment.  
 
“Well, first of all, ladies and gentlemen, the defendants are not entitled to shield behind their solicitors' 
advice. They are both, as it were, adults and grown men and it is for you to consider whether they 
were able to decide for themselves what to do when being questioned about these matters. It was for 
them to decide, having received advice from their legal advisers, as to whether they ought to accept 
that advice, or whether they should not. You are not concerned to decide, I may say, whether you think 
the solicitors' advice was right or wrong, or whether it was good or bad, but you are entitled to consider 
the reasons that have been advanced.  
 
“It was suggested that the reason that this advice was given, and the reason the defendants did not 
answer questions, was because they had not had adequate disclosure of the facts of the case. Well, 
seeing as that reason has been advanced to you, you are entitled to consider that. They had had 
disclosure that they were suspected of an offence at a particular time, a certain time on January 25, 
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that it occurred at a certain place, that it took the form of an assault by two men on to one, that the 
victim was a man called Nigel Caris. You may ask yourselves, ‘Well, was that an adequate disclosure 
to enable them to answer the questions, what more did they really need to know, if that was what they 
are being charged with’? Say the Crown, well could they not have just told the truth and said, ‘Well, 
yes we know these people but we do not know anything to do with this offence.’? So, as I say, it is for 
you to consider, ladies and gentlemen, whether those are valid reasons.  
 
“Now similarly, in the case of Mr Hall, he says that he found it difficult to answer questions, by reason 
of his speech impediment. Well you have seen him give evidence, and you have seen what the nature 
of his speech impediment is. It is for you to decide what the nature of his speech impediment is, it is 
for you to decide whether that is a valid reason for not answering questions in the police station.  
 
“If you consider that the reasons advanced by these defendants are valid reasons why they should 
refuse to answer questions, then you may not draw any adverse inferences against them. It would not, 
obviously be right to do so if they have, in your judgment, a good reason or a valid reason not to 
answer these questions, then do not draw any adverse inferences against them, and simply ignore 
the fact that they have not answered these questions.  
 
“If, on the other hand, you take the view that the reasons advanced are not valid in your judgment, and 
it is your judgment that matters about this, and that they have failed to provide an adequate explanation 
in relation to this matter, well then you may draw such inferences from that as you think are correct. 
You ask yourselves, what is an inference, or what inferences should we draw. Well, again I go back 
to what the prosecution suggest you should draw as your conclusion, namely that they wanted to hide 
the truth and they wanted to hide the connection between the four main players in this case, and that 
that is, say the prosecution, the action of guilty men who have committed this assault. If you agree that 
is the proper inference to draw, then you draw it. If you do not think it is the proper inference to draw, 
well then do not. It is your decision.” 
THE APPEAL 
Following their convictions for causing grievous bodily harm with intent, the defendants appealed inter 
alia because they claimed that the judge had misdirected the jury regarding the operation of s.34. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal. Although a defendant cannot hide behind his solicitor’s advice 
as a reason not to answer questions, if that advice is the genuine reason for his silence – rather than 
the fact that he had no answer to the allegations made by the police – then no inference of guilt should 
be drawn from his silence at the interview about something he relies on in court. The judge had not 
made that clear to the jury. 
“We are very conscious that directions pursuant to section 34 of the Act are never easy for a trial 
judge, particularly where reliance is placed on legal advice. In those circumstances, it may be helpful 
if we set out the sort of direction on this aspect of the case that we believe would have been appropriate 
in the case: 
 
“Each defendant has told you that he did not answer questions because he was advised by his solicitor 
that he should not do so as the police had not sufficiently disclosed the information that was available 
to them. It is not what the solicitors thought that matters. It is what each defendant thought. A person 
has the choice whether to accept advice or reject it. From the warning that was given at the beginning 
of each interview, the defendants were aware of the possibility that any failure to mention matters upon 
which they relied might harm their defence at their trial. You have to take those circumstances into 
account, along with all the other circumstances including in the case of Betts, his age and in the case 
of Hall the extent of his speech impediment as you find it to be, in deciding whether each defendant 
could reasonably be expected to mention at that stage those matters upon which he subsequently 
relied.  
 
“If you think in either case that the reasons that the defendant gave may be the true explanation for 
his failure to mention these matters, then you may not hold his failure against him nor draw any adverse 
inference from the failure. If, on the other hand you are satisfied that the true explanation for either 
defendant's failure is that he did not at that time have any answer to the allegations that were being 
put to him, or that he realised that such explanation as he had would not at that stage stand up to 
questioning or investigation by the police and that the advice of the solicitor did no more than to provide 
him with a convenient shield behind which to hide, then and only then can you draw such inferences 
as you consider proper from his failure.” 
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27.4 However, even if an accused is following his solicitor’s advice in good faith, it might still not be 
reasonable for him to remain silent. The test is objective. 
 
27.5 R. v. Hoare (Kevin) and Pierce (Graham) [2005] 1 WLR 1804 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
Hoare and Pierce appealed against their convictions for conspiring to supply a class B drug, namely 
amphetamine. Hoare, who lived on a remote farm from where he ran a glass making and chemical 
supply business, had been placed under the surveillance of the police, who suspected him of 
manufacturing amphetamine there.  
 
He was observed delivering a box to Pierce, which, upon Pierce's arrest shortly afterwards, was found 
to contain amphetamine. Hoare was arrested a short time later.  
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
Both men were questioned following arrest but gave "no comment" interviews on their solicitors' advice 
to remain silent.  
 
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL 
 
At trial, they both contended that they had not been aware that the substances in question were 
amphetamine.  
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY  
 
The trial judge directed the jury, under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1004 s.34, that they 
could draw an adverse inference from Hoare and P's silence if they felt that it had not been reasonable 
for the men to rely on their solicitors' advice.  
 
THE APPEAL 
 
Hoare and Pierce argued that the judge had wrongly set out to the jury an objective test of 
reasonableness rather than a subjective test of whether they had genuinely followed the advice. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeals, that reliance on the advice of a solicitor was not enough in itself to 
prevent an adverse inference being drawn from silence at interview. Even where the advice was in 
good faith and the reliance on it genuine, an inference could still be drawn if the jury felt that the true 
reason for the silence was because the accused had either had no explanation or no satisfactory 
explanation to give.  
 
Thus, the test was overall an objective one that had to take account of all the circumstances of the 
case, including what was in the mind of the accused. The judge's use of the term "reasonable" was 
therefore permissible and in accordance with the current line of authority which all essentially 
advocated the same test. 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR 
 
27.6 ARTICLE 6 (1) 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. 
27.7 The right to silence is not mentioned in Article 6, and is not absolute, so it is not necessarily a violation 
of Article 6 to draw inferences from silence when the interview of the accused is otherwise properly 
conducted.  
 
27.8 However, it is a violation of Article 6 if a judge fails to direct the jury to consider whether the defendant's 
reason for remaining silent on legal advice was genuine.  
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27.9 John Murray v. United Kingdom [1996] 22 EHRR 29 
 
John Murray was arrested after being found in a house in which an IRA informer, L, had been held 
captive.  
 
On being taken for police questioning M was refused access to a solicitor for 48 hours.  
 
John Murray chose to remain silent during a number of police interviews, despite being warned that 
adverse inferences might be drawn at trial from his silence. He was convicted of aiding and abetting 
the false imprisonment of L and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.  
 
The trial judge exercised his discretion under the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 
Art.4 and Art.6 to draw adverse inferences from the fact that M refused to account for his presence at 
the house.  
 
When Murray's appeal against conviction was dismissed, he lodged an application with the European 
Commission of Human Rights who referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
Held, that (1) by 14 votes to five, an accused's right to silence was not absolute in the sense that no 
adverse inferences could ever be drawn at trial from that silence. It was a matter for the court in every 
case to determine what weight should be given to the fact that an accused had chosen not to offer an 
explanation of the circumstances of his case and to determine whether there had been improper 
compulsion on the part of the authorities.  
 
Having regard to all the evidence in the instant case, it could not be concluded that the drawing of 
reasonable inferences infringed M's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 
Art.6(1). 
 
However, having regard to the scheme under the 1988 Order, it was imperative in the interests of 
fairness for an accused to have access to a lawyer at the initial stages of police questioning. The 
refusal of the police to grant M access to a solicitor during the first 48 hours of his detention was 
therefore in breach of Art.6(1) read with Art.6(3)(c). 
27.10 Condron v. United Kingdom (2001) 31 EHRR 1  
WC and KC were convicted of drug related offences, following a jury direction by the trial judge stating 
that they had the option of drawing an adverse inference from silence during police interview. Their 
solicitor, believing them to be suffering from heroin withdrawal symptoms, had advised them to say 
nothing.  
 
WC and KC were found guilty, and whilst the Court of Appeal considered the direction to be flawed, it 
did not find the conviction to be unsafe.  
 
C complained to the European Court of Human Rights contending that he did not receive a fair trial 
within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art. 6.1. 
 
Held, allowing the application, that C had not received a fair trial under Art. 6.1 as the jury should have 
been directed that if the silence could not be attributed to C having no answer, or none that would 
stand up in cross examination, no adverse inference should be drawn. The reason for the silence, if 
proffered, and its plausibility should have been taken into account. 
 
27.11 R. v. Beckles [2005] 1 WLR 2829 
 
On 23 May 1997 at the Central Criminal Court before Judge Pownall QC and a jury, Keith Anderson 
Beckles, was convicted of two counts of robbery, one count of false imprisonment and one count of 
attempted murder.  
 
He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, concurrent, on each count of robbery, three years' 
imprisonment, concurrent, on the count of false imprisonment and nine years' imprisonment, 
consecutive, on the count of attempted murder, making a total of 15 years' imprisonment. 
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THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
On 3 January 1996, Mohamoud Abdi Mohammed spent the day selling khat (a stimulant leaf) in the 
Upton Park area of London. At about 9.30 pm he met Michelle Whyte, a prostitute. She proposed that 
they should go back to her flat for sex, which would cost £20. Mohamoud, who had takings of about 
£90 with him at the time, agreed. They took a cab to a flat owned by Rudolph Montague but used by 
Whyte for such purposes, in Hackney. Present in the flat were several people including Montague and 
Keith Beckles. 
 
Mohamoud was searched at knife-point by Montague, whilst Whyte and Beckles held him. Montague 
found £40 and left the premises to buy drugs. Mohamoud was prevented from leaving the premises 
by Beckles.  
 
Montague returned to the flat with crack cocaine and this was smoked. 
 
Mohamoud was then searched for a second time. He was held down by Beckles (who was in 
possession of a hammer at the time) while Whyte searched him, finding more money in a purse tucked 
between Mohamoud's shirt and vest. Mohamoud was then kept in the flat until he was allegedly thrown 
out of a window by Montague and Beckles. Mohamoud landed on the ground below. He could not 
move his lower body and attracted attention by throwing stones at a ground floor window.  
 
An ambulance was called to the scene and at 2.50 a m on 4 January 1996, Mohamoud was taken to 
the Royal London Hospital. He had seriously injured his spinal cord and was and remains completely 
paralysed from the waist down. He will be a complete paraplegic for the rest of his life. 
 
THE POLICE INTERVIEW 
 
Three weeks later, Beckles was arrested. On his way to the police station he said that he could tell the 
officers everything and that the victim had not been pushed but had jumped. When he arrived at the 
police station, he was advised by a solicitor not to answer questions when interviewed. He followed 
that advice.  
 
The victim then identified Beckles as one of those who had thrown him out of the window.  
 
Subsequently, at a second interview, Beckles said that he was told that the victim had jumped out of 
the window. He went to have a look and saw him lying on the grass. He then left the flat because he 
was scared and thought the victim might be dead.  
 
THE JUDGE’S DIRECTION TO THE JURY 
 
At his trial on charges of robbery, false imprisonment and attempted murder, Beckles gave evidence 
in line with the account he gave at the second interview.  
 
Pursuant to section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the judge directed the jury 
that, if they saw fit, they were entitled to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's silence at his 
first interview with the police. The defendant was convicted.  
 
THE APPEALS 
 
Beckles’ appeal against conviction was dismissed.  
 
He then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that the trial judge's direction to 
the jury as to their right to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's silence at interview was a 
misdirection, because the judge had failed to direct them to consider whether the defendant's reason 
for remaining silent on legal advice was genuine.  
 
That misdirection amounted to a violation of the defendant's rights under article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. On this basis, Beckles applied to the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission who referred his case to the Court of Appeal. 
 
The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal, quashed the conviction as unsafe and ordered a retrial. 
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J THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY 
 
28  INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY 
 
28.1 The rule against hearsay is one of the great exclusionary rules of evidence. The reasons for the rule 
are derived both from efficiency and from principle. 
 
28.2 From the point of view of the most effective evidence, out-of-court statements which cannot be tested 
on cross-examination risk mistake, false recollections, ambiguity and insincerity. 
 
28.3 On the question of principle, there are two aspects to the exclusion. 
 
i) Such statements have not been made on oath in open court. 
 
ii) It has been argued that the rule against hearsay protects what, in the US constitution, is known 
as the ‘right to confrontation’ – the right to confront one’s accuser. This has never been fully 
acknowledged in English common law, but it should be noted that Article 6 of the ECHR refers 
to the right of defendants to examine – or have examined – witnesses called against them. 
 
28.4 The common law exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal cases have been supplemented by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, which specifically preserves much of the old law. There are, therefore, now 
many exceptions to the rule. In civil cases, the rule has simply been abolished! 
 
29 HEARSAY: POLICY AND PRACTICE 
29.1 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 moves away from the strict common law rule against the admission of 
hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings. The current policy is more flexible and promotes the 
inclusion of relevant hearsay evidence, on the basis that justice is not served if important information 
is excluded for no good reason. The weight to be attached to hearsay evidence is a matter for the jury 
or magistrates' court. 
 
29.2 Article 6(3) (d) of the European Convention on Human Rights states that a person charged with a 
criminal offence has a right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him". 
 
29.3 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v UK [2012] 54 EHRR 23 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held that a conviction based solely or decisively on evidence 
adduced from an absent witness does not automatically amount to a breach of the Convention. 
However, such cases must be subject to "the most searching scrutiny."  
 
29.4 The question for the court is whether there are sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including 
measures that permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability of that evidence to take place.  
 
29.5 The safeguards contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, supported by those in section 78 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the common law, are in principle, strong safeguards 
designed to ensure fairness. If trial courts apply these properly and have regard to this Grand Chamber 
judgment and the decision of the Supreme Court in Horncastle, trials will be fair. 
 
29.6 The modern leading case about the policy of the hearsay rule and its exceptions is R. v. Horncastle 
(R. v. Marquis; R. v. Carter), which was a conjoined appeal to the Supreme Court in 2009.  
 
The Supreme Court held that it did not conflict with Article 6 for a conviction to be based solely or to a 
decisive extent on hearsay evidence, despite this apparently conflicting with a rule from the European 
Court of Human Rights, which states that hearsay should not be the sole and decisive reason for a 
conviction. However, the court will still generally look for other corroborating evidence to ensure 
fairness.16 
 
16 See for example R. v. Allcie Houler [2019] EWCA Crim 1064. 
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29.7 R. v. Horncastle [2010] 2 AC 373 
Horncastle’s Case  
 
On 29 November 2007, in the Crown Court at Liverpool, Christopher Horncastle and David Lee 
Blackmore, were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to section 18 of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861.  
 
On 30 November 2007, Horncastle was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection with a 
specified minimum term of 6 years and Blackmore was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.  
 
They each appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had wrongly allowed the 
admission into evidence of the written statement of the complainant who had died before the trial. 
 
Marquis’ Case  
 
On 12 May 2008, in the Crown Court at Nottingham, Joseph David Graham, pleaded guilty to 
dangerous driving and assault with intent to resist arrest.  
 
On 20 May 2008, in the Crown Court at Nottingham, he and Abijah Marquis were convicted of kidnap.  
 
On 24 July 2008, Marquis was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection with a specified 
minimum term of 10 years and Graham was sentenced to imprisonment for public protection with a 
specified minimum term of 5 years. 
 
They each appealed against conviction on the grounds that their convictions were based to a decisive 
extent on hearsay statements, in contravention of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
Carter’s Case 
 
On 22 October 2008, David Michael Carter, was convicted of ten counts of distributing indecent 
photographs of children, contrary to section 1(1)(b) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 . On 28 
November 2008, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 months' imprisonment on each count.  
 
He appealed against conviction on the grounds that the judge had wrongly allowed the admission in 
evidence of a hearsay document where there was no evidence as to its reliability. 
 
THE JUDGMENT 
 
The Supreme Court dismissed all the appeals. 
 
Although the domestic court was required to take account of the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights in applying principles which were clearly established, where, on rare occasions, the 
domestic court was concerned that the European Court's decision insufficiently appreciated or 
accommodated particular aspects of the domestic process, it might decline to follow the decision. The 
present cases came within that category.  
 
The 2003 Act represented a crafted code enacted by Parliament, which regulated the admission of 
hearsay evidence at trial in the interests of justice and contained specific safeguards which did not 
include a “sole or decisive” rule and rendered such a rule unnecessary. The statutory code struck the 
correct balance between ensuring the fairness of the defendant's trial and protecting the interests of 
the victim in particular, and society in general, that a guilty person should not be immune from 
conviction where a witness who had given critical and apparently reliable evidence in a statement was 
unavailable through death or some other reason to be called at trial. 
 
Although the European court had recognised the need for exceptions to the strict application of article 
6(3)(d), since it had approved such exceptions largely in the context of continental procedures which 
did not address the aspect of a fair trial guaranteed by article 6(3)(d), its resulting jurisprudence lacked 
clarity. The “sole and decisive” rule, which had been introduced into its jurisprudence without 
explanation of the underlying principle or full consideration of whether its imposition was justified as 
applicable equally to the continental and common law jurisdictions, would create severe practical 
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difficulties if applied to English criminal procedure and the European court had not established that its 
introduction was necessary.  
 
It was not right for the domestic court to require such a rule to be applied rather than the provisions of 
the 2003 Act, interpreted in accordance with their natural meaning; and that, so long as those 
provisions were observed, there would be no breach of article 6 and, in particular article 6(3)(d), if a 
conviction were based solely or to a decisive extent on hearsay evidence.  
 
30  WHAT IS HEARSAY EVIDENCE? 
 
30.1 Historically, hearsay evidence could be broken down into four parts 
 
i. An oral or written statement; 
ii. Made out of court; 
iii. Repeated in court; 
iv. To prove the truth of the matter stated out of court. 
 
30.2 Examples include: 
 
i. A witness repeating at court what he has been told by another person; 
ii. A witness statement being read out in evidence at court, rather than the witness attending court 
to give oral evidence; 
iii. A business document being produced in evidence. 
 
31 THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
31.1 Prior to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, there was a general common law rule that hearsay evidence 
was inadmissible in criminal proceedings.  
 
31.2 Hearsay evidence was deemed to be ‘second-hand’ evidence because it was repeating something 
that had been said elsewhere, and the maker of the original statement could not therefore be cross-
examined on its contents.  
 
31.3 This general rule was subject to a number of exceptions, contained both in the common law and in a 
number of statutes. The CJA abolished the common law rule and put in place a statutory framework 
under which hearsay evidence may be admissible if it satisfies certain requirements. However, some 
of the common law exceptions to the rule were specifically preserved. 
 
31.4 One way for the parties to avoid the rule against hearsay is to establish that the evidence they wish to 
rely on in court is not, in fact, hearsay according to the statutory definition. Statements by third parties 
not present in court are not always hearsay, and if they are not, they will only be deemed inadmissible 
if they fall foul of the other exclusionary rules (e.g. because they are irrelevant or unduly prejudicial). 
 
32  THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
 THE STATUTORY DEFINITION 
 
32.1 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.114 (1) 
 
 Admissibility of hearsay evidence 
(1) In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is admissible 
as evidence of any matter stated if, but only if— 
(a) any provision of this Chapter or any other statutory provision makes it admissible, 
(b) any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible, 
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible, or 
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(d) the court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible. 
32.2 Hearsay is thus ‘a statement, not made in oral evidence, that is relied on as evidence of a matter in 
it.’ 
e.g. Garth is charged with handling a stolen bike. At Garth’s trial, the CPS calls Adam to give evidence. 
Adam tells the court: “Garth showed me a bike. He told me he had just been given it by a mate of his, 
who had nicked it from somewhere else.” 
 
This is hearsay evidence because the CPS will rely on the statement made by Garth to Adam to show 
that he was in possession of a bike which he knew to be stolen. The statement by Garth is being relied 
on as evidence of a matter stated in it. 
 
‘A STATEMENT’ 
32.3 A ‘statement’ is defined in s.115. 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.115(2) 
 
A statement is any representation of fact or opinion made by a person by whatever means; and it 
includes a representation made in a sketch, photofit or other pictorial form. 
 
 ‘EVIDENCE OF ANY MATTER STATED’ 
 
32.4 The statement must be made with the purpose of getting the addressee to believe it. 
 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.115(3) 
 
A matter stated is one to which this Chapter applies if (and only if) the purpose, or one of the purposes, 
of the person making the statement appears to the court to have been— 
 
(a) to cause another person to believe the matter, or 
 
(b) to cause another person to act or a machine to operate on the basis that the matter is as stated. 
 
32.5 R. v. Knight [2007] All ER (D) 381 
 
The defendant was convicted of various sexual offences committed against a 14-year old girl.  
 
At trial, the girl’s aunt was permitted to give evidence of entries she had read in the girl’s diaries that 
detailed the girl’s sexual contacts with the defendant. The defendant submitted that such evidence 
was hearsay and should not have been admitted. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that such evidence was not hearsay, because the girl had not intended other 
people to read the entries in the diary, and it therefore fell outside the scope of s.115. 
 
‘A MATTER STATED’ AND IMPLIED ASSERTIONS 
 
32.6 The effect of the restricted definition of a ‘statement’ is to enable evidence to be admitted of what used 
to be called 'implied assertions' as these are not ‘matters stated’. 
 
32.7 This reverses the decision made in R v Kearley (1992) 2 AC 228  
 
 R v Kearley (1992) 2 AC 228  
 
The police answered telephone calls and personal calls to the defendant's home from people asking 
about drugs that the defendant had for sale. The prosecution wished to adduce the evidence to prove 
that the intended recipient of the calls was a dealer in drugs, without evidence from the callers 
themselves. The House of Lords decided that, as evidence of the fact that the defendant dealt in drugs, 
the caller's words were hearsay and thus inadmissible. 
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The callers' words would no longer be considered as hearsay, because they do not fall within the 
definition of being a 'matter stated'. The purpose of the calls was not to cause another person to believe 
that the recipient of the call was a drug dealer, but simply to request drugs.  
 
32.8 R. v. Chrysostomou [2010] EWCA Crim 1403  
 
Mark Chrysostomou appealed against his conviction for possessing an imitation firearm with intent to 
cause fear of violence, and putting a person in fear of violence by harassment. 
Chrysostomou had stood outside the house of the victim (V) with an imitation firearm. His case was 
that he had lent her money and was trying to get it back.  
 
When Chrysostomou's mobile phone was examined, there were four text messages received by him 
which suggested that he might be a drug dealer. When Chrysostomou gave evidence, he alleged that 
V took cocaine, and that she had not repaid her debt to him.  
 
The Crown applied to adduce the four texts from Chrysostomou's phone as "bad character" evidence, 
relying on the gateways under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(f) and s.101(1)(g). The judge 
granted the application and concluded, considering s.101(3) of the 2003 Act and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78, that it was not unfair in the circumstances to permit the evidence to 
be admitted.  
 
Among the issues for determination were whether the texts constituted hearsay evidence within the 
terms of the 2003 Act;  
 
HELD: When evidence not in the form of oral evidence in the proceedings was sought to be admitted, 
there were three preliminary questions that had to be asked:  
 
(a) whether it was relevant;  
 
(b) if so, whether it was a "statement" within the meaning of s.115(2) of the 2003 Act; and 
 
(c) if so, what the purpose was for adducing it in evidence.  
 
In the instant case, it had not been argued that the texts were irrelevant, and the court was prepared 
to accept that they were "statements".  
 
However, the purpose for which the Crown wished to adduce the texts was not to prove, as fact, any 
matters stated in them. The object of adducing them was as evidence of an underlying state of affairs, 
namely that C dealt with drugs and so could meet the demands of the person texting him. The texts 
were sought to be admitted as evidence of an "implied assertion", therefore they were not caught by 
the statutory code on hearsay in the 2003 Act and, subject to any other objections to admissibility, 
could be admitted.  
 
32.9 The leading case on what amounts to hearsay under the Act is R v. Twist [2011] EWCA Crim 1143, in 
which the Court of Appeal gave some useful examples, and discouraged the avoidance of the difficult 
concept of the "implied assertion”, because the CJA 2003 focuses on the 'matter stated' which it is 
sought to prove. 
32.10 The Court of Appeal recommended the following approach 
i) identify what relevant fact (matter) it is sought to prove; 
ii) ask whether there is a statement of that matter in the communication. If no, then no question of 
hearsay arises (whatever other matters may be contained in the communication); 
iii) if yes, ask whether it was one of the purposes (not necessarily the only or dominant purpose) of the 
maker of the communication that the recipient, or any other person, should believe that matter or act 
upon it as true? If yes, it is hearsay. If no, it is not. 
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32.11 R v. Twist [2011] EWCA Crim 1143 
 
Four appeals were heard together.  
 
In Andrew Twist’s case, Twist was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to supply: he was 
arrested in possession of a large wrap of heroin worth about £450, and also of a small wrap of the 
same drug worth about £10. He also had £232 in cash.  
 
Just before his arrest he had driven up in his car and had met and picked up another man by 
arrangement. The other man was a known heroin user. Twist admitted simple possession of the drugs 
found on him, but he denied any intent to supply. He contended that his meeting with the other man 
was nothing to do with drugs, but was because that man owed him money.  
 
The Crown sought to adduce evidence of 24 text messages received on the two mobile phones Twist 
was using at the time and which contained requests for the supply of drugs. They were received over 
a period of about five days up to the afternoon of Twist's arrest.  
 
The judge ruled that the messages were not hearsay because any assertion was merely implied and 
the purpose for which they were relied on was not to prove any fact or matter stated in them. 
 
It was held on appeal that it was not hearsay. The 2003 Act concentrated on the "matter stated" which 
it was sought to prove. This was defined by reference to the purpose of the maker (usually the sender 
of the communication). The matter stated had to be something which the maker intended someone 
(generally the recipient) to believe or to act upon: s.115(3).  
 
Two questions which had to be addressed in most cases were:  
 
(i) what was the matter which it was sought to prove? and  
 
(ii) did the maker of the communication have the purpose of causing the recipient to believe or to 
act upon that matter?  
 
To say that a communication was evidence of a fact (i.e. tended to prove it) was not the same as 
saying that that fact was the matter stated in the communication for the purposes of s.115. that it was 
not. 
 
 HUGHES L.J. 
 
9 It is therefore helpful, as it seems to us, that the Act avoids the use of the expression “assertion” 
altogether, and with it the difficult concept of the “implied assertion”. Instead, the Act concentrates the 
mind on the “matter stated”, which it is sought to prove. This is defined by reference to the purpose of 
the maker (i.e. usually the speaker or sender of the communication). The matter stated must be 
something which the maker intended someone (generally the recipient, since it is to him that the 
communication is addressed) to believe or to act upon: s.115(3) . 
 
10 The “matter stated” will usually be a fact, but may also be an opinion: s.115(2) . For convenience 
we shall refer hereafter to facts, but the same applies where the matter stated is an opinion. 
 
11 There are therefore two questions which have to be addressed in most cases: 
i) what is the matter which it is sought to prove? (it must of course be a relevant matter); and 
ii) did the maker of the communication have the purpose of causing the recipient to believe or to act 
upon that matter? 
12 In addressing these questions, and the application of the Act generally, it needs to be remembered 
that to say that a communication is evidence of a fact (i.e. tends to prove it) is not the same as saying 
that that fact is the matter stated in the communication for the purposes of the Act. 
 
13 If a buyer for a large chain store telephones the sales director of a manufacturer, with whom he 
routinely does business, and orders a supply of breakfast cereal or fashion jeans he is generally not 
representing as a fact or matter either: (a) that the sales director’s firm manufactures the flakes or the 
jeans; or (b) that he the buyer works for the chain store. Crucially for the application of the Act, even if 
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it be suggested that the order should be construed as an “implied assertion” of either fact (a) or fact 
(b), it will be beyond doubt in most cases that the caller does not have it as one of his purposes to 
cause the recipient to believe or act upon either of those facts. The recipient knows them very well. 
Those are simply the facts (or matters) which are common knowledge as between the parties to the 
call. Neither is, therefore, a matter stated in the call for the purpose of ss.114 and 115 . The call is 
however evidence of both fact (a) and fact (b). It is not, no doubt, conclusive, at least if there is any 
realistic possibility of mistake, but it is undoubtedly evidence of those facts. Conversely, if the caller 
tells the recipient, perhaps in order to induce him to speed up the supply, that the buyers have already 
sold five tons of the goods, it is his purpose to induce the recipient to believe that fact. If that were the 
fact sought to be proved, the call would be hearsay evidence of that matter. 
 
14 If there is a queue of young people outside a building at midnight, obviously waiting for an evening 
out, that is some evidence tending to prove that the building is being operated as a club, which may 
be the matter which it is sought to prove, perhaps in licensing proceedings. There is no statement of 
that matter for the purposes of the Act. If several of the queuers were heard to be telling others about 
last week’s “rave”, the only way that could possibly be regarded as a statement of the fact that this 
was a club would be by treating it, artificially as it seems to us, as an implied assertion of that fact. But 
it makes no difference whether it is so treated or not, because none of the speakers would have the 
purpose of inducing any listener to believe or to act upon the fact that the place is a club, since that is 
simply a common basis for conversation, and all of them know it.  
 
Conversely, if the issue is not whether the place was a club, but rather whether there was a large event 
the previous week, the statement of the fact/matter that there had been such an event would indeed 
be caught by the hearsay rule; those who spoke of it were doing so with the purpose of inducing their 
hearers who had not been there to believe it. The out-of-court statement would indeed be hearsay 
evidence of that matter. 
 
15 Some communications may contain no statement at all. If, for example, the communication does 
no more than ask a question, it is difficult to see how it contains any statement. A text message to 
someone asking: “Will you have any crack tomorrow?” seems to us to contain no statement at all. But 
even if it be analysed as containing an “implied assertion” that the recipient is a drug dealer, that fact 
is still not a “matter stated” for the purposes of ss.114 and 115(3) because the sender does not have 
any purpose to cause the recipient to believe that fact or to act upon the basis that it is true. They both 
know it, and it is the common basis of their communication. 
 
16 Similarly, it is important when applying the statute to distinguish between: 
i) the speaker wishing the hearer to act upon his message; and 
ii) the speaker wishing the hearer to act upon the basis that a matter stated in the message is as stated 
(i.e. true). 
Only the second will bring into operation the hearsay rules. If the sender asks whether the recipient 
will have any crack tomorrow, he does indeed want the recipient to act on his message because he 
hopes to extract an answer to his question. Even more clearly, he does so if he goes one step further 
and asks for crack to be sold to him tomorrow, because then he hopes to receive a supply. But in 
neither case does he have the purpose of causing the recipient of his message to believe that the 
recipient is a drug dealer, or to act on the basis that that is the truth. 
 
17 Generally, therefore, it is likely to be helpful to approach the question whether the hearsay rules 
apply in this way: 
i) identify what relevant fact (matter) it is sought to prove; 
ii) ask whether there is a statement of that matter in the communication. If no, then no question of 
hearsay arises (whatever other matters may be contained in the communication); 
iii) if yes, ask whether it was one of the purposes (not necessarily the only or dominant purpose) of the 
maker of the communication that the recipient, or any other person, should believe that matter or act 
upon it as true? If yes, it is hearsay. If no, it is not. 
100 
 
18 The answers to these questions will be case-sensitive. The same communication may sometimes 
be hearsay and sometimes not, depending on the matter for which it is relied upon and the fact which 
it is sought to prove. 
 
19 In addressing these questions, we would strongly recommend avoidance of the difficult concept of 
the “implied assertion”. That was described by the Law Commission, rightly in our view, as “a 
somewhat unfortunate expression”. As the commission went on to point out: “First, it begs the question 
of whether the words or conduct in question are an assertion of the fact that they are adduced to prove. 
It is at least arguable that they are not assertive at all, but directly probative – in which case it would 
follow that they should not be caught by the hearsay rule.  
 
Second, the word ‘implied’ is here used in an unusual sense. Normally it refers to a statement which 
is not expressly spoken or written but is intended to be understood from what is said or done. But 
where there is an assertion of the fact to be proved, it is immaterial whether that assertion is express 
or (in the ordinary sense) implied. An assertion of a fact is no less of an assertion because it is implicit 
in an express assertion of a different fact, or because it takes the form of nonverbal conduct such as 
a gesture. An assertion can therefore be implied (in the ordinary sense) without being what is described 
in the context of hearsay as an ‘implied’ assertion.” 
 
As we have sought to explain, it no longer matters whether a statement is analysed as containing an 
implicit (or “implied”) assertion if the speaker’s purpose does not include getting anyone else to accept 
it as true. 
 
EXAMPLES OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
32.12 Examples of hearsay evidence that commonly arise include: 
1. A witness repeating at trial what he has been told by another person; 
2. A statement from a witness being read out at trial instead of the witness attending curt to give 
oral advice; 
3. A police officer repeating at trial a confession made to him by a defendant 
4. A business document being introduced in evidence at court. 
 
33  STATUTORY CATEGORIES OF ADMISSIBILITY 
33.1  Hearsay evidence (as defined above) is admissible in criminal proceedings only if: 
1. The 2003 Act or any other statutory provision makes it admissible – s.114 (1) (a); or 
 
2. Any rule of law preserved by section 118 makes it admissible - s.114 (1) (b); or 
 
3. All parties to the proceedings agree to it being admissible – s. 114 (1) (c); or  
 
4. The court is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for it to be admissible –  
s. 114 (1) (d). 
 THE SECTION 114 (1) (d) DISCRETION 
33.2 In exercising the discretion under Section 114 (1) (d) the court must have regard to the following (and 
any others it considers relevant): 
• How much probative value the statement has (assuming it to be true) in relation to a matter in 
issue in the proceedings, or how valuable it is for the understanding of other evidence in the case;  
• What other evidence has been, or can be, given on the matter or evidence mentioned above;  
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• How important the matter or evidence mentioned is in the context of the case as a whole;  
• The circumstances in which the statement was made; 
• How reliable the maker of the statement appears to be; 
• How reliable the evidence of the making of the statement appears to be; 
• Whether oral evidence of the matter stated can be given and, if not, why it cannot; 
• The amount of difficulty involved in challenging the statement; 
• The extent to which that difficulty would be likely to prejudice the party facing it. 
33.3 Section 114 (1) (d) will be considered only in cases where admissibility under the other statutory 
provisions and the retained common law rules is not allowed. 
33.4 The test for admissibility is "interests of justice".  
The guidelines for the factors to consider in relation to the interests of justice test are detailed. 
Prosecutors will need to take these factors into account when considering the likely admissibility of 
evidence that the prosecution propose to call. These will also be the factors to take account of when 
receiving a notice of intention to adduce hearsay evidence from the defence. The prosecutor will need 
to decide whether to oppose any notice or agree to admit the evidence. 
33.5 The courts have indicated a willingness to use Section 114 (1) (d).  
33.6 R v Xhabri [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 26 
The Court of Appeal, when considering an application to admit the previous complaint of a rape victim 
under s.120, stated that even if the previous complaint fell outside the strict construction of s.120 they 
would admit the evidence under s.114 (1) (d). 
34 CASES WHERE THE WITNESS IS UNAVAILABLE 
 
34.1 Criminal Justice Act 2013, s.116 
Cases where a witness is unavailable 
(1) In criminal proceedings a statement not made in oral evidence in the proceedings is 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated if— 
(a)  oral evidence given in the proceedings by the person who made the statement would be 
admissible as evidence of that matter, 
(b)  the person who made the statement (the relevant person) is identified to the court’s 
satisfaction, and 
(c)  any of the five conditions mentioned in subsection (2) is satisfied. 
(2) The conditions are— 
(a)  that the relevant person is dead; 
(b)  that the relevant person is unfit to be a witness because of his bodily or mental condition; 
(c)  that the relevant person is outside the United Kingdom and it is not reasonably practicable to 
secure his attendance; 
(d)  that the relevant person cannot be found although such steps as it is reasonably practicable 
to take to find him have been taken; 
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(e)  that through fear the relevant person does not give (or does not continue to give) oral evidence 
in the proceedings, either at all or in connection with the subject matter of the statement, and 
the court gives leave for the statement to be given in evidence. 
(3)  For the purposes of subsection (2)(e) “fear” is to be widely construed and (for example) 
includes fear of the death or injury of another person or of financial loss. 
(4)  Leave may be given under subsection (2)(e) only if the court considers that the statement 
ought to be admitted in the interests of justice, having regard— 
(a)  to the statement’s contents, 
(b)  to any risk that its admission or exclusion will result in unfairness to any party to the 
proceedings (and in particular to how difficult it will be to challenge the statement if the relevant 
person does not give oral evidence), 
(c) in appropriate cases, to the fact that a direction under section 19 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (c. 23) (special measures for the giving of evidence by fearful 
witnesses etc) could be made in relation to the relevant person, and 
(d)  to any other relevant circumstances. 
(5) A condition set out in any paragraph of subsection (2) which is in fact satisfied is to be treated 
as not satisfied if it is shown that the circumstances described in that paragraph are caused— 
(a)  by the person in support of whose case it is sought to give the statement in evidence, or 
(b)  by a person acting on his behalf, 
in order to prevent the relevant person giving oral evidence in the proceedings (whether at all 
or in connection with the subject matter of the statement).  
34.2 S.116 (2) (b) was recently applied in R. v. Eljack and Latie [2019] EWCA Crim 1038 
 R. v. Eljack and Latie [2019] EWCA Crim 1038  
 
Kuany Eljack, now aged 24, and Khalid Latif, now aged 19, were convicted of one count of wounding 
with intent, one count of unlawful wounding and one count of robbery. They were each sentenced to 
a total of eight years' detention at a young offender institution.  
 
On 6 January 2017 the main complainant, John Furman called the ambulance service and told them 
that he and his friend Mr. Ginova had been stabbed by two people. When the police attended the 
address, they found that both men had knife wounds. Mr. Furman told police that he had been attacked 
in his flat by two men. He said that Mr. Ginova had been the principal target for the attack, but that 
when he endeavoured to intervene he himself was also cut. He told the young men that he would give 
them money if they stopped attacking Mr. Ginova. The men escorted Mr. Furman to a local cash 
machine outside a branch of Costcutters, although he said that on the way they assaulted him and 
punched him several times. He gave them money, he said, because he was scared for his safety. 
 
Neither of the victims were available to give testimony, but the prosecution sought to have their 
hearsay evidence admitted. 
 
The problem with Ginova is that he could not be found. The judge refused to admit his hearsay 
evidence because he was not satisfied that all reasonable steps had been taken to locate him. 
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However, he did permit the statement of Furman to be admitted, as he clearly fell under the provision 
of s.116 (2) (b), as being unfit to be a witness because of his bodily or mental condition. He had been 
under the care of Dr Nadia Davies (Consultant Psychiatrist) for the past 10 years, and she had made 
the following report: 
 
(a) Mr. Furman is a 55-year-old gentleman who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and 
although he has never been formally admitted to a mental health unit in the UK, he constantly 
struggles to manage his paranoid delusions.  
 
(b) Whilst his anti-psychotic medication partially controls his symptoms, Mr. Furman 
experiences voices telling him that his phone is bugged and that people intend to harm him in 
some way.  
 
(c) Mr. Furman's paranoid symptoms are exacerbated by non-compliance with prescribed 
medication and his periodic use of drugs, namely crack cocaine and heroin.  
 
d) Recently Mr. Furman and a friend who was visiting were physically attacked by two local 
drug dealers who demanded money from his friend. While trying to defend his friend from a 
beating Mr. Furman's hand and neck were slashed by a knife. Mr. Furman was then forced to 
go to a local cash point to withdraw some money to pay his friend's debts. 
 
(e) Mr. Furman understands the nature of the charges against the accused, he understands 
the purpose of the court proceedings and the role of professionals in the proceedings. He 
does however have difficulty expressing himself particularly when under stress as he is 
agitated, fearful of strangers, is distracted by auditory hallucinations and at times has 
disorganised thinking.  
 
(f) I would consider that although he had the capacity to give a witness statement that he is 
not fit to give evidence and am concerned that being compelled to give evidence would be 
detrimental to his mental health.  
 
(g) His symptoms and ability to communicate facts (or his reality as opposed to any paranoid 
delusions) are greatly assisted when he is accompanied by mental health professionals he 
knows and trusts.  
 
(h) The difference between when Mr. Furman is referring to a real occurrence and when he is 
being affected by paranoid hallucinations would be obvious to anyone but especially those 
who know Mr. Furman and are responsible for supporting him with his mental health problems. 
 
34.3 S.116 (2) (e) was recently applied in R. v. Allcie Houler [2019] EWCA Crim 1064, a very short judgment 
which is reproduced in full below. 
 
R. v. Allcie Houler [2019] EWCA Crim 1064  
 
1. LADY JUSTICE HALLETT DBE, THE VICE PRESIDENT 
 
2. Background  
 
3. On 12 March 2018, the applicant pleaded guilty to possessing an offensive weapon. On 4 April 
2018, he was convicted of murder with a minimum term of 25 years. He now seeks to renew his 
application for leave to appeal.  
 
4. The facts  
 
5. The co-accused, Sylvester and Lewis, the applicant and the deceased, Nico Ramsey, were all 
involved in class A drug dealing. Sylvester believed that Nico Ramsey had stolen some drugs and 
sought revenge. Forty minutes before Mr. Ramsey's murder on 13 February 2016, three men, 
including Sylvester and Lewis, arrived at the home o f a drug addict, Ms Tracey Smith, looking for 
Mr. Ramsey. The phones of Sylvester and the applicant were in the same area and in the vicinity 
of Ms Smith's home at the same time. Three men, said to be Sylvester, Lewis and the applicant, 
then found the deceased, chased him and caught up with him. They beat him to the ground and 
he was stabbed twice in the chest area. He was dragged along the road and kicked and beaten 
further.  
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6. The incident was witnessed by passers-by and, importantly, captured on CCTV. On that footage, 
the applicant can be seen taking out a knife and making stabbing motions in the area of the 
deceased's chest. A knife that was linked by forensic evidence to the stabbing and to the applicant 
was found in a nearby alley.  
 
7. The applicant left the country after the murder and his co-accused were tried without him and 
convicted. At their trial, the evidence of Ms Smith was admitted as hearsay because the trial judge 
held that she was in genuine fear for her life and the lives of her children. Sylvester attempted to 
appeal his conviction on the ground that the hearsay evidence of Ms Smith was wrongly admitted, 
but his application was refused.  
 
8. The applicant was extradited from Venezuela, to which he had fled, and stood trial alone. At his 
trial, he admitted it was possible he killed the deceased, but claimed he did not have the intent for 
murder. He denied going to Ms Smith's house looking for the deceased and insisted he came 
upon Sylvester and Lewis and the incident by chance.  
 
Ground of Appeal  
 
9. There is one ground of appeal namely that the trial judge wrongly admitted the hearsay evidence 
of Ms Smith.  
 
10. It is said that Ms Smith's evidence undermined the central plank of the defence: that the applicant 
was not a party to Sylvester's search for the deceased and had no prior intent to cause any harm, 
let alone really serious bodily harm.  
11. Trial counsel acknowledged that this court in Sylvester’s appeal rejected that argument, but 
insisted that the evidence of Ms Smith affected the applicant's case more than it affected the case 
of Sylvester and Lewis. They admitted going to her house; he did not.  
 
12. Furthermore, her evidence was described as inherently unreliable. When she provided the 
information of the visit to her home, Ms Smith understood that it would not be used in court. She 
could not name the man said to be the applicant, although he had previously supplied her with 
drugs, her description of him was inaccurate and of his clothing unspecific and she had lied about 
the presence of her boyfriend at the time of the visit.  
 
13. If, as the applicant asserts, Ms Smith's evidence was pivotal to the Crown case, the admission of 
her evidence was said to undermine the defence and therefore the fairness of the applicant's trial.  
 
Conclusions  
 
14. The single judge gave full, careful and ample reasons for rejecting the application for leave and 
we do not intend to repeat them.  
 
15. The evidence of Ms Smith undoubtedly met the requirements of section 116(4) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, as the trial judge found. He conducted a careful voir dire, he applied the correct 
principles and he provided full and sound reasons for his decision to admit the evidence.  
 
16. In any event, the evidence from Ms Smith was not pivotal to either the defence or the Crown case. 
The applicant could be put in the area of Ms Smith's house and at the scene by other independent 
evidence and her evidence paled into virtual insignificance compared to the CCTV footage. The 
applicant was caught on camera fully participating in a vicious attack by three men on Mr. Ramsey; 
an attack that left Mr. Ramsey dead. The applicant can be seen stabbing the deceased twice in 
the chest in a way that led the pathologist to say in his opinion the applicant stabbed the fatal 
wound. After the incident and as they left the scene, the applicant patted Sylvester on the back in 
a manner of congratulating him. Unfortunately, his intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm was 
all too obvious.  
 
17. For those reasons, we agree with the single judge. The application for leave to appeal against 
conviction is unarguable and it is dismissed.  
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35 CASES INVOLVING BUSINESS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 
 
35.1 Criminal Justice Act 2013, s.117 
 Business and Other Documents5 
 
(1)  In criminal proceedings a statement contained in a document is admissible as evidence of 
any matter stated if— 
(a)  oral evidence given in the proceedings would be admissible as evidence of that matter, 
(b)  the requirements of subsection (2) are satisfied, and 
(c)  the requirements of subsection (5) are satisfied, in a case where subsection (4) requires 
them to be. 
(2)  The requirements of this subsection are satisfied if— 
(a)  the document or the part containing the statement was created or received by a person in 
the course of a trade, business, profession or other occupation, or as the holder of a paid or 
unpaid office, 
(b) the person who supplied the information contained in the statement (the relevant person) 
had or may reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the matters dealt 
with, and 
(c)  each person (if any) through whom the information was supplied from the relevant person to 
the person mentioned in paragraph (a) received the information in the course of a trade, 
business, profession or other occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office. 
(3)  The persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) may be the same 
person. 
(4)  The additional requirements of subsection (5) must be satisfied if the statement— 
(a)  was prepared for the purposes of pending or contemplated criminal proceedings, or for a 
criminal investigation, but 
(b)  was not obtained pursuant to a request under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-
operation) Act 2003 (c. 32) or an order under paragraph 6 of Schedule 13 to the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 (c. 33) (which relate to overseas evidence). 
 (5)  The requirements of this subsection are satisfied if— 
(a) any of the five conditions mentioned in section 116(2) is satisfied (absence of relevant 
person etc), or 
(b) the relevant person cannot reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters 
dealt with in the statement (having regard to the length of time since he supplied the 
information and all other circumstances). 
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(6) A statement is not admissible under this section if the court makes a direction to that effect 
under subsection (7). 
(7) The court may make a direction under this subsection if satisfied that the statement’s 
reliability as evidence for the purpose for which it is tendered is doubtful in view of— 
(a) its contents, 
(b) the source of the information contained in it, 
(c) the way in which or the circumstances in which the information was supplied or received, or 
(d) the way in which or the circumstances in which the document concerned was created or 
received. 
35.2 The Act deals differently with statements contained in general business documents and statements 
made in contemplation of criminal proceedings. 
35.3 Generally a statement contained in a document is admissible of any matter stated if:  
• Oral evidence would be admissible as evidence of the matter;  
• The document or the part containing the statement was created or received by a person in the course 
of a trade, business, profession or other occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office;  
• The person who supplied the information contained in the statement (the relevant person) had or may 
reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with; and  
• Each person (if any) through whom the information was supplied from the relevant person to the 
person creating or receiving the information also received the information in the course of a trade, 
business, profession or other occupation, or as the holder of a paid or unpaid office (section 117 (2)). 
35.4 Documents admissible under these provisions will be wide ranging and include company 
correspondence, hospital records and a note made by an operator working for a paging company that 
messages have been left for a customer (Rock [1994] Crim LR 843). 
35.5 In the case of statements prepared for the purposes of pending or contemplated criminal proceedings, 
or for a criminal investigation (other than a request under section 7 of the Crime (International Co-
operation) Act 2003 - relating to overseas evidence, usually obtained pursuant to a letter of request) 
then one of the five conditions in section 116 (2) must also be satisfied (see above), or the relevant 
person cannot reasonably be expected to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the 
statement (having regard to the length of time since he supplied the information and all other 
circumstances) (section 117 (5) ). 
35.6 Documents where these additional requirements must be met will include statements of fraud 
investigators and police officer's notes. However, it may be that the information upon which the fraud 
investigator bases his statement will be admissible, as much of that information may be contained in 
business documents admissible under section 117 (2). 
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35.7 The person supplying the information is the relevant person (section 117 (2) (b)). Therefore, the 
decision in Bedi [1992] 95 Cr. App. R. 21, where it was accepted that reports of the loss or theft of 
credit cards compiled by a bank employee from information supplied by the owners of the cards were 
'made' by the employee rather than by the owners of the cards, is reversed. It is now clear that the 
maker of the statement is the owner of the cards. 
35.8 Although admissibility is generally automatic, there is limited discretion given to the court to exclude 
evidence if satisfied that the statement's reliability is doubtful in view of:  
• Its contents;  
• The source of the information contained in it;  
• The way in which or the circumstances in which the information was supplied or received; or  
• The way in which or the circumstances in which the document concerned was created or received 
(section 117 (7)). 
35.9 This provision is of particular importance to the prosecution as it is the only way of challenging the 
admissibility of business and other documents tendered by the defence. The test is in favour of 
admissibility rather than in favour of exclusion. 
35.10 S.117 was recently applied in R. v. Johnson [2019] EWCA Crim 1730. 
35.11 R. v. Johnson [2019] EWCA Crim 1730  
Ian Johnson (aged 60) was convicted of indecent assault and sentenced to five-and-a-half year’s 
imprisonment. 
 
In 1998, whilst working as a driving instructor, he told his 17-year-old female student (LA) to drive to a 
deserted industrial estate, ostensibly to practice parking. Once there, he raped her. She was too 
frightened of her father’s health to report the incident at the time, but in 2016, she saw Johnson in a 
local store, which caused her to have a panic attack, and she reported the incident of 18 years before. 
 
Her medical records disclosed that in 2002, when she was suffering from depression, she had 
informed the doctor that she had been attacked by a driving instructor. A further entry in her medical 
records in 2006 recorded that she had been raped by her driving instructor when she was 17. 
 
At the trial the prosecution sought to adduce hearsay evidence under section 117 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 of the entries in the medical records. In a written ruling the judge found that they were 
plainly admissible as evidence to rebut recent fabrication.  
 
The defence had complained that the records had been redacted, but little redaction could be 
perceived and that which had been omitted was material that was plainly irrelevant.  
 
The judge said that the only discretion in section 117 to exclude the documents was in subsections 
(6) and (7), which were not relevant, an approach to the makers of the notes could not possibly lead 
to their recollecting anything, which was a situation envisaged by subsection (5) although that 
subsection could not apply in this case because of the terms of subsection (4).  
 
The defence appealed inter alia on the basis that the hearsay evidence of the medical reports should 
not have been admitted. However, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the evidence was admissible 
under s.117 to show consistency and to rebut any suggestion of recent invention by the victim. 
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“The fifth ground is that the judge erred in admitting as hearsay evidence redacted medical records 
containing complaints about the applicant and then failing to warn the jury as to the difficulties posed 
to the defence in challenging that evidence. In our judgment, the judge was clearly correctly to admit 
what the complainant had told the doctor as recorded in the medical records under section 117 to 
show consistency and to rebut any suggestion of recent invention. As for the alleged failure to warn 
about limitations of hearsay evidence, as the single judge said, that direction would only be required if 
the defence was disputing that LA told the doctor what was recorded but that was not disputed.”  
per Flaux LJ at para 23. 
 
36 COMMON LAW CATEGORIES 
 
36.1 The CJA specifically preserves certain categories of common law admissibility 
36.2 Criminal Justice Act 2013, s.118 
Preservation of certain common law categories of admissibility 
(1) The following rules of law are preserved. 
Public information etc  
1   Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings—  
(a) published works dealing with matters of a public nature (such as histories, scientific works, 
dictionaries and maps) are admissible as evidence of facts of a public nature stated in them, 
(b) public documents (such as public registers, and returns made under public authority with 
respect to matters of public interest) are admissible as evidence of facts stated in them, 
(c) records (such as the records of certain courts, treaties, Crown grants, pardons and 
commissions) are admissible as evidence of facts stated in them, or 
(d) evidence relating to a person’s age or date or place of birth may be given by a person 
without personal knowledge of the matter. 
Reputation as to character  
2   Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings evidence of a person’s reputation is 
admissible for the purpose of proving his good or bad character.  
Note: The rule is preserved only so far as it allows the court to treat such evidence as proving 
the matter concerned.  
Reputation or family tradition  
3   Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings evidence of reputation or family tradition 
is admissible for the purpose of proving or disproving—  
(a) pedigree or the existence of a marriage, 
(b) the existence of any public or general right, or 
(c) the identity of any person or thing. 
Note: The rule is preserved only so far as it allows the court to treat such evidence as proving or 
disproving the matter concerned.  
Res gestae  
4   Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings a statement is admissible as evidence of 
any matter stated if—  
(a) the statement was made by a person so emotionally overpowered by an event that the 
possibility of concoction or distortion can be disregarded, 
(b) the statement accompanied an act which can be properly evaluated as evidence only if 
considered in conjunction with the statement, or 
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(c) the statement relates to a physical sensation or a mental state (such as intention or 
emotion). 
Confessions etc  
5   Any rule of law relating to the admissibility of confessions or mixed statements in criminal 
proceedings.  
Admissions by agents etc  
6   Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings—  
(a) an admission made by an agent of a defendant is admissible against the defendant as 
evidence of any matter stated, or 
(b) a statement made by a person to whom a defendant refers a person for information is 
admissible against the defendant as evidence of any matter stated. 
Common enterprise  
7    Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings a statement made by a party to a 
common enterprise is admissible against another party to the enterprise as evidence of any 
matter stated.  
Expert evidence  
8    Any rule of law under which in criminal proceedings an expert witness may draw on the body 
of expertise relevant to his field.  
 
9 With the exception of the rules preserved by this section, the common law rules governing 
the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings are abolished. 
 
37  RES GESTAE 
 
37.1 Res Gestae is Latin for ‘things done’. It is a peculiar rule which allows hearsay evidence to be admitted 
if the statement is made during the excitement of – or as part of – the litigated event. 
 
37.2 Res gestae do not have to be events that are exactly contemporaneous with the statements. 
 
Where the victim of an attack has informed a witness of what occurred in such circumstances as to 
satisfy the trial judge that the event was so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts 
of the victim so as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion and the statement was made 
in conditions of approximate but not exact contemporaneity, evidence of what the victim said is 
admissible as to the truth of the facts recited as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
 
37.3 R v. Andrews (Donald) [1987] AC 281 (HL) 
 
THE FACTS 
 
On 13 September 1983 Alexander Morrow, who lived at flat No. 3, Rouple House, London, was 
attacked and stabbed with two different knives and robbed. Within minutes of the attack, and bleeding 
profusely from a deep stomach wound, he went downstairs to the flat below for assistance. The police 
and ambulance were immediately telephoned, and again within a matter of minutes the police arrived, 
shortly followed by the ambulance. Mr. Morrow had been mortally wounded. He was kept alive on a 
life-support machine but died two months after this attack.  
 
Both Peter O'Neill and Donald Andrews, were charged with murder. O'Neill pleaded guilty to 
manslaughter, which plea was accepted by the prosecution. Andrews pleaded not guilty and O'Neill 
was the prosecution's main witness at Andrews' trial.  
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O'Neill lived in flat No. 5, on the floor above that of the deceased. He and Andrews had been out 
drinking that day and returned home in the evening about 8.30 p.m. to his, O'Neill's flat. As they were 
about to leave the flat a very short while later, Andrews asked if O'Neill had any knives, and when 
O'Neill told him there were some in the kitchen, Andrews helped himself to a large bread knife and a 
small potato knife. He also took a blanket from O'Neill's daughter's cot. On the way out, the appellant 
stopped at the deceased's flat, put the blanket over his and O'Neill's head, handed O'Neill the small 
potato knife and tried to force the lock of the flat using the bread knife. He failed. He then knocked on 
the door and when the deceased answered, the appellant shouldered the door open, lunging with the 
knife, and stabbing the deceased in his chest and stomach.  
 
As the deceased fell down Andrews said, "I am going to finish the old bastard off." O'Neill said he then 
dropped the potato knife, tried to save the deceased but in the process was stabbed twice in the leg. 
The cot blanket by this stage had come off their heads. Andrews then ran into the room, came back 
with the deceased's stereo player, told O'Neill to get the deceased's money and O'Neill took about £4. 
 
They then returned to O'Neill's flat and put the blanket back. They then left, taking with them the two 
knives and the stereo record player and went to the appellant's flat in Droitwich House. Subsequently, 
O'Neill was taken by ambulance to hospital to have his wounds dealt with. 
 
THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
The police, P.C. Worboys and P.C. Hanlon, arrived about 15 minutes after the incident.  
 
P.C. Worboys' main preoccupation was in administering first aid, in particular in stopping blood pouring 
from the stab wound in the stomach. While he was so doing, he asked the deceased how he had 
received his injuries. The deceased replied that he had been attacked by two men. He gave the names 
of his attackers, as being Peter O'Neill from flat 5, Rouple House, and the other, as a man he knew as 
Donald. He said he had gone to the door of his flat, opened the door and was attacked by these two 
men.  
 
Mr. Worsley, the barrister for the prosecution, sought to have the statement of the deceased admitted 
as evidence of the truth of the facts that he had asserted, namely that he had been attacked by both 
O'Neill and the appellant. Since evidence of this statement could only be given by a witness who had 
merely heard it, such evidence was clearly hearsay evidence. 
 
The res gestae doctrine 
 
Mr. Worsley based his submission that this hearsay evidence was admissible upon the so-called 
doctrine of "res gestae." He could not submit that the statement was a "dying declaration" since there 
was no evidence to suggest that at the time when the deceased made the statement (two months 
before his ultimate death), he was aware that he had been mortally injured. 
 
It was held that there was sufficient proximity in time for the doctrine to apply, all other conditions 
relating to the reliability of the statement being satisfied. 
 
 LORD ACKNER 
 
My Lords, may I therefore summarise the position which confronts the trial judge when faced in a 
criminal case with an application under the res gestae doctrine to admit evidence of statements, with 
a view to establishing the truth of some fact thus narrated, such evidence being truly categorised as 
"hearsay evidence?" 
 
1. The primary question which the judge must ask himself is - can the possibility of concoction or 
distortion be disregarded? 
 
2. To answer that question the judge must first consider the circumstances in which the particular 
statement was made, in order to satisfy himself that the event was so unusual or startling or dramatic 
as to dominate the thoughts of the victim, so that his utterance was an instinctive reaction to that event, 
thus giving no real opportunity for reasoned reflection. In such a situation the judge would be entitled 
to conclude that the involvement or the pressure of the event would exclude the possibility of 
concoction or distortion, providing that the statement was made in conditions of approximate but not 
exact contemporaneity. 
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3. In order for the statement to be sufficiently "spontaneous" it must be so closely associated with the 
event which has excited the statement, that it can be fairly stated that the mind of the declarant was 
still dominated by the event. Thus, the judge must be satisfied that the event, which provided the 
trigger mechanism for the statement, was still operative. The fact that the statement was made in 
answer to a question is but one factor to consider under this heading. 
 
4. Quite apart from the time factor, there may be special features in the case, which relate to the 
possibility of concoction or distortion… The judge must be satisfied that the circumstances were such 
that having regard to the special feature of malice, there was no possibility of any concoction or 
distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused. 
5. As to the possibility of error in the facts narrated in the statement, if only the ordinary fallibility of 
human recollection is relied upon, this goes to the weight to be attached to and not to the admissibility 
of the statement and is therefore a matter for the jury. However, here again there may be special 
features that may give rise to the possibility of error. In the instant case there was evidence that the 
deceased had drunk to excess, well over double the permitted limit for driving a motor car. Another 
example would be where the identification was made in circumstances of particular difficulty or where 
the declarant suffered from defective eyesight. In such circumstances the trial judge must consider 
whether he can exclude the possibility of error. 
 
37.5 The doctrine should not be used to avoid calling witnesses to give original evidence when they are 
actually available. 
 
 LORD ACKNER 
 
I would… strongly deprecate any attempt in criminal prosecutions to use the doctrine as a device to 
avoid calling, when he is available, the maker of the statement. Thus, to deprive the defence of the 
opportunity to cross-examine him, would not be consistent with the fundamental duty of the 
prosecution to place all the relevant material facts before the court, so as to ensure that justice is done. 
 
37.6 The issue of res gestae came up in a recent case in Scotland. 
 
McGaw and Reid v. HM Advocate [2019] HCJAC 78 (High Court of Justiciary, Appeal Court) 
(14 November 2019) 
 
The defendants had been convicted of producing a psychoactive substance, contrary to the 
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016. They had been producing the drug before it became illegal to do 
so, and much of the case rested on whether their previous activities were relevant and admissible 
evidence as to whether they had continued to produce the drug after it became illegal.  
 
Part of the evidence involved WhatsApp messages exchanged between the parties and their clients 
after the Act came into force, which indicated that they were still in business. The defendant argued 
that this was hearsay evidence which should be excluded.  
 
It was held that these messages were admissible as res gestae. 
 
“Proof of the exchange of WhatsApp messages formed part of the case against each appellant. These 
messages were not in the same category as evidence of the hearsay of one accused after the 
commission of a crime and outwith the presence of another accused. The messages were part of the 
commission of the offence; i.e. res gestae. They were capable of incriminating all of the accused, 
whether or not the particular accused sent or received the message. They were pieces of evidence 
which were capable of demonstrating what was going on and who was involved.”  
per Lord Carloway, Lord Justice General, at para 38 
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38  MULTIPLE HEARSAY 
 
38.1 Multiple hearsay refers to the situation where information is relayed through more than one person 
before it is recorded. 
 
38.2 Multiple hearsay is only admissible if:  
 
Either of the statements is admissible under section 117 (business documents) or section 119 
(inconsistent statements) or section 120 (other previous statement); or  
 
All parties agree; or  
 
The court uses its discretion to admit under section 121. 
 
38.3 Discretion under section 121 is framed differently to the overall discretion of the court and requires the 
court to be satisfied that the value of the evidence, taking into account how reliable the statements 
appear to be, is so high that the interests of justice require the later statement to be admissible for 
that purpose. 
 
38.4 It has been suggested that the discretion in section 121 is to be viewed as a higher test than the 
discretion in section 114 (1) (d). This is because multiple hearsay is more likely to be unreliable. 
However, there may still be circumstances where it can be reliable. 
 
39 CREDIBILITY 
 
39.1 The credibility of any witness who does not give evidence can be challenged by admitting evidence 
relevant to credibility as if the witness were giving the evidence in person (section 124(2)). Another 
party may be permitted to lead additional evidence to deny or answer any allegation made (section 
124 (3)). 
 
40  UNCONVINCING EVIDENCE 
 
40.1 In a trial before judge and jury the judge has the power to direct an acquittal or discharge the jury if 
after the close of the prosecution case he considers that the case is based wholly or partly on a hearsay 
statement and that statement is so unconvincing that, considering its importance to the case against 
the defendant, his conviction would be unsafe (section 125).  
 
40.2 This provision only applies to jury trials on the basis that in these circumstances Magistrates would be 
bound to acquit. 
 
41 GENERAL DISCRETION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
 
41.1 The court is given a general discretion to refuse to admit hearsay evidence under the Act if satisfied 
that the case for excluding the statement, taking account of the danger that to admit it would result in 
undue waste of time, substantially outweighs the case for admitting it (section 126 (1)). 
 
41.2 The Act also specifically preserves the power of the court to exclude prosecution evidence under 
section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and any other power to exclude evidence at 
its discretion (section 126 (2)).  
 
41.3 It should be noted that section 78 relates only to the exclusion of prosecution evidence and the 
common law rules refer to exclusion if it is necessary to secure a fair trial for the accused. It is submitted 
that the only discretion to exclude defence evidence is that contained in section 126. 
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42 EXPERT EVIDENCE: PREPARATORY WORK 
 
42.1 Section 127 creates an exception to the hearsay rule for information relied on by an expert, subject to 
the court's discretion to require attendance of the relevant witness. A statement prepared for the 
purposes of criminal proceedings made by a person having personal knowledge of any matter stated 
can be relied upon by an expert to base an opinion on it. 
 
42.2 It is a requirement that notice be given to the other party that the expert will be basing an opinion or 
inference on the statement. The notice must provide the name of the person making the statement 
and the nature of the matters contained in it. 
 
42.3 The issue of expert evidence came up in the recent case of R. v. Pringle [2019] EWCA Crim 1722 
 
42.4 R. v. Pringle [2019] EWCA Crim 1722 
 
James Pringle (aged 20) was convicted of abducting a child, contrary to s.2 (1) (b) of the Child 
Abduction Act 1984. His ‘victim’ was a 13-year old schoolgirl, who fancied herself as Pringle’s 
girlfriend, and played truant from school to spend the day with him.  
 
One of the issues raised in the case by the prosecution was that by spending time with the girl, Pringle 
was in breach of a prohibition contained in a Child Abduction Warning Notice, which had been served 
on him two days earlier. However, this was not the offence with which he was charged, and the defence 
(unsuccessfully) argued that it was unduly prejudicial for the judge to have permitted this evidence to 
be admitted. The court held that it was at least relevant to the issue of whether the defendant knew 
that he was not permitted to socialise with the girl 
 
There was also an issue about Pringle’s learning difficulties, which might have meant that his interview 
should have been conducted in the presence of an appropriate adult. The defence wished to introduce 
into evidence a report from an expert intermediary, which indicated the problems that Pringle might 
have had in understanding the implications of the CAWN.  
 
As this expert was not available for cross-examination, this evidence would have been hearsay, and 
the court held that it was not admissible as it did not fall within the exception in s.127, as the report 
had not been prepared for the purposes of the criminal proceedings, but was merely incidental to them.  
 
43 CONFESSIONS 
 
43.1 Section 128 of the 2003 Act inserts section 76A into the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. This 
enables a defendant to introduce a confession made by a co-defendant subject to his proving (on the 
balance of probabilities) that the confession was not made by oppression or in circumstances likely to 
render it unreliable. 
 
43.2 Facts discovered as a result of a confession will still be admissible even if the confession is excluded. 
 
44  REPRESENTATIONS OTHER THAN BY A PERSON 
 
44.1 A statement made by a machine (e.g. a computer), which relies on information supplied by a person, 
is only admissible to the extent that the information provided was accurate: section 129 (1). 
 
44.2 There is a presumption that a mechanical device has been properly set or calibrated: section 129 (2). 
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45  RELEVANCE OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
45.1 Whether or not evidence is hearsay, or whether or not one of the exceptions applies, it must still be 
relevant in order to be admissible. If a report of a third-party statement is being given as evidence 
other than to establish its truth, then it is often not relevant to the case at all. 
 
45.2 R. v. Blastland [1986] AC 41 
 
FACTS 
 
Douglas Blastland, was charged with (count 1) buggery, contrary to section 12 (1) of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1957. the particulars of offence being that he on 9 December 1982 committed buggery 
with Karl James Fletcher, a boy aged 12 years; and (count 2) murder, the particulars being that on or 
about 9 December 1982, he murdered Karl James Fletcher. 
 
The case for the prosecution was that he had forcibly buggered Karl Fletcher and then strangled him 
with a scarf. He pleaded not guilty.  
 
He gave evidence that he had attempted to bugger the boy but had desisted when the boy had 
complained of pain. Shortly afterwards, he had seen a man called Mark nearby and, afraid that he had 
been seen committing a serious offence, had run off and returned to his home.  
 
His case was that it had been Mark, not he, who had committed the offences with which he was 
charged. He sought to call a number of witnesses to give evidence that Mark had said, before the 
boy's body had been discovered, that a young boy had been murdered. The judge ruled that that 
evidence was hearsay and inadmissible. He also refused an application by the appellant to call Mark 
and treat him as a hostile witness.  
 
The appellant was convicted on both counts, and his appeal against conviction, on the ground that the 
judge had been wrong to exclude the evidence in question, was dismissed by the Court of Appeal 
(Criminal Division). 
 
The certified question for the House of Lords was, inter alia, whether evidence of words spoken by a 
third party who is not called as a witness is hearsay evidence, if it is advanced as evidence of the fact 
that the words were spoken and so as to indicate the state of knowledge of the person speaking the 
words: the inference to be drawn from such words is not that the statement is true, but that the person 
speaking them may be guilty himself of the offence with which the defendant is charged. 
 
HELD 
 
Dismissing the appeal, that the principle that statements made to a witness by a third party were not 
excluded by the hearsay rule when they were put in evidence solely to prove the state of mind of the 
maker of the statement or of the person to whom it was made, applied only where the state of mind 
evidenced by the statement was directly in issue at the trial or of direct and immediate relevance to an 
issue in the trial. 
 
Mark's knowledge that the boy had been murdered had not been in issue at the trial nor per se was it 
of any relevance to the issue at the trial, which had been whether it was proved that the appellant had 
buggered and murdered the boy. How Mark had come by that knowledge, albeit relevant, had been a 
matter of pure speculation as to which the statements of the witnesses in question would have been 
of no probative value. 
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K IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 
 
PART ONE: Famous False Identifications  
 
46 ADOLF BECK17 
 
46.1 The Adolf Beck case was a notorious incident of wrongful conviction 
by mistaken identity, brought about by unreliable methods of identification, 
erroneous eyewitness testimony, and a rush to convict the accused. 
 
46.2 As one of the best known causes célèbres of its time, the case led to the 
creation of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in 1907. 
 
 BECK’S BACKGROUND 
 
46.3 Adolf (or Adolph) Beck was born in Norway in 1841, and educated as a 
chemist. However, he went to sea soon afterwards and moved to England 
in 1865, working as a clerk to a shipbroker. In 1868 he moved to South 
America, where he made a living for a while as a singer, then became a 
shipbroker, and was also engaged in buying and selling houses. 
 
46.4  He returned to England in 1885 and engaged in various financial schemes, including an investment 
in a copper mine in Norway. Unfortunately, the mine did not turn a profit, and he poured in more and 
more money until he had to put the mine up for sale. There were no takers and he was reduced to 
near-poverty. He was also in debt to the hotel in Covent Garden where he lived, had borrowed money 
from his secretary, and was chronically short of money. Nevertheless, he tried to keep up appearances 
by dressing in a frock coat and top hat whenever he went out, even though they had become 
threadbare. 
  
THE FIRST ARREST AND CONVICTION 
 
46.5 On 16 December 1895, Beck was stepping out of the front door of 135 Victoria Street (or 139, 
according to at least one account) when a woman blocked his way. She accused him of having tricked 
her out of two watches and several rings. Beck brushed her aside and crossed the road. When the 
woman followed him, he complained to a policeman that he was being followed by a prostitute who 
had accosted him. The woman demanded his arrest, accusing him of having swindled her three weeks 
earlier.  
 
46.6 The policeman took them both to the nearest police station, where the woman identified herself as 
Ottilie Meissonier, unmarried, and a language teacher. She alleged that she had been walking down 
Victoria Street one day when Beck approached her, tipping his hat and asking if she was Lady Everton. 
She said that she was not, but she was impressed by his gentlemanly manner and they struck up a 
conversation. According to her account, he introduced himself as "Lord Willoughby" and advised her 
that the flower show she was heading for was not worth visiting. He said that he knew horticulture 
because he had gardens on his Lincolnshire estate extensive enough to require six gardeners.  
 
Meissonier mentioned that she grew chrysanthemums. The man asked her whether he might see them 
and she invited him to tea the following day. 
 
46.7 At her home the next day he invited her to go to the French Riviera on his yacht. He insisted upon 
providing her with an elegant wardrobe for the voyage, wrote out a list of items for her and made out 
a cheque for £40 to cover her purchases. Then he examined her wristwatch and rings, and asked her 
to let him have them so that he could match their sizes and replace them with more valuable pieces. 
After he left, she discovered that a second watch was missing. Suspicious, she hurried to the bank to 
cash the cheque, only to find that it was worthless. She had been swindled and she swore that it was 
Adolf Beck who had done it. He was promptly arrested. 
46.8 The inspector who was assigned to the case learned that in the previous two years twenty-two women 
had been defrauded by a grey-haired man who called himself "Lord Wilton de Willoughby" and used 
 
17 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adolf_Beck_case>. 
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the same modus operandi as Beck's accuser had described. These women were asked to view a line-
up that included Beck along with ten or fifteen men who had been selected randomly from the street. 
Because he was the only one with grey hair and a moustache he was quickly identified by the women 
as the man who had defrauded them. 
 
46.9 Beck was charged with ten misdemeanours and four felonies. The felony charges were based on 
presumed prior convictions in 1877, when a man named John Smith had been sentenced to five years 
for swindling unattached women by using the name Lord Willoughby, writing worthless cheques and 
taking their jewellery. He had disappeared after his release. and it was assumed that Beck and Smith 
were one and the same. Descriptions of John Smith from prison files were never compared with the 
current appearance of Adolph Beck. 
 
46.10 At Beck's committal hearing, in late 1895, one of the policemen who had arrested Smith eighteen 
years before was called to testify. PC Elliss Spurrell gave his account as follows: "In 1877 I was in 
the Metropolitan Police Reserve. On 7 May 1877 I was present at the Central Criminal Court where 
the prisoner in the name of John Smith was convicted of feloniously stealing ear-rings and a ring and 
eleven shillings of Louisa Leonard and was sentenced to five years' penal servitude. I produce the 
certificate of that conviction. The prisoner is the man. ... There is no doubt whatever – I know quite 
well what is at stake on my answer and I say without doubt he is the man." 
 
46.11 Beck protested and insisted that he could bring witnesses from South America to prove that he was 
there in 1877. 
 
46.12 On 5 March 1896 Adolf Beck was found guilty of fraud[ and was sentenced to seven years of penal 
servitude at Portland Convict Prison on the Isle of Portland. In prison he was given John Smith's old 
prison number, D 523, with the letter W added, indicating a repeat convict. 
 
46.13 England did not yet have a court of criminal appeal, but between 1896 and 1901 Beck's solicitor 
presented ten petitions for re-examination of his case. His requests to see the prison's description of 
John Smith were repeatedly denied. However, in May 1898 an official at the Home Office looked at 
the Smith file and saw that Smith was Jewish and thus had been circumcised, while Beck was not. 
The Home Office asked Sir Forrest Fulton for his opinion of this new evidence. Fulton wrote a minute 
dated 13 May in which he acknowledged that Smith and Beck could not be the same person, but he 
added that even if Beck was not Smith, he was still the imposter of 1895, and that he viewed the South 
American alibi "with great suspicion." As a result, the letter W was removed from Beck's prison 
number, but nothing else was done regarding the case. 
 
46.14  While Beck remained in prison, George Robert Sims, a journalist who worked for the Daily Mail and 
had known Beck since his return to England in 1885, wrote an article in the paper emphasising that 
Beck had been tried on the assumption that he and Smith were the same person, yet no evidence to 
support that assumption had been allowed by Judge Fulton. Public opinion was slowly swayed by 
Sims and others, including Arthur Conan Doyle, to the view that Beck's conviction was unjust. 
 
46.15 Beck was paroled in July 1901 for good behaviour. 
 
THE SECOND ARREST AND CONVICTION 
 
46.16 On 22 March 1904, a servant by the name of Paulina Scott filed a complaint that a grey-haired, 
distinguished looking man had accosted her on the street, paid compliments to her and then stolen 
her jewellery. The inspector who took the complaint was familiar with Beck's case and assumed he 
must be the culprit, so he sent Scott to the restaurant where Beck took his lunch. She did not recognise 
him but the inspector was undeterred by the woman's uncertainty and set a trap for him. 
 
46.17 On 15 April 1904, as Beck left his flat, Scott ran up to him and accused him of defrauding her of her 
jewellery. Beck was horrified and denied the charge. Scott repeated her accusations and told him that 
someone was waiting to arrest him. He ran away in panic, but was caught immediately by the waiting 
police inspector, who arrested him at once. Beck's panicked flight reinforced the inspector's 
assumption regarding his guilt. 
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46.18 He was again put on trial on 27 June at the Old Bailey before Sir William Grantham. Five women 
identified him and, based on this positive identification, he was found guilty by the jury. The judge, 
however, was dissatisfied about the case and expressed some doubts regarding it. Despite 
assurances from the Home Office and the police of Beck's guilt, he decided to postpone sentencing. 
Ten days later the case was solved once and for all. 
 
THE TRUTH ABOUT JOHN SMITH 
 
46.19  On a routine visit to the Tottenham Court Road police station on 7 July, Inspector John Kane of 
the Criminal Investigation Department was told of the arrest of a man who had tried to swindle some 
rings from a pair of unemployed actresses that afternoon and had been apprehended at a pawnshop. 
The detective was familiar with the Beck case, having been present at Beck's two trials and asked for 
details. The details fitted the usual pattern but the alleged culprit, Adolph Beck, was already in jail, 
awaiting sentencing. 
 
46.20 The inspector went to the new prisoner's cell. It held a grey-haired man, approximately of Beck's 
height, with certain features which made him resemble Beck. However, Beck was younger and frailer 
in build, and this man had a scar on the right side of his neck, as Ottilie Meissoner remembered. The 
prisoner had given his name as William Thomas but the inspector, convinced that he was John Smith, 
informed Scotland Yard. Three of the five women who identified Beck in his second trial were brought 
in to confront Thomas and they quickly identified him as the swindler (the other two had gone abroad 
and thus were not present). Other women were brought in as well who also admitted their error in 
identifying Beck. When the man who had been John Smith's landlord in 1877 identified Thomas as his 
former tenant, the prisoner confessed his crimes. 
 
46.21 "William Thomas" turned out to be as much an alias as "John Smith" had 
been, and he had two other aliases as well, "William Wyatt" and "William 
Weiss". His true identity was Wilhelm Meyer, born in Vienna and graduated 
from the University of Vienna. He studied leprosy in the Hawaiian 
Islands under Father Joseph Damien. He later became surgeon to the King 
of Hawaii and was engaged in growing coffee, and in various other 
businesses in the United States, even setting up practice as a physician 
in Adelaide before moving to London. Apparently, he fell upon hard times 
when he stayed there, and turned to preying on women through fraud. When 
Beck was sent to prison in his place, Meyer had gone back to the United 
States and did not come back until 1903, apparently when he thought Beck 
had served out his sentence, and resumed his swindling until he was finally 
arrested.  
 
When brought to trial on 15 September, Wilhelm Meyer pleaded guilty to 
those offences. 
 
AFTERMATH OF THE CASE: THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 
 
46.22 Adolf Beck was given a free pardon by the King on 29 July 1904 and in compensation for his false 
imprisonment was awarded £2,000, later raised to £5,000 due to public clamour (about £300,000 
today), again due to George Robert Sims, but those who were responsible were the subject of public 
indignation. 
 
46.23 Eventually a Committee of Inquiry was established, headed by the noted jurist and Master of the 
Rolls Sir Richard Henn Collins. It heard evidence from all those involved in the case, including Horace 
Avory and Sir Forrest Fulton. In its report, it concluded that Adolph Beck should not have been 
convicted in the first place due to the many errors made by the prosecution in presenting its case. The 
Committee also chastised Judge Fulton in his conduct on the case, as he should have given 
consideration to the 1877 case, more so because of his involvement with the 1877 case, which served 
to prejudice the proceedings against Beck.  
 
46.24 Furthermore, it criticised the Home Office for its indifference in acting on the case despite the fact that 
it had known since 1898 that Beck and Smith were not the same man. Instead, it sought to preserve 
the credibility of the judiciary rather than admit or correct its mistakes. It also stated that the omission 
of the prison authorities to state the fact of Smith's circumcision in the records of 1877 and 1881 was 
the primary cause of the miscarriage of justice. 
118 
 
46.25 As a direct result of the case, important reforms resulted, including the creation of the Court of Criminal 
Appeal.  
 
46.26 The case is still cited by judges in Commonwealth countries as a glaring example of how 
inaccurate eyewitness identification can be, and the extreme care with which juries must regard 
evidence of this kind. As for Adolf Beck, his exoneration brought him little consolation. He died a 
broken man of pleurisy and bronchitis in Middlesex Hospital on 7 December 1909. 
 
 
47 MAHMOOD HUSSEIN MATTAN 195218 
 
47.1 Mahmood Hussein Mattan was a Somali former merchant seaman who 
was wrongfully convicted of the murder of Lily Volpert on 6 March 1952. 
The murder took place in the Docklands area of Cardiff, Wales, and 
Mattan was mainly convicted on the evidence of a single prosecution 
witness. Mattan was executed in 1952 and his conviction was quashed 
45 years later on 24 February 1998, his case being the first to be referred 
to the Court of Appeal by the newly formed Criminal Cases Review 
Commission. 
 
MATTAN’S BACKGROUND 
 
47.2 Mahmood Hussein Mattan was born in British Somaliland in 1923 and his job as a merchant seaman 
took him to Wales where he found work at a foundry in Tiger Bay. In Cardiff he met Laura Williams, a 
worker at a paper factory. The couple married just three months after meeting, but as 
a multiracial couple they suffered racist abuse from the community. The couple had three children, but 
in 1950 they separated and afterwards lived in separate houses in the same street. In 1952 Mattan 
resigned his job at the steelworks 
 
CONVICTION FOR MURDER 
 
47.3 On 6 March 1952, Lily Volpert, a 42-year-old woman, was found murdered in her outfitter's shop in the 
Cardiff Docklands area. Her throat had been cut with a razor, and about £100 (equivalent to about 
£2,700) had been stolen. Within a few hours Mattan was questioned by the Cardiff City Police and ten 
days later he was charged with Volpert's murder. When the police raided Mattan's home they 
discovered a broken shaving razor and a pair of shoes with blood specks on them. There was no 
evidence of any blood-stained clothing or the missing money. 
 
47.4 The trial took place at the Glamorgan Assizes in Swansea in July 1952. The main witness for the 
prosecution was Harold Cover, a Jamaican with a history of violence, who later received a share of a 
reward of £200 (equivalent to about £5,500) offered by the Volpert family. Cover claimed to have seen 
Mattan leaving Volpert's shop, though it later emerged that he had previously identified another Somali 
living in the area at the time, Taher Gass, as the man he had seen. The jury was not told of this, or of 
Cover's background during the trial. Neither was the jury informed that four witnesses had failed to 
select Mattan from an identification parade.  
 
47.5 One 12-year-old girl, who saw a black man near the shop at the time of the murder, and was confronted 
with Mattan, stated that he was not the person she witnessed, but the police ignored her statement 
and did not take the evidence to court. Furthermore, the shoes belonging to Mattan with specks of 
blood were second-hand, and no forensic information was brought forward linking the samples. 
 
47.6 Mattan was described as having a limited understanding of English, and refused the services of an 
interpreter. In a trial slanted with racial overtones, Mattan's barrister described his client as "Half-child 
of nature; half, semi-civilised savage". These comments are likely to have prejudiced the jury and 
undermined Mattan's defence, particularly since they came from Mattan's own barrister, who had the 
task of defending him.  
 
47.7 On 24 July 1952, Mattan was convicted of the murder of Lily Volpert and the judge passed the 
mandatory sentence of death. 
 
 
18  <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahmood_Hussein_Mattan>. 
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47.8 Mattan was refused leave to appeal and to call further evidence in August 1952, and on 3 September 
1952, six months after the murder of Volpert, he was hanged at Cardiff Prison.  
 
POSTHUMOUS APPEAL 
 
47.9 The Mattan family's first attempt to overturn the conviction was denied in 1969 by the Home 
Secretary James Callaghan; by this stage, three years had passed since the death penalty's abolition. 
 
47.10 In 1996 the family was given permission to have Mattan's body exhumed and moved from a felon's 
grave at the prison to be buried in consecrated ground in a Cardiff cemetery. 
 
47.11 When the Criminal Cases Review Commission was set up in the mid-1990s, Mattan's case was the 
first to be referred by it. On 24 February 1998 the Court of Appeal came to the judgment that the 
original case was, in the words of Rose LJ, "demonstrably flawed".  
 
47.12 The family were awarded £725,000 compensation, to be shared equally among Mattan's wife and 
three children. The compensation was the first award to a family for a person wrongfully hanged. 
 
 
48  JEAN CHARLES DE MENEZES 2005 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
48.1 On 7 July 2005, four suicide bombers detonated bombs on the London transport 
network, killing themselves and 52 other people. On 21 July 2005, explosive 
devices were discovered in rucksacks left on three underground trains and on 
one bus. On 22 July 2005, the police conducted a surveillance operation at an 
address at which two suspects in the failed bombings of 21 July were thought 
to live.  
 
48.2 Jean Charles de Menezes, a 27-year-old Brazilian electrician, lived close to 
that address and was wrongly identified as one of the suspects. 
 
48.3 On July 22, 2005, he was followed to an underground station and shot dead 
by armed officers while on board a stationary Northern line train at Stockwell. 
He was shot seven times in the head and once in the shoulder at point-
blank range by officers from the Met police’s CO19 firearms unit. 
 
WHY DID POLICE THINK HE WAS A TERRORIST?  
 
48.4 In the early hours of that day, police traced a gym card found in one of the bags containing the failed 
bombs to an address at Scotia Road, south London. They believed it was being used by a suspected 
terrorist called Hussain Osman. 
 
48.5 A senior officer drew up a plan that anyone coming out of the address should be allowed to walk a 
short distance away so they were out of sight of anyone else in the flats, then stopped by armed police 
and their identity checked. 
 
48.6 After he left his flat, for some reason officers allowed him to board a bus towards Stockwell station. 
They followed him and shot him after he boarded a Northern line train at Stockwell. Rules of 
engagement introduced by the Met to deal with suicide bombers required armed officers to shoot and 
kill suspected bombers before they have a chance to detonate any explosives. But it was a case of 
mistaken identity. 
 
WHAT DID THE POLICE SAY ABOUT THE SHOOTING?  
 
48.7 The Met police commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, told a press conference that the dead man “was challenged 
and refused to obey police instructions”, while Scotland Yard said his “clothing and behaviour at the 
station added to their suspicions”. 
 
These claims were all later found to be false. Blair admitted the force had made a “serious mistake” in 
the immediate aftermath of the shooting. 
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48.8 In 2007, the Office of the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis was found guilty of breaches of 
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 s.3 and s.33 in connection with M's death. However, no 
individual police officers were prosecuted. 
 
48.9 In 2009, the Met had to pay compensation believed to be just over £100,000 plus the family’s legal 
costs. In return the family agreed to end their legal (civil) action against Scotland Yard. 
 
THE CASE IN THE ECHR 2016 
48.10 Da Silva v. United Kingdom (5878/08) (2016) 63 E.H.R.R. 12 
Lawyers for the family argued the decision not to prosecute anyone over the shooting was in violation 
of De Menezes’ right to life, under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
They also challenged the definition of self-defence used by British authorities in the case. 
 
In a ruling, judges in Strasbourg concluded there had been a thorough investigation into De Menezes’ 
death, which “concluded that there was insufficient evidence against any individual officer to 
prosecute”. 
 
They found that the Crown Prosecution Service was not obliged to lower the evidence threshold under 
human rights laws where the state was involved in the killing. 
 
“The decision not to prosecute any individual officer was not due to any failings in the investigation or 
the state's tolerance of or collusion in unlawful acts; rather, it was due to the fact that, following a 
thorough investigation, a prosecutor considered all the facts of the case and concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence against any individual officer to meet the threshold evidential test in respect of 
any criminal offence.  
 
“Nevertheless, institutional and operational failings were identified and detailed recommendations 
were made to ensure that the mistakes leading to M's death were not repeated. Those institutional 
failures resulted in the conviction of the Office of the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis for 
offences under the 1974 Act. This was not a case of "manifest disproportion" between the offence 
committed and the sanction imposed. The cases in which the instant court had found such a manifest 
disproportion were ones in which individuals were found guilty of serious offences but given 
excessively light punishments. Here, an independent prosecutor weighed all the evidence in the 
balance and decided that there was only sufficient evidence to prosecute the Office of the 
Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis for offences under the 1974 Act. Moreover, there was 
no evidence to indicate that the "punishment" imposed (a fine of £175,000 and costs of £385,000) was 
excessively light for offences of that nature.” 
 
The decision by Europe’s highest human rights court brings to an end an 11-year legal saga which 
saw the police’s account of events rejected at an inquest. 
 
NEWS REPORT ON THE DE MENEZES CASE 
 
48.11 THE PROBLEM WITH EYEWITNESSES19 
The aftermath of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Tube station has shown 
that eyewitness testimony may not always be as reliable as it seems.  
On the day Mr Menezes was killed, a picture was quickly painted by eyewitnesses of a suspect who 
had vaulted over a ticket barrier, ran away from police, and had worn a bulky jacket that could have 
concealed a device. 
Scotland Yard did nothing to dispel that impression, saying that the shooting had been "directly linked" 
to anti-terrorism operations, that Mr Menezes had been challenged but had not obeyed, and that the 
victim's "clothing and behaviour" had added to suspicions. 
 
19 Finlo Rohrer BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4177082.stm>. 
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Over the last month, the image of Mr Menezes' conduct has been slowly dispelled, before being 
completely shattered by Independent Police Complaints Commission documents leaked to ITV News. 
Identification errors 
According to the documents, Mr Menezes was wearing a light denim shirt or jacket, walked through 
the barriers having picked up a free newspaper, and only ran when he saw his train arriving. It has left 
many scratching their heads as to how the witnesses could have got it so wrong. 
The reliability of eyewitness accounts of crime has proved a rich seam for psychologists and 
criminologists to mine over the years. Andrew Roberts, a lecturer in law at Leeds University 
specialising in evidence, said courts have recognised for a long time that eyewitness identification 
evidence is "inherently unreliable". 
News reports 
But it is not just the thorny issue of recognising a face that confuses witnesses. Witnesses' recollection 
of every aspect of an incident can be contaminated by what they hear from other people. 
Forensic psychologist Dr Fiona Gabbert has been working at Aberdeen University with Professor 
Amina Memon on the distortions in eyewitness recollection. 
"Memories are very vulnerable to error. If you witness a crime and then read a local news report 
everything can be combined in your memory at a later date," she said. 
"It can be hard to distinguish between what you saw, and another source of information. If there are 
two people witnessing a crime it is very likely that you are going to ask the person next to you or say 
'I can't believe what just happened'." 
In studies at the university, subjects were shown very slightly different versions of the same event, 
such as a crime filmed from different angles. 
The subjects are allowed to talk and then a statement is taken as if they are talking to the police. 
Dr Gabbert said 70% of participants reported witnessing at least one thing they could not possibly 
have seen themselves. 
Easily influenced 
Even when given a "source monitoring test", where the participants are asked to highlight what they 
saw and what might have come from other sources, 50% will report an item from their discussions with 
other people as their own. 
"It is a true memory error - you are really thinking that you have seen it. It is horrifically scary," Dr 
Gabbert continued. 
"There are criminal cases where witnesses identified the same innocent person. It goes to show your 
memory is so easily influenced. You discuss your memories with people every single day." 
Not just other witnesses, but leading questions from journalists or investigators can also have an 
influence. 
Detectives are always keen to speak to witnesses before reporters are able to get to them, fearing that 
sensational aspects will filter into their recollections. 
And even without the influence of other people, retaining an accurate recollection of a complex event 
is not easy. 
Mr Roberts said stress was a major factor in distorted testimony. 
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"When you see a very violent episode you are likely to be under great stress that adversely affects 
your ability to recall events accurately. There is also a well-known effect called 'weapon focus'. If you 
are watching an event where someone is brandishing a gun you don't recall as much information - 
psychologists think naturally your focus is on the weapon." 
In a rolling news society, the effect of the media is powerful. 
"One of the most dangerous things about the [Stockwell] shooting is the amount of information that is 
in the public domain. Witnesses on the tube are likely to have seen other witness accounts, the official 
version and information that followed from the police," Mr Roberts said.  
"Where a witness is exposed to post-event information that tends to get assimilated into the memory." 
Mr Roberts cited a study of Amsterdam residents who lived near the site of a 1992 plane crash that 
claimed 43 lives after a cargo jet smashed into an apartment block. 
"The crash was never filmed. But quite a large proportion were adamant they had seen footage on TV 
and could recall images that were very graphic. They had got all this information from various sources 
but remembered it as an image they had seen on TV." 
And setting aside all these factors, eyewitnesses can get things wrong because of interpretation. 
Photo shop manager Christopher Wells, who said he saw the Stockwell victim vaulting a ticket barrier, 
has since conceded that he must have seen a plain clothes police officer. 
 
 
PART TWO: The Devlin Committee 
 
49 THE DEVLIN COMMITTEE REPORT 1976 
 
49.1 A departmental committee was set up in the mid-1970s under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin to report 
on evidence and identification procedures. 
 
49.2 The main momentum for the committee proceedings were two recent miscarriages of justice in which 
false identification evidence had led to convictions which were later overturned. 
 
R v. Laslo Viraq (1969)  
 
49.3 In 1969, Laszlo Virag was convicted of stealing from parking meters and using a firearm while trying 
to escape police officers. Despite his strong alibi and other contradictions in the evidence, he was 
identified by eight witnesses as the man who committed the crime. 
While he was in prison it was found another person had committed the crime and he was pardoned. 
49.4 R. v. Luke Dougherty (1972)  
In 1972, Luke Dougherty was convicted of shoplifting after two witnesses picked his face out of a police 
album. 
He was eventually cleared, with the Court of Appeal and the Devlin Committee noting numerous flaws 
in both the investigation and the trial. 
 
49.5 Professor Glanville Williams commented: 
 
‘Neither the Beck case at the turn of the century nor the many miscarriages of justice since then have 
sufficiently impressed those concerned with criminal justice of the dangers of identification evidence. 
To mention some of the instances in late years: three occurred alone in the space of a few months in 
1967-68. A memorandum of the National Council of Civil Liberties published in 1968 gave details of 
15 cases from 1966 onwards. In most of these a person was convicted on identification evidence and 
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the mistake was either established or very likely: in a few of them the defendant had not gone beyond 
being committed for trial when by a happy accident the mistake was discovered.’ 
 
49.6 The committee reported in 1976, reaching this conclusion: 
 
‘We are satisfied that in cases which depend wholly or mainly on eye-witness evidence of identification, 
there is a special risk of wrong conviction. It arises because the value of such evidence is exceptionally 
difficult to assess: the witness who has sincerely convinced himself and whose sincerity carries 
conviction is not infrequently mistaken. We have found no forensically practical way of detecting this 
sort of mistake.’20 
 
PART THREE: The Turnbull Direction  
 
50 INTRODUCTION 
 
50.1 At the same time as the Devlin Committee was reporting, a supercharged Court of Appeal considered 
the problems of identification evidence and issued a set of guidelines designed to reduce the risk of 
miscarriages of justice. 
 
50.2 The guidelines fall into two sections: 
 
1. Whenever a case against a defendant depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or 
more identifications of the defendant, which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the direction to the 
jury should include a warning of the special need for caution before convicting the defendant and the 
reasons for that caution. 
 
2. Further, the quality of the identification should be considered and the jury should be directed to 
examine closely the circumstances in which the identification was made. Where the quality of the 
identification is good, the jury can safely be left to assess the value of the evidence, but, where the 
quality is poor, the case should be withdrawn from the jury unless there is other evidence capable of 
supporting the identification. The judge should direct the jury on the evidence that is capable of 
supporting the identification. 
 
51 THE TURNBULL CASE 
 
51.1 R. v. Turnbull [1977] Q.B. 224 
 
On October 13, 1975, the defendants, Raymond Turnbull and Joseph Nicholas David Camelo, were 
convicted at the Newcastle-upon-Tyne Crown Court of conspiracy to commit burglary and were each 
sentenced by Judge Smith to three years' imprisonment.  
 
They appealed against conviction on the ground that the verdict of the jury was unsafe and 
unsatisfactory, being based upon the identification of Turnbull by a single detective constable who 
knew him previously, who was in a moving car looking across a road at night and who caught a glimpse 
of him as he momentarily turned his head.  
 
51.2 FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
Three cases were heard together. The facts of the Turnbull case itself were as follows. 
 
Raymond Turnbull and Joseph Camelo had devised a scheme whereby they could induce 
shopkeepers, customers of the Gosforth Branch of Lloyds Bank Ltd., to post their night safe wallets 
containing their day's takings through the ordinary letter-box in the main front door of the bank instead 
of into the night safe. Turnbull and Camelo then intended that in the course of the following night or 
week-end they would break into the bank through a window at the rear of the branch which was 
unprotected by any burglar alarm, and remove the wallets which would be conveniently lying on the 
floor just within the bank's front door. 
 
20 Devlin, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department on Evidence and Identification in Criminal Cases, 
1976, London HC 338; 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228523/0338.pdf>. 
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The first step in the conspiracy was to put the night safe out of action by inserting a bent nail into its 
lock. A notice typed on bank notepaper and purporting to be signed by a non-existent area manager 
was then fixed above the night safe. This notice informed customers that owing to vandalism the night 
safe was out of order and advised them to put their deposits through the bank letter-box. Over the 
latter a card was fixed upon which was boldly printed the message "Night Safe here." 
 
Between about 5.30 p.m. and 6.30 p.m. on December 21, 1974, a number of unsuspecting 
shopkeepers and the employees of one security firm, following the instructions on the two notices, 
posted wallets containing over £5,000 takings through the bank's letter-box.  
 
51.3 THE TRIAL 
 
At the trial, the principal witness on identity was Detective Constable Smith. He gave evidence that on 
the relevant night he had signed off duty at Gosforth Police Station, which was not far from the bank, 
at 8 p.m. He went to the car park at the rear of the police station and drove into the main road to which 
reference has been made and along it towards the bank. As he did so, and at a point which it was 
agreed was some 62 yards from the front door of the bank, Smith said that he saw a man in that 
doorway who seemed to be taking a notice from the door of the bank. The man left the doorway and 
started to walk to his left along the pavement with his shoulders hunched to the point in the wall of the 
bank where the night safe was. There he pulled another notice quickly off it and as he did so he 
glanced briefly to his right, that is to say along the main road in the direction from which Detective 
Constable Smith had been coming. 
 
At the time, Smith's car was just passing the bank, some 10 yards or so from the night safe and 
Detective Constable Smith's evidence was that as the man turned his head, he (Smith) recognised 
him and recognised him as the appellant Turnbull. The latter was a man whom the officer had known 
for some time. Detective Constable Smith said that it was a well-lit street and that he had no difficulty 
in recognising Turnbull.  
. 
Counsel for the Crown accepted that the quality of the identification by Detective Constable Smith 
could not be said to have been good, and indicated that had there been no other supporting evidence 
he would not have been disposed to argue that the appellants' convictions should stand. In the 
circumstances, however, he contended that there was ample other evidence which went to support 
the correctness of Smith's identification. 
 
He pointed out that Smith already knew Turnbull and that his was more recognition than mere 
identification. Both Smith and another witness gave a general description of the man they each saw 
and of the coat which he was wearing that night which was consistent with the facts. A van recently 
hired by Camelo was in the vicinity at the relevant time and Sergeant Wakenshaw had recognised 
Camelo at the wheel as the van passed the bank.  
A few minutes later, when the van was stopped a mile or so away, both Camelo and Turnbull were in 
it and there was substantial evidence that at about that time the latter at least had been in possession 
of housebreaking implements. 
 
The Court of Appeal held that there was clearly evidence which went to support the correctness of 
Smith's identification of Turnbull, and thus the implication that both he and Camelo had conspired as 
charged. Given the honesty of Smith's identification which, as we have said, the jury must have 
accepted, our opinion is that there can be no real doubt about its accuracy.  
 
In the result the court not think that it can be said that the verdicts in this case were in any way unsafe 
or unsatisfactory and the appeals against conviction were therefore dismissed. 
 
51.4 THE TURNBULL GUIDELINES 
 
In the course of the judgment, Lord Widgery CJ set out the correct procedures for cases which rested 
on identification evidence. 
 
In our judgment the danger of miscarriages of justice occurring can be much reduced if trial judges 
sum up to juries in the way indicated in this judgment. 
 
First, whenever the case against an accused depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of 
one or more identifications of the accused which the defence alleges to be mistaken, the judge should 
warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting the accused in reliance on the 
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correctness of the identification or identifications. In addition, he should instruct them as to the reason 
for the need for such a warning and should make some reference to the possibility that a mistaken 
witness can be a convincing one and that a number of such witnesses can all be mistaken. Provided 
this is done in clear terms the judge need not use any particular form of words. 
 
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the circumstances in which the 
identification by each witness came to be made. How long did the witness have the accused under 
observation? At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any way, as for example 
by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever seen the accused before? How often? If 
only occasionally, had he any special reason for remembering the accused? How long elapsed 
between the original observation and the subsequent identification to the police? Was there any 
material discrepancy between the description of the accused given to the police by the witness when 
first seen by them and his actual appearance?  
 
If in any case, whether it is being dealt with summarily or on indictment, the prosecution have reason 
to believe that there is such a material discrepancy they should supply the accused or his legal 
advisers with particulars of the description the police were first given. In all cases if the accused asks 
to be given particulars of such descriptions, the prosecution should supply them.  
 
Finally, he should remind the jury of any specific weaknesses which had appeared in the identification 
evidence. 
 
Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is 
purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in 
recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made. 
 
All these matters go to the quality of the identification evidence. If the quality is good and remains good 
at the close of the accused's case.  the danger of a mistaken identification is lessened, but the poorer 
the quality, the greater the danger. 
 
In our judgment when the quality is good, as for example when the identification is made after a long 
period of observation, or in satisfactory conditions by a relative, a neighbour, a close friend, a workmate 
and the like, the jury can safely be left to assess the value of the identifying evidence even though 
there is no other evidence to support it: provided always, however, that an adequate warning has been 
given about the special need for caution. Were the courts to adjudge otherwise, affronts to justice 
would frequently occur. A few examples, taken over the whole spectrum of criminal activity, will 
illustrate what the effects upon the maintenance of law and order would be if any law were enacted 
that no person could be convicted on evidence of visual identification alone. 
 
Here are the examples. A had been kidnapped and held to ransom over many days. His captor stayed 
with him all the time. At last he was released but he did not know the identity of his kidnapper nor 
where he had been kept. Months later the police arrested X for robbery and as a result of what they 
had been told by an informer they suspected him of the kidnapping. They had no other evidence. They 
arranged for A to attend an identity parade. He picked out X without hesitation. At X's trial, is the trial 
judge to rule at the end of the prosecution's case that X must be acquitted? 
 
This is another example. Over a period of a week two police officers, B and C, kept observation in turn 
on a house which was suspected of being a distribution centre for drugs. A suspected supplier, Y, 
visited it from time to time. On the last day of the observation B saw Y enter the house. He at once 
signalled to other waiting police officers, who had a search warrant to enter. They did so; but by the 
time they got in, had escaped by a back window. Six months later C saw Y in the street and arrested 
him. Y at once alleged that C had mistaken him for someone else. At an identity parade he was picked 
out by B. Would it really be right and in the interests of justice for a judge to direct Y's acquittal at the 
end of the prosecution's case? 
 
A rule such as the one under consideration would gravely impede the police in their work and would 
make the conviction of street offenders such as pickpockets, car thieves and the disorderly very 
difficult. But it would not only be the police who might be aggrieved by such a rule. Take the case of a 
factory worker, D, who during the course of his work went to the locker room to get something from 
his jacket which he had forgotten. As he went in, he saw a workmate, Z, whom he had known for years 
and who worked nearby him in the same shop, standing by D's open locker with his hand inside. He 
hailed the thief by name. Z turned round and faced D; he dropped D's wallet on the floor and ran out 
of the locker room by another door. D reported what he had seen to his chargehand. When the 
chargehand went to find Z, he saw him walking towards his machine. Z alleged that D had been 
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mistaken. A directed acquittal might well be greatly resented not only by D but by many others in the 
same shop. 
 
When, in the judgment of the trial judge, the quality of the identifying evidence is poor, as for example 
when it depends solely on a fleeting glance or on a longer observation made in difficult conditions, the 
situation is very different. The judge should then withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal 
unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the identification. This may be 
corroboration in the sense lawyers use that word; but it need not be so if its effect is to make the jury 
sure that there has been no mistaken identification: for example, X sees the accused snatch a woman's 
handbag; he gets only a fleeting glance of the thief's face as he runs off but he does see him entering 
a nearby house. Later he picks out the accused on an identity parade. If there was no more evidence 
than this, the poor quality of the identification would require the judge to withdraw the case from the 
jury; but this would not be so if there was evidence that the house into which the accused was alleged 
by X to have run was his father's.  
 
Another example of supporting evidence not amounting to corroboration in a technical sense is to be 
found in Reg. v. Long (1973) 57 Cr.App.R. 871 . The accused, who was charged with robbery, had 
been identified by three witnesses in different places on different occasions but each had only a 
momentary opportunity for observation. Immediately after the robbery the accused had left his home 
and could not be found by the police. When later he was seen by them, he claimed to know who had 
done the robbery and offered to help to find the robbers. At his trial he put forward an alibi which the 
jury rejected. It was an odd coincidence that the witnesses should have identified a man who had 
behaved in this way. In our judgment odd coincidences can, if unexplained, be supporting evidence. 
 
The trial judge should identify to the jury the evidence which he adjudges is capable of supporting the 
evidence of identification. If there is any evidence or circumstances which the jury might think was 
supporting when it did not have this quality, the judge should say so. A jury, for example, might think 
that support for identification evidence could be found in the fact that the accused had not given 
evidence before them. An accused's absence from the witness box cannot provide evidence of 
anything and the judge should tell the jury so. But he would be entitled to tell them that when assessing 
the quality of the identification evidence they could take into consideration the fact that it was 
uncontradicted by any evidence coming from the accused himself. 
 
Care should be taken by the judge when directing the jury about the support for an identification which 
may be derived from the fact that they have rejected an alibi. False alibis may be put forward for many 
reasons: an accused, for example, who has only his own truthful evidence to rely on may stupidly 
fabricate an alibi and get lying witnesses to support it out of fear that his own evidence will not be 
enough. Further, alibi witnesses can make genuine mistakes about dates and occasions like any other 
witnesses can. It is only when the jury is satisfied that the sole reason for the fabrication was to deceive 
them and there is no other explanation for its being put forward can fabrication provide any support for 
identification evidence. The jury should be reminded that proving the accused has told lies about where 
he was at the material time does not by itself prove that he was where the identifying witness says he 
was. 
 
In setting out these guidelines for trial judges, which involve only changes of practice, not law, we have 
tried to follow the recommendations set out in the Report which Lord Devlin's Committee made to the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department in April 1976. We have not followed that report in using 
the phrase "exceptional circumstances" to describe situations in which the risk of mistaken 
identification is reduced. In our judgment the use of such a phrase is likely to result in the build-up of 
case law as to what circumstances can properly be described as exceptional and what cannot. Case 
law of this kind is likely to be a fetter on the administration of justice when so much depends upon the 
quality of the evidence in each case. Quality is what matters in the end. In many cases the exceptional 
circumstances to which the report refers will provide evidence of good quality, but they may not: the 
converse is also true. 
 
A failure to follow these guidelines is likely to result in a conviction being quashed and will do so if in 
the judgment of this court on all the evidence the verdict is either unsatisfactory or unsafe. 
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52 THE CONTENT OF A TURNBULL DIRECTION 
 
52.1 There is no expectation that the trial judge incants a special or specific formula. 
 
52.2 The key elements of a Turnbull direction are as follows: 
 
i. Whenever a case depends wholly or substantially on disputed identification evidence, the 
judge has to warn the jury of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on that 
evidence.  
 
ii. The judge must explain why special caution is needed when considering identification 
evidence and, more particularly, must tell the jury that a convincing identifying witness can still 
be a mistaken one, which might lead to a miscarriage of justice21. There is no necessary 
correlation between confidence and accuracy. 
 
iii. The judge has to direct the jury to examine the circumstances of the identification closely, 
including such matters as the length of time the accused was under observation, his distance 
from the witness, the lighting, the clarity of view, whether the witness had ever seen him 
before, and the time elapsed between the observation and the subsequent identification to the 
police.  
 
iv. The judge has to indicate any specific weaknesses in the identification evidence, and remind 
the jury that mistakes in the recognition of close friends and relatives could sometimes be 
made.  
 
v. Where the quality of the identification evidence is good, the jury can safely be left to assess 
its value even if there is no other evidence to support it, provided that an adequate warning 
has been given about the special need for caution. However, when the quality of the identifying 
evidence is poor, the judge should withdraw the case from the jury and direct an acquittal 
unless there is other evidence supportive of the correctness of the identification 
 
vi. Such supporting evidence need not amount to corroboration in its technical sense, and the 
judge should identify for the jury any evidence that s/he adjudges to be capable of supporting 
the identification.  
 
vii. The judge has, however, to take special care when dealing with a false alibi. A false alibi could 
only be supportive of disputed identification evidence if the jury was satisfied that the sole 
reason for the fabrication was to deceive them, and they are to be reminded that the fact that 
an accused has lied about his whereabouts does not of itself prove that he has been where 
the identifying witness said he has.  
 
53  IDENTIFICATION THROUGH RECOGNITION 
WHEN THE WITNESS ALREADY KNOWS THE ACCUSED  
 
53.1 Although the Turnbull direction is especially important where the witness is claiming to identify a 
stranger whom he has never seen before the incident, it might also be needed were they are already 
acquainted. How often does someone say: “I saw someone today. I could have sworn it was you!” 
 
53.2 R. v. Turnbull [1977] QB 224 
 
“Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger; but even when the witness is 
purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in 
recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.” per Lord Widgery at p.228 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21  R v. Nash [2004] EWCA Crim 2696. 
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53.3 R. v. Thomas Bentley (1994) 99 Cr. App. R. 342 
 
THE ALLEGED FACTS 
 
On February 26 1989, there was a function in the British Legion Club at Parsons Green, that occasion 
being the televised version of the boxing match between Bruno and Tyson. A large number of people 
attended the show.  
 
After the televised fight had finished, a young man in the club called Kieran Lismore was severely 
wounded by a glass that was pushed into his face by someone or other.  
 
The prosecution case was that it was Thomas Bentley who had inflicted those injuries on Lismore. 
The only evidence that it was Bentley was that given by Lismore himself.  
 
There was no doubt that the two young men, Lismore and Bentley, had known each other for some 
considerable time. Indeed, they went to the same primary school. The two of them were not particularly 
friendly but they had met each other from time to time over the years, and indeed had played some 
sort of sport together. 
 
Kieran Lismore had gone to watch the boxing match at the British Legion Club, although he was not a 
member. There is no doubt at all that he had had a great deal too much to drink: seven or eight pints 
of lager. When he reached the hospital to have his injuries attended to, it was noted by the doctor who 
treated him that he was well under the influence of alcohol at that time. 
 
According to Lismore, as he went up to the bar to get a drink he collided with Bentley and what he 
described as an unfriendly exchange of words took place between them, although he could not 
remember precisely what it was that was said. According to him at that point, or shortly afterwards, 
Bentley lunged at him and he heard a crunching noise round his face. 
 
THE DEFENCE 
 
Bentley denied that he had been the assailant. Indeed, he denied that he had been present at that 
time. He said that he had left before this particular fracas took place.  
 
THE JUDGE’S SUMMING UP 
 
“The issue there—and it has been made quite plain to us throughout the trial—is that Thomas Bentley 
says, ‘It wasn't me’. That is his defence reduced to three words, ‘It wasn't me’. You will be looking at 
the evidence to decide whether or not the prosecution has made you sure that it was him who caused 
those injuries… 
 
“Let me make it quite plain that the only evidence that identifies this defendant, Thomas Bentley, as 
being the assailant of Kieran Lismore is that of Kieran Lismore. There is no other evidence that pins 
Thomas Bentley down as being the assailant, and so you will have to look very carefully at 
Kieran Lismore's evidence to see whether that evidence satisfies you so that you are sure that it was 
Thomas Bentley who wounded him… 
 
“That is really the nub of what you have to determine so far as his evidence is concerned, and you are 
looking at his evidence against the background that he had certainly had a very great deal to drink that 
night, or that night and the following morning, some seven or eight pints of lager. He was clearly under 
the influence of alcohol when he got to the hospital because the doctor, who was the first witness 
called before you noticed that fact and made a note of it in his hospital records.” 
 
THE VERDICT 
 
On February 8, 1990, Bentley was convicted by a majority of 10 to two of wounding with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 . On 
February 9 he was sentenced to two years' detention in a young offender institution. 
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THE APPEAL 
 
Bentley appealed on the grounds that the judge did not give a sufficient direction on the lines 
of Turnbull (1976) 63 Cr.App.R. 132, [1977] Q.B. 223 , before the jury retired. 
 
It was held, allowing the appeal, that the failure to warn of the danger of incorrect identification 
evidence being given by an apparently honest witness, and the further danger of an honest, convincing 
witness nevertheless making a mistaken identification, amounted to a material misdirection. 
Accordingly, the conviction was quashed. 
 
LORD LANE CJ 
 
“So far as it went, this was a model summing up in clarity and conciseness. But there is no doubt that 
there were two matters missing from it.  
 
“The first was that there was no warning as to the dangers of identification evidence and the reason 
for those dangers existing, namely the experience the courts have had of mistakes in the past, and 
there was no warning to the jury that a convincing witness may nevertheless be a wrong witness. The 
problem we have to decide is whether in the circumstances of this particular case—I stress that in the 
circumstances of this particular case—those directions rendered the conviction unsafe or 
unsatisfactory and amounted to a material misdirection… 
 
“The second thing which the jury are unlikely to know is the substantial degree of risk that honest 
witnesses may be wrong in their evidence of identification… 
 
“The only question which remains therefore in the absence of such directions in the present case is 
whether this was a case where such directions were required? We have come to the conclusion, not 
without some considerable hesitation, that it was such a case, that the judge should have given those 
two sorts of warning to the jury and that the absence of them was a material misdirection. It follows 
therefore that we are not satisfied that this was a safe or satisfactory conviction. It follows likewise that 
this appeal must be allowed and the conviction quashed.” 
 
“What is sometimes called the recognition type of identification—as it was in this case—can be treated 
as straightforward or trouble free. It cannot. Each of us, and no doubt everyone sitting in this Court, 
has had the experience of seeing someone in the street whom we know, only to discover later that it 
was not that person at all. The expression “I could have sworn it was you” indicates the sort of warning 
which the judge should give, because that is exactly what the witness does. He swears that it was the 
person he thinks it was. He may nevertheless have been mistaken even where it is a case of 
recognition rather than one of identification. 
 
“There are even in the narrow field of recognition cases degrees of danger. There is perhaps less 
danger where, as in the present case for example, two people, the identifier and the so called identified, 
know each other and have known each other for many years; perhaps less danger where there is no 
doubt that the identified person was in fact at the scene at the time and was not somewhere else 
altogether. Even here it is at least advisable that the jury should be alerted to the possibility of the 
honest mistake and to the dangers of identification evidence, and the reason for those dangers.”  
per Lord Lane CJ 
 
53.4 Mark Anthony Capron v. The Queen [2006] UKPC 34 Privy Council, the Bahamas 
 
The appellant, Mark Capron, appealed against a decision of the Court of Appeal of the Bahamas 
dismissing his appeal against his conviction for the murder of Andrew Ferguson, for which Capron had 
been sentenced to death. 
According to the Crown's principal witnesses, Gregory Ferguson and Irvin Brown, they saw Capron 
shoot the victim. The incident occurred in broad daylight on the morning of 6 March 2001 in Johnson 
Alley in Nassau. There was an argument between Jermaine Hepburn (also known as “Bingy”) and 
Irvin Brown. Bingy had a knife. A scuffle broke out between Bingy and Brown. The deceased was 
present.  
Gregory Ferguson said that Capron came across the street with a gun, took hold of the deceased by 
the neck and shot him. He then ran after Irvin and shot at him. Capron then came back and fired 
another shot at the deceased who was lying on the ground.  
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Gregory Ferguson identified Capron in the dock. He said that he had grown up with Capron and had 
known him for 8 to 9 years or more. During that period, he would see Capron sometimes twice a day, 
almost every day.  
Capron's defence had been that the witnesses were lying when they identified him as the murderer, 
and that the witnesses themselves had attacked the victim in connection with a drugs matter. Capron 
had also maintained that at the time of the murder he had been talking to his uncle on the porch of the 
uncle's house, and he had relied on an alibi placing him there before and after the shooting.  
On the basis that it was not a case of mistaken identity, but whether the witnesses were lying, the trial 
judge summed up without a Turnbull warning, but directed the jury that it had to be sure that the 
witnesses were telling the truth and that they were not mistaken about the identity of the person who 
had shot the victim.  
The judge also stated that the witness providing the alibi could not say for sure that he had seen 
Capron on the porch at the time of the shooting, and said that the jury might think his evidence did not 
assist Capron.  
Capron appealed inter alia on the basis that even though the defence had attacked the witnesses on 
the basis that they were lying, rather than that they were mistaken in their identification of Capron, the 
judge should have given a Turnbull direction. 
The Privy Council held that even in a recognition case, the trial judge should give an 
appropriate Turnbull direction unless, despite any defence challenges, the nature of the eye witness 
evidence was such that the direction would add nothing of substance to the judge's other directions to 
the jury on how they should approach that evidence 
In this case, the jury had the evidence of the witnesses who had known Capron for many years before 
the incident and who would have been able to recognise him in the conditions prevailing, and a 
full Turnbull direction would not have added anything of substance to the directions that the judge 
actually gave the jury. The absence of a Turnbull direction did not, therefore, make Capron's conviction 
unsafe.  
However, the judge's comments that the alibi witness had only seen Capron on the porch before and 
after the incident rather than at the very time of the shooting, and that his evidence did not take 
Capron's case any further, was too extreme and should not have been made in those terms. While it 
was true that the alibi witness could not say who had fired the shots, the absence of that particular 
evidence did not detract in any way from the actual evidence that he was able to give, namely that 
Capron had been on his uncle's porch both before and after the incident. Capron was fully entitled to 
make that point and it was essential that the jury should have been left to consider it, free from the 
judge's repeatedly expressed and extremely negative assessment of the evidence.  
Given that the Crown's case depended on the jury accepting the evidence of W, and that the alibi 
evidence could be seen as casting doubt on their evidence, it was impossible to say that, if the jury 
had been given appropriate directions on the alibi evidence, they would inevitably have returned the 
same verdict. Accordingly, the verdict was unsafe. 
“Even in a recognition case, the trial judge should always give an appropriate Turnbull direction unless, 
despite any defence challenges, the nature of the eye witness evidence is such that the direction would 
add nothing of substance to the judge's other directions to the jury on how they should approach that 
evidence.” per Lord Rodger at para 16 
53.5 The fact that the witness has some prior acquaintance with the suspect also does not automatically 
dispense with the need for an Identification Parade. 
53.6 R v Fergus [1992] Crim LR 363 
 
Fergus was charged with wounding with intent and affray. The prosecution case was that the victim, 
R, came with others to a party attended by F and was stabbed by F during a general disturbance when 
R and the two other men in his group were stabbed by F's two brothers (who were also charged).  
 
The issue was the identity of R's first assailant. R said that he did not really know F beforehand but 
had seen him and his brothers once before when someone had told him who F was. The Crown sought 
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leave to ask R if the man he knew as F was in court. The judge agreed and F and his two brothers 
changed places in the dock. R then identified F as the man he knew by that name.  
 
A further witness named F as the attacker but likewise said that he did not know F, though he had 
seen him.  
 
F was convicted and appealed, submitting, inter alia, that the judge should not have admitted the 
evidence of R purporting to identify F without an identification parade. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal, there was an important distinction to be made between cases where the 
complainant claimed to recognise the assailant as a person he already knew well and those where the 
complainant had never seen the assailant before.  
 
Although danger of mistake existed in the "recognition" case it was less than in the identification case. 
 
The case where the complainant had seen the assailant only once or on a few occasions before might 
well be treated as that of identification rather than recognition. It was acknowledged that dock 
identification was unsatisfactory but the identification of a person through a name which was only 
known by hearsay was almost equivalent to a dock identification.  
 
In a case of recognition an identification parade would often be pointless but in the present case an 
identification parade or at the least a controlled confrontation should have been held. Since the only 
previous time when R had seen F was a casual incident when there was little occasion to remember 
him and bearing in mind the difficult lighting and other circumstances when the attack occurred the 
conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory.  
 
 
54 CASES THAT MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE JURY 
 
54.1 In some circumstances, it is considered simply too dangerous for the court to admit visual identification 
evidence at all. If the prosecution case relies on identification evidence of poor quality and there is no 
other evidence in the case to support the correctness of the identification, it is the judge’s duty to 
withdraw the case from the jury and to direct an acquittal. 
 
 Obvious Cases 
 
54.2 In some cases the need to withdraw the case from the jury is obvious. 
Wilbert Daley v. The Queen [1994] 1 AC 117 PC Jamaica 
The defendant was charged with the murder of a woman who had been shot by one of two men who 
had broken into her house. The prosecution case depended wholly on visual evidence of identification 
by the deceased's husband, which the defence alleged to have been mistaken.  
 
At the close of the prosecution case the judge rejected a submission of no case to answer. The judge 
in her summing up referred to serious weaknesses in the identification evidence. She warned the jury 
that the identification had not been very good and expressed her opinion that the prosecution had not 
made the identification clear enough.  
 
The defendant was convicted and the Court of Appeal of Jamaica dismissed his application for leave 
to appeal against conviction. 
 
On the defendant's appeal to the Judicial Committee, it was held, allowing the appeal, that where the 
trial judge considered that the quality of the identification evidence was poor and insufficient to found 
a conviction, and there was no other evidence to support that identification evidence, he should 
withdraw the case from the jury at the end of the prosecution case. 
 
However, where the strength of the prosecution evidence depended on the determination of a 
witness's reliability, and on one possible view of the facts there was evidence upon which a jury could 
properly convict, the judge should not stop the trial even if he regarded the prosecution evidence as 
uncreditworthy, but should leave the case to the jury. 
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In this case, since the trial judge had rationally considered the prosecution's case on identification to 
be too weak to sustain a conviction, she should have withdrawn the case from the jury with a direction 
to acquit the defendant; and therefore, a miscarriage of justice had occurred and the conviction would 
be quashed  
 
Less Obvious Cases 
 
54.3 Sometimes it is not clear that the identification is so poor that the whole case should collapse. In that 
case, the matter may be left to the jury – with a suitable Turnbull warning. 
 
54.4 R. v. Dossett (Steven Edward) [2013] EWCA Crim 710 
 
Steven Dossett appealed against a conviction for robbery. 
 
Dossett and his co-accused (James Ganney), in an unprovoked robbery, knocked the complainants 
(Dee Riley and Michael Ryan) to the ground at night, punching and kicking them before running off 
with Riley's handbag. Ryan stated that Dossett was visible in the street lighting. It was accepted that 
the street lighting was poor and that Ryan's observation took place under difficult conditions.  
 
At an identification procedure, Dossett was picked out by Ryan but not Riley (who picked out a 
volunteer). A DNA profile matching Ganney was found on the recovered handbag.  
 
Dossett’s submission that the identification evidence was too weak to support a safe conviction was 
rejected. The judge had noted that neither witness mentioned the suspects' tattoos, Riley's failure to 
identify Dossett, the possibility of distraction during the attack and the discrepancy between Dossett's 
height estimated by Ryan and his actual height.  
Dossett submitted that the judge should have withdrawn the case from the jury because of the 
weakness of the identification evidence. 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
“Although the whole incident lasted only a few minutes, this was not really a case of a fleeting glimpse, 
such as one might have of a person running away from the scene of a crime. Mr. Ryan and the two 
robbers were all in close proximity and he was able to get a good look, albeit for only a short period of 
time, at the face of the man standing behind Miss Riley. Experience suggests that it is not necessary 
to look at a person's face for long in order to take in its essential features, especially when there is 
good reason for it to be imprinted on the mind of the observer, as was the case here. It is quite true 
that neither witness mentions seeing any tattoos, though whether they were clearly visible under the 
prevailing conditions is uncertain. There is also the discrepancy between Mr. Ryan's assessment of 
the attacker's height and the height of the appellant, but there is a real distinction between the 
instinctive process of taking in a person's facial features and the conscious mental process involved 
in assessing a person's height in feet and inches. 
 
“In our view this was a case in which the quality of the original observation was good enough to justify 
the judge's leaving the case to the jury provided that she warned them clearly of the dangers inherent 
in visual identification and drew their attention to the specific weaknesses in the evidence. In the event, 
no criticism is made of that part of her summing up.” per Moore-Bick LJ 
 
Multiple Witnesses 
 
54.5 Even when there is more than one witness, the evidence may still be considered to be too poor for the 
case to continue. 
 
54.6 R. v. Weeder (Thomas Henry) (1980) 71 Cr App R 228 
 
THE FACTS 
 
Shortly after 10.45 p.m. on April 20, 1978, Mr. Tierney was attacked near his home when returning 
from a public house. He was struck on the back of the head from behind and fell to the ground 
underneath a lamp post, where he became unconscious for a short time. When he turned round to 
see what was happening, he received another blow to his head. He was then hit about the legs and 
body and tried to protect himself by kicking out. He had a good look at his assailant, who was wielding 
a bat. The street lamp provided a bright light and Mr. Tierney was looking up at his assailant while he 
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was being attacked. Another man kicked him in the side but he only saw this man's back. Something 
was said during the attack about a girl. Both men ran off when Mr. Tierney's neighbours came out to 
see what was happening. 
 
Miss Susan Massam, aged 18 years, was in her bedroom when the attack took place. She heard a 
thud on the side of the fence just outside her room. She looked out and saw the appellant hitting a 
man's legs with a stick-like object. She also saw another man, whom she identified as Patrick O'Toole, 
beating the man's legs with a tennis racket. The light was shining down right on them. She could see 
their faces. She knew the appellant because her friend used to go out with him. She had seen him 
about 50 times. She used to live not far away from where the appellant lived. 
 
The police were called and when they visited the appellant's home shortly afterwards, he was not in. 
However, at 2 a.m. on the following day the appellant telephoned the police station and asked why the 
police were looking for him and Patrick O'Toole. The officer said he was not prepared to discuss the 
matter over the telephone and asked him to come to the police station.  
 
The appellant told the officer that he was after the wrong O'Toole and said: “It's Anthony you want, he 
and I have been together all night.” He and Anthony O'Toole arrived at the police station about an hour 
later and when interviewed denied the offence. 
 
THE TRIAL 
 
The trial judge gave a clear Turnbull direction, but did not direct that the trial should end. Weeder 
appealed on the basis that the judge should have ended the trial because the identification evidence 
was too poor. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
It was held by the Court of Appeal that even though multiple witnesses might present ‘poor’ evidence, 
which should end a trial, this was not such a case. The appeal was dismissed. 
 
“(1) When the quality of the identifying evidence is poor the judge should withdraw the case from the 
jury and direct an acquittal unless there is other evidence which goes to support the correctness of the 
identification. The identification evidence can be poor, even though it is given by a number of 
witnesses. They may all have had only the opportunity of a fleeting glance or a longer observation 
made in difficult conditions, e.g. the occupants of a bus who observed the incident at night as they 
drove past. 
 
“(2) Where the quality of the identification evidence is such that the jury can be safely left to assess its 
value, even though there is no other evidence to support it, then the trial Judge is fully entitled, if so 
minded, to direct the jury that an identification by one witness can constitute support for the 
identification by another, provided that he warns them in clear terms that even a number of honest 
witnesses can all be mistaken.” per the Lord Chief Justice 
 
 
55 WHEN A TURNBULL DIRECTION MAY BE NEEDED 
 
55.1 In cases in which the judge does not stay the prosecution on account of the Crown’s heavy reliance 
upon inherently weak identification evidence, a Turnbull direction must be delivered whenever the 
prosecution case depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of 
the accused which the defendant alleges to be mistaken. 
 
55.2 R. v. Servis [2015] EWCA Crim 2291 
 
Sergeant Prior, a police officer driving a police patrol car, saw a Ford Focus motor vehicle driving in 
the opposite direction and thought he recognised the driver as the defendant, Shankye Servis, whom 
he had encountered a number of times in the course of his police duties. He started to follow the 
vehicle and found it was being driven dangerously and at excessive speed, so he reported the incident 
on his police radio, saying he thought he knew who the driver was, but not naming the defendant, and 
gave the last three letters of the vehicle’s registration number.  
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Sergeant Prior was then involved in a collision with another vehicle, and had to abandon the chase. 
The Ford Focus itself collided with a stationary motor vehicle, causing injuries to the two men inside 
and damage to their vehicle as well as to the Ford Focus. The driver of the Ford Focus got out and left 
the scene.  
The following morning the defendant’s mother, Georgia Servis, who was the owner of the Ford Focus, 
reported her car stolen and the spare key to it missing. The defendant and another son, Malouki, lived 
with her. The defendant was arrested and interviewed at the police station, where he denied any 
involvement in the offences, saying he had been with family and friends, but failing to provide their 
contact details. He was charged with dangerous driving, contrary to s.2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 , 
and aggravated vehicle taking, contrary to s.12A of the Theft Act 1968 . 
At the trial, the main prosecution witness, who was the officer who had initially given chase, gave 
evidence identifying the defendant as the driver of the Ford Focus. The defendant’s mother, another 
prosecution witness, said her sons looked alike and had been mistaken for each other before and that 
there was another man of a similar description living in the house.  
The defendant denied any involvement in the offences and said he had been visiting his sister, who 
gave evidence in support of the defendant’s alibi.  
Summing up, the judge failed to enumerate the weaknesses in the identification evidence or to put 
squarely to the jury that the defendant had a brother who looked like him, lived in the same house and 
had access to the spare key. Further, the judge adopted the prosecution case that the first officer had 
positively identified the driver of the Ford Focus as the defendant while omitting to mention his name 
in his radio messages. 
The defendant’s appeal against conviction was allowed. The judge’s summing up was highly criticised. 
Appeal allowed. 
• The judge’s summing up was discursive and badly structured and moved between directions 
of law and summaries of the factual evidence in a random manner must have been confusing 
for the jury; 
• Nowhere did the judge properly warn the jury about the dangers of mistaken identification, 
even in a recognition case, nor did he explain why such a warning was necessary; 
• Where there were weaknesses in the identification evidence, the judge needed to set them 
out clearly in one section of the summing up, preferably when he was giving his directions of 
law: 
• There was a possible weakness in the prosecution case that the police officer might have 
mistaken the defendant for his brother, but that point was not set out in the summing up; 
• The chatty comments interjected in the directions of law about identification evidence would 
have confused the jury and were unhelpful; 
• In relation to the alibi evidence, the judge ought to have explained that, if the jury rejected it, 
it did not mean that the defendant was in fact guilty of the offence charged. 
• Accordingly, looking at the summing up as a whole, the directions on the identification issue 
were unsatisfactory and the conviction was unsafe. 
 RECOGNITION CASES 
 
55.3 As discussed above, the direction is usually needed even if the defendant and the witness already 
knew each other. 
 
THE ACCUSED ADMITS HIS PRESENCE AT THE SCENE BUT DENIES HIS 
PARTICIPATION 
 
55.4 R. v. Brian Thornton [1995] 1 Cr App R 578 
 
Thornton was charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent. He had been a guest at a 
wedding reception where the bridegroom's brother was attacked by several people and seriously 
injured. He was identified by two witnesses as one of those involved in the attack.  
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Thornton's case was that he had witnessed part of the attack but was not himself a participant. He 
was convicted and appealed inter alia on the grounds that the judge should have given the jury a 
full Turnbull direction. 
 
Held, allowing the appeal, that although Thornton agreed that he had been present during part of the 
attack he denied taking part in it and in the circumstances a mistaken identification was clearly 
possible; accordingly, the judge ought to have given the jury a full Turnbull direction. 
 
56 WHEN A TURNBULL DIRECTION MAY NOT BE NEEDED 
 
WHEN THE ACCUSED CLAIMS THE WITNESS IS TRYING TO FRAME HIM 
56.1 R. v. Jason Cape, Stephen Jackson and David Gardner [1996] 1 Cr App R 191 
It was alleged that the appellants were amongst five or six men involved in a fight which broke out in 
a public house. The victim, Alan Hedley, was held down and beaten and then had his ear bitten off. 
The appellants were charged with violent disorder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent.  
 
The prosecution case depended wholly upon the evidence of the licensee of the public house. He did 
not see what any individual in the group around H had done but he said that the appellant, Jackson, 
was part of the group and later he saw Jackson with blood around his mouth. He saw the appellant, 
Gardner, stamp on another man's face before he left the public house but he could not attribute any 
specific blow to the appellant, Cape.  
 
It was not in dispute that he knew all the appellants. The defence of each was that they were not 
involved in the fight although they were in the public house at the relevant time. It was their case that 
the licensee was lying and was motivated by malice because he bore a grudge against Gardner in 
particular who had cheated him over some stolen cigarettes.  
 
All three appellants were convicted of both offences. They appealed against conviction on the ground 
that the judge failed to give any direction to the jury as to how to approach the question of identification 
evidence. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the issue in the case was not a question of identification but of the 
veracity of the licensee who knew all three appellants; and that, accordingly, since a frame-up was 
alleged no useful purpose could be served by giving an identification warning. 
 
WHEN THE ACCUSED ADMITS HIS PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME 
AND HAS UNUSUAL PHYSICAL FEATURES 
56.2 R. v. Robert Slater [1995] 1 Cr App R 584 
THE FACTS 
 
The appellant, a man of unusually large size (6 feet 6 inches and very broad) was charged with 
inflicting grievous bodily harm. The victim was punched whilst in a nightclub and sustained a broken 
jaw. He said that his attacker was a very big man who had struck him after he had objected to the man 
taking hold of his girlfriend.  
 
A witness to the assault gave evidence that she had seen the attacker earlier the same evening in a 
public house. He was talking to her sister who was the victim's girlfriend. The girlfriend said that she 
had spoken to a man in the public house who later took hold of her in the night club as he walked up 
some stairs. A little later she saw that man, the appellant, at the top of the stairs and the victim at the 
bottom. The appellant told her that he had hit her boyfriend because of something he had said. Another 
witness heard the victim arguing with a very tall man who was threatening to hit him again. The 
appellant gave evidence and said that it was possible that he had spoken to the victim's girlfriend in 
the public house. He had gone to the nightclub where an incident had taken place but he had played 
no part in it.  
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THE APPEAL 
 
He was convicted and appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the judge should have given a 
full Turnbull direction as to evidence of identification. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeal, that the need for a full Turnbull direction arose where there was a 
possibility of mistaken identification. Such a possibility would generally arise when the issue was 
whether the defendant was present and a witness claimed to identify him on the basis of a previous 
sighting. Where, however, there was no issue as to the defendant's presence at or near the scene of 
the offence, but the issue was as to what he was doing, it did not automatically follow that 
a Turnbull direction must be given.  
 
Whether such a direction was necessary would depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. 
The possibility of a mistake was a necessary prerequisite for an identification issue to arise such as to 
require a Turnbull direction. In the present case, the appellant was of wholly unusual size and there 
was no evidence to suggest that anyone else in the nightclub was remotely similar in height to him. 
There was no basis for any mistake. The issue was not identification but what the appellant had done. 
Accordingly, the judge was not required to give a Turnbull direction. 
 
“It would, as it seems to us, be contrary to common sense to require a Turnbull direction in all cases 
where presence is admitted but conduct disputed. Purely by way of example, such a direction would 
not, in our view, generally be necessary if the defendant admitted he was the only person present 
when the complainant received his injuries, or if a woman and a man were present and the complainant 
said the man caused his injuries, or if a black man and a white man were present and the complainant 
said the white man caused the injuries, or if four men were present, three dressed in black and one in 
white, and the complainant said the man in white caused his injuries. Of course, in all but the first of 
those examples, an appropriate warning would need to be given if in a particular case, for example, 
the lighting was bad or there were other circumstances giving rise to the possibility of mistake. But, in 
our judgment, the possibility of mistake is a necessary prerequisite for an identification issue to arise 
such as to require a Turnbull direction. 
 
“In the present case the appellant is of a wholly unusual size: he is six feet six inches tall and very 
broad. The witnesses who gave evidence in the case drew a distinction between the very tall man and 
the shorter man, Sulley. There was, before the jury, no evidence at all to suggest either that the absent 
Sulley, or anyone else present in the MGM Club, was remotely similar in height to this appellant. It 
follows that, in our judgment, there was no basis for any mistake. The issue here, as it seems to us, 
as in the case of Hope, was not identification, but what the appellant did.” per Rose LJ 
 
 
57 AN INCOMPLETE TURNBULL DIRECTION DOES NOT 
NECESSARILY MEAN THAT AN APPEAL WILL SUCCEED 
 
R. v. Daniel Torme [2003] EWCA Crim 2322 
 
The victim of the offence was a man by name David Edwards, the landlord of the Silver Jubilee Public 
House. He lived in a flat above the pub, as did his business partner, Janet Murphy. Just before 2 am 
on 17th April 2001 they were in their beds in the flat and were disturbed by noise from outside. Both 
went on to the landing outside their rooms. Four men burst through the window at the end of the 
landing. They were all wearing balaclavas. One of them had a claw hammer. He hit Mr Edwards on 
the head. Another punched him to the side of the head. But their violent incursion into the premises 
had triggered the alarm system and all four fled empty-handed except for a set of keys. The police 
were called and Mr Edwards was taken to hospital. He informed an officer that he had recognised the 
appellant as one of his attackers, the one who had punched him on the side of the head. He later 
picked him out an identification parade, even though all the men in the line-up were wearing 
balaclavas, 
 
Mr Edwards gave evidence that he had spoken to the appellant on numerous occasions outside the 
pub when he, the appellant, had caused trouble with other youths. Just before the incident he, Mr 
Edwards, had been almost asleep or in a state close to sleep. The lighting on the landing was very 
good — indeed, like the lighting in the courtroom. There were no physical obstructions to his view of 
the assailants, apart from the balaclavas they wore. The time that elapsed from the men smashing 
through the window until he was hit with the hammer was less than a minute. The blow from the 
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hammer made him groggy. He was terrified, overwhelmed and disorientated by the manner of the 
burglars' entry. The men approached almost in single file down the landing. He was not able to say 
whereabouts in the group the appellant was. All four of them were shouting at him at once. He was 
trying to respond in some way. For much of the time he was concentrating on the man with the claw 
hammer. The punch to the side of his head, however, caused him to turn towards the man who 
administered it. When he recognised him, he was sure that the man was the appellant. 
 
The judge gave a Turnbull warning, but limited to the fact that the suspect was wearing a balaclava. 
He did not warn the jury about the possibility of mistakes, even in recognition cases. However, he did 
mention the other circumstances of the incident (such as the grogginess of the victim); and it was also 
clear that the defendant had changed his alibi during the very short case. 
 
Whilst endorsing the importance of the Turnbull direction, the Court of Appeal did not think that the 
incomplete nature of the directions in this case made the verdict unsafe. 
 
“We do not for one moment desire to suggest that the giving of these directions pursuant to the 
authority of Turnbull is not of very great importance in identification cases. What has persuaded us in 
the end that the incomplete nature of the Recorder's directions concerning identification does not taint 
the safety of the conviction is a combination of factors, namely the reference to those weaknesses in 
the summing-up upon which reliance is placed in other parts of the summing-up than the identification 
direction, the significance of the lie or putative lie told by the appellant relating to whether he had been 
in the pub before upon the jury's assessment of the evidence by Mr Edwards that he had recognised 
his assailant, the shortness of the trial and the correctness of the identification direction so far as it 
goes. We are in the end confident that the safety of the conviction is not impugned here. It follows that 
the appeal must be dismissed. We, however, emphasise again the importance of the Turnbull direction 
when judges are trying cases involving identification and recognition. per Law LJ at para 12 
 
58 CRITICISM OF THE TURNBULL DIRECTION 
 
58.1 It has been suggested that although it is assumed that a warning about weak evidence may make a 
jury more cautious to rely on it, the Turnbull directions might actually have the opposite effect. 
 
i. By its very length, the direction might serve to focus attention on the suspect piece of evidence, 
thereby increasing its apparent significance to the jury; and 
 
ii. When a judge feels the identification evidence needs support, s/he will emphasise the 
‘supporting evidence’ and may thereby give it more weight, and also be seen to be suggesting 
the correctness of the suspect evidence. 
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PART FOUR: PACE Code D22 
 
59 INTRODUCTION 
 
59.1 PACE Code D provides another means of reducing the risk of miscarriages of justice deriving from 
mistaken identifications.  
 
59.2 The latest version was issued in 2017, and sets out detailed procedures with which the police must 
comply for identification of suspects by witnesses during the investigation of crime. 
 
59.3 R. v. Nethercott [2011] EWCA Crim 2987 
 
“Ultimately, the Codes of Conduct are there because they provide safeguards not only for defendants 
but also for police officers investigating cases. If they are not followed, then there is a real danger that 
they can destabilise what might otherwise be a proper prosecution and a safe conviction.”  
per Roderick Evans J at para 40 
 
60 VIDEO IDENTIFICATION 
 
60.1 Under earlier versions of Code D, the preferred method of identification was by way of a real-life 
identity parade. However, advances in modern technology has no made video identification the 
preferred method. 
 
60.2 In particular, the police now have access to a system called the Video Identification Parade Electronic 
Recording (VIPER), which is owned and run by West Yorkshire Police, who introduced it in 1997 as 
part of a drive against street crime23. 
 
60.3 This is a digital system for conducting identity parades. Rather than recruit a group of volunteers who 
resemble a suspect, police officers can retrieve a selection of pre-recorded video recordings of people 
unrelated to the case under investigation. Police officers make up a virtual parade, using clips taken 
from this library, and witness is then shown these, along with recordings of the current suspect. The 
system is used by many police forces across the UK. 
 
60.4 The system contains clips of over 50,000 different people, which can be downloaded to police laptops 
to allow identification to be conducted at a witness' home. A conventional lineup would cost at least 
£800 and could take up to ten weeks to set up - a VIPER parade costs around £150 and can be 
constructed in a few minutes. 
 
61 CODE D SUMMARY 
 
Circumstances in which an eye-witness identification procedure must be held  
 
61.1 CODE D: 3.12  
 
If, before any identification procedure set out in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.10 has been held  
 
(a) an eye-witness has identified a suspect or purported to have identified them; or  
 
(b) there is an eye-witness available who expresses an ability to identify the suspect; or  
 
(c) there is a reasonable chance of an eye-witness being able to identify the suspect, and the eye-
witness in (a) to (c) has not been given an opportunity to identify the suspect in any of the procedures 
set out in paragraphs 3.5 to 3.10, then an identification procedure shall be held if the suspect disputes 
being the person the eye-witness claims to have seen on a previous occasion (see paragraph 3.0), 
unless:  
 
 
22 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/592562/pace-
code-d-2017.pdf>. 
23  <http://www.viper.police.uk/pages/demo_video.html>. 
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(i) it is not practicable to hold any such procedure; or 
(ii) any such procedure would serve no useful purpose in proving or disproving whether the 
suspect was involved in committing the offence, for example where the suspect admits being 
at the scene of the crime and gives an account of what took place and the eye-witness does 
not see anything which contradicts that; or 
(iii) when it is not disputed that the suspect is already known to the eye-witness who claims to 
have recognised them when seeing them commit the crime.  
 
61.2 CODE D: 3.13  
 
An eye-witness identification procedure may also be held if the officer in charge of the investigation, 
after consultation with the identification officer, considers it would be useful.  
 
The Forbes Warning 
 
61.3 Where there has been a breach of Code D, the judge may still admit the evidence (as long as PACE 
1984 s.78 does not come into play), but should normally warn the jury about the breach and its possible 
consequences. This is called a ‘Forbes warning’ after the case of R. v. Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473. 
 
61.4 R. v. Forbes [2001] 1 AC 473 
 
The complainant, Mr. Tabassum, who had just withdrawn cash from a cashpoint machine in Ilford, was 
confronted by a man who attempted to rob him. The complainant evaded his assailant and returned 
to a waiting vehicle driven by a friend. After they had driven off, he identified his assailant, who made 
eye contact with him and spat towards the vehicle as it passed him. The complainant immediately 
contacted the police, who drove him round the streets in search of his assailant.  
In due course the complainant identified the defendant, Anthony Leroy Forbes, who denied the 
accusation and repeatedly asked for an identification parade to be held. No such parade took place.  
At trial, objection was taken to the admission of the complainant's identification evidence on the ground 
that the failure to hold a parade had been a breach of paragraph 2.3 of Code D, and that in 
consequence the evidence ought to have been excluded under section 78 of PACE. The judge ruled 
that since there had been a full and complete identification at the scene an identification parade was 
not necessary. In consequence, without exercising her discretion under section 78, she admitted the 
evidence and in summing up did not direct the jury as to the effect of any breach of the Code.  
On the defendant's appeal against conviction the Court of Appeal concluded that there had been a 
breach of paragraph 2.3 but that the admission of the identification evidence and the absence of such 
a direction to the jury had not been unfair. They accordingly ruled that the conviction was safe and 
dismissed his appeal. 
The defendant appealed, claiming his right to a fair trial under article 6 had been infringed and his 
conviction thereby rendered unsafe under section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. 
Held: 
(1)  Paragraph 2.3 of Code D, although not to be construed to cover every conceivable situation, 
imposed a mandatory obligation on police officers that, except in limited, specified circumstances, an 
identification parade was to be held whenever the suspect disputed an identification and he consented 
to the parade being held; that such a duty was not displaced where there had previously been a full 
and complete or unequivocal identification by the relevant witness; and that, accordingly, there had 
been a breach of paragraph 2.3 . 
(2)  The House of Lords held that any alleged infringement of a defendant's right to a fair trial, 
guaranteed by article 6, was to be assessed in the context of the whole history of the proceedings and 
where that right had been infringed the conviction would be held to be unsafe within the meaning of 
section 2 of the 1968 Act. In the instant case, since there had been two informal identifications of the 
defendant, and since the complainant's street identification had been compelling and untainted, that 
evidence had been rightly admitted. Where a breach of Code D was established, but the trial judge 
nevertheless rejected an application to exclude evidence on that account, he should explain to the jury 
that there had been a breach and the circumstances in which it arose and invite them to consider its 
possible effect. 
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However, in the instant case, since the absence of such a direction could not have affected the jury's 
verdict, the defendant's trial was not unfair nor was his conviction unsafe.24 
The contents of a VIPER identification 
61.5 The set of images must include the suspect and at least eight other people who, so far as possible, 
resemble the suspect in age, general appearance and position in life.  
 
61.6  If the suspect has an unusual physical feature, e.g., a facial scar, tattoo or distinctive hairstyle or hair 
colour which does not appear on the images of the other people that are available to be used, steps 
may be taken to: (a) conceal the location of the feature on the images of the suspect and the other 
people; or (b) replicate that feature on the images of the other people.  
For these purposes, the feature may be concealed or replicated electronically or by any other method 
which it is practicable to use to ensure that the images of the suspect and other people resemble each 
other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 See also R. v. Nazir Ahmed [2019] EWCA Crim 1771. 
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L IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 
 
62 GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
 The Common Law Rule 
 
62.1 At common law, the courts would generally admit any relevant evidence, however it was obtained, as 
long as it was reliable, subject to obvious policy restrictions such as disallowing evidence obtained by 
torture25, Thus, illegal methods used to obtain evidence would not render it inadmissible unless it also 
reflected adversely on the fairness of the trial. 
 
 R. v. Leatham (1861) 8 Cox C.C. 498  
 
"It matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible." per Compton J.  
 
Kuruma v. R. [1955] AC 197, 203 
 
“In their Lordships' opinion the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is 
whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with 
how the evidence was obtained. While this proposition may not have been stated in so many words in 
any English case there are decisions which support it, and in their Lordships' opinion it is plainly right 
in principle.” per Lord Goddard 
 
 R. v. Sang [1980] AC 402, 437 
 
“However much the judge may dislike the way in which a particular piece of evidence was obtained 
before proceedings were commenced, if it is admissible evidence probative of the accused's guilt it is 
no part of his judicial function to exclude it for this reason.” per Lord Diplock 
 
 Fox v. Chief Constable of Gwent [1986] AC 281, 292 
 
“It is a well-established rule of English law, which was recognised in R. v. Sang, that (apart from 
confessions as to which special considerations apply) any evidence which is relevant is admissible 
even if it has been obtained illegally.” per Lord Fraser 
 
62.2 The leading authority on this prior to the enactment of PACE 1984, was R. v. Sang [1980], a case 
concerned with evidence obtained by way of an agent provocateur – that is, someone who tricked the 
defendant into committing the offence in order to have him arrested for it. 
R. v. Sang [1980] AC 402 (HL) 
The certified questions for the House of Lords were as follows: 
Question 1: Has a trial judge a discretion to reject admissible evidence unfairly obtained otherwise 
than in cases where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value?  
 
Answer 1: A judge in a criminal trial always has a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if, in his 
opinion, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. However, save with regard to 
admissions and confessions and generally with regard to evidence obtained from the accused after 
commission of the offence, the judge has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means, the court not being concerned with 
how it was obtained, 
 
Question 2: If he has such a discretion, is he bound in his exercise of it, to reject evidence of the 
commission of crime where the crime would not have been committed but for the activities of the agent 
provocateur? 
 
Answer 2: It is no ground for the exercise of the discretion to exclude evidence that it was obtained as 
the result of the activities of an agent provocateur 
 
25 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) [2005] 3 WLR 1249 (HL). 
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THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
Leonard Anthony Kimyou Sang and Matthew Mangan were jointly indicted at the Central Criminal 
Court before Judge Buzzard on October 13, 1977, on two counts.  
 
The first alleged conspiracy between them and others to utter forged United States banknotes. The 
second alleged unlawful possession of the forged United States banknotes. To both those counts each 
defendant initially pleaded not guilty.  
 
Mr. Giovene, counsel for Sang, alleged that whilst Sang was in Brixton Prison (for a different offence) 
he was approached by a police informer called Scippo, who tricked him into meeting up with a man 
called Glass after his release, and selling him some of the forged banknotes. Glass was in fact a police 
sergeant, and the whole thing was a set-up to get Sang to commit the crime for which he was being 
prosecuted. It was said that the offences would not have been committed but for the police-inspired 
activities of Scippo and subsequently of Sergeant Glass. 
 
The barrister argued that since the offence had only been committed because of the activities of an 
agent provocateur, the evidence of such an offence should be excluded by the judge, which would 
mean that there was no case to answer. 
 
THE DECISION AT THE TRIAL 
 
The judge ruled that as a matter of law he did not possess the discretion to reject the evidence in 
question. Therefore, as Mr. Giovene had already hinted would be the case if the judge rejected his 
submissions, Sang pleaded guilty to count 1, the conspiracy count, and Mangan pleaded guilty to 
count 2, the possession count. These pleas were duly accepted.  
 
The judge sentenced Sang to 18 months' immediate imprisonment and Mangan to 12 months' 
imprisonment suspended for two years. The judge, who was uncertain as to the correctness of his 
ruling on the evidence point, proffered a certificate to Mr. Giovene on Sang's behalf that Sang's case 
was fit for appeal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the defendant, and the case went to 
the House of Lords. 
 
THE APPEAL IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
The House of Lords upheld the judgments of the lower courts.  
 
1. A judge in a criminal trial always has a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if, in his opinion, its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 
 
2. However, save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard to evidence 
obtained from the accused after commission of the offence, the judge has no discretion to refuse to 
admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. 
The court is not concerned with how it was obtained, and it is no ground for the exercise of the 
discretion to exclude evidence that it was obtained, for example, as the result of the activities of an 
agent provocateur.26 
 
62.3 This case has caused much consternation amongst commentators as it is not clear how wide the 
discretion is, and in particular what is meant by ‘evidence obtained from the accused after commission 
of the offence’, 
 
62.4 In practice, the common law in this area has largely been superseded by the statutory discretion to 
exclude evidence contained in PACE s.78. However, s.78 (2) specifically preserves the common law 
discretion, which technically gives the court two different discretions to exclude evidence on the 
grounds of unfairness.  
 
62.5 Although unusual, the courts do sometimes explicitly apply both tests, even though the statutory rule 
is wider and so will cover situations caught by the common law. 
 
 
 
 
26 See, however, R. v. Looseley: A-G’s Reference (No.3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2060. 
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THE STATUTORY RULE 
 
62.6 A similar (though not identical) effect to the common law is now reached under s.78 of PACE 
PACE 1984, s78: Exclusion of unfair evidence 
 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely 
to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence 
 
62.7 This is considered to be a wider discretion to exclude prosecution evidence than previously existed at 
common law. 
 
 R. v. Cooke [1995] Crim LR 497 (see 4.6 below) 
 
“Until the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 came into force, the discretion of the court not to 
admit evidence which, though improperly obtained, was nevertheless relevant to and admissible in the 
proceedings was strictly circumscribed. (See the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Sang (1979) 
69 Cr.App.R. 282, [1980] A.C. 402 , following the decision of the Privy Council in Kuruma v. R. [1955] 
A.C. 197). 
 
“However, despite some expressions of opinion to the contrary, it is now clear that section 78 has 
given the courts a substantially wider discretion to refuse to admit evidence improperly obtained.”  
per Glidewell LJ 
 
62.8 Section 78 seems to give the court more leave to exclude improperly obtained evidence than at 
common law, as it expressly invites the court to consider ‘the circumstances in which the evidence 
was obtained’.  
 
 EFFECT OF ARTICLE 6 
 
62.9 In addition, under s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, English legislation must be interpreted as far as 
possible to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. This includes Article 6, 
which gives the right to a fair trial, including the pretrial phase of the proceedings. Thus, in considering 
s.78, the court must also take into account the more general rights under Article 6. 
 
Beghal v. DPP [2016] AC 88 (SC) 
 
“Even without the direct application of article 6 of the Convention the outcome of the section 
78 judgment is effectively inevitable. Once article 6, directly binding on a court under section 6(3) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 , is brought into the equation, there is simply no room for any contrary 
conclusion, for, as is shown by Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313, article 6 has the 
effect that any use in a criminal prosecution of answers obtained under compulsion of law will be a 
breach of the right to a fair trial. The presence or absence of other evidence implicating the defendant 
is irrelevant to this proposition.” per Lord Hughes at para 66 
 
62.10 PG and OH v. United Kingdom [2002] Crim LR 308 
 
“While Art.6 guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility 
of evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national law. It is not 
the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence—for 
example, unlawfully obtained evidence—may be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was 
guilty or not. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including 
the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair.” para 76 
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63 RELEVANCE  
 
63.1 The most fundamental aspects of evidence are that it must be relevant and reliable, and the judge has 
the general discretion to exclude any evidence which does not meet those criteria. 
 
63.2 Relevance refers to any item of proof that renders a fact in issue either more probable or less probable. 
 
63.3 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894) was a celebrated Victorian judge 
who explained relevance as follows: 
 
“Any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each other that according 
to the common cause of events, one either taken by itself or in connection 
with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present or future 
existence of the other.” 
 
63.4 DPP v. Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 
 
“Your Lordships have been concerned with four concepts in the law of evidence: (i) relevance; (ii) 
admissibility; (iii) corroboration; (iv) weight. The first two terms are frequently, and in many 
circumstances legitimately, used interchangeably; but I think it makes for clarity if they are kept 
separate, since some relevant evidence is inadmissible and some admissible evidence is irrelevant 
(in the senses that I shall shortly submit).  
 
“Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires proof. I 
do not pause to analyze what is involved in "logical probativeness", except to note that the term does 
not of itself express the element of experience which is so significant of its operation in law, and 
possibly elsewhere. It is sufficient to say, even at the risk of etymological tautology, that relevant (i.e. 
logically probative or disprobative) evidence is evidence which makes the matter which requires proof 
more or less probable.  
 
“To link logical probativeness with relevance rather than admissibility (as was done in Sims) not only 
is, I hope, more appropriate conceptually, but also accords better with the explanation of Sims given 
in Harris v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1952] A.C. 694, 710. Evidence is admissible if it may be 
lawfully adduced at a trial. "Weight" of evidence is the degree of probability (both intrinsically and 
inferentially) which is attached to it by the tribunal of fact once it is established to be relevant and 
admissible in law (though its relevance may exceptionally, as will appear, be dependent on its 
evaluation by the tribunal of fact).” per Lord Simon at p.756 
 
63.5 R. v. Randall [2004] 1 WLR 56 
 Relevance 
“The theme that ran through the Crown's case and oral argument was that evidence of Glean's 
propensity to violence “proves nothing”. Taken in isolation that is right. But relevance in cases such as 
the one under consideration is a more subtle concept… 
 
“A judge ruling on a point of admissibility involving an issue of relevance has to decide whether the 
evidence is capable of increasing or diminishing the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. The 
question of relevance is typically a matter of degree to be determined, for the most part, by common 
sense and experience.” per Lord Steyn at para 20 
 
63.6 As Lord Steyn suggests, relevance is not an exact science. There is no calibrated scale which indicates 
the exact point at which the significance of a piece of evidence becomes too speculative to justify its 
admission. It is largely just a matter of common sense. 
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63.7 R. v. Wilson (Jamie) [2008] EWCA Crim 1754 
 
Wilson was convicted on seven counts of robbery. 
Over the period of one month, seven women had been robbed in the street by a masked man carrying 
a knife. Only the robber's eyes and top of his nose had been visible. Days after the last robbery, police 
officers observed Wilson in the area where the robberies had taken place. His clothing matched the 
description of the robber. W was followed, stopped and searched and a large kitchen knife and a 
telephone were found under his top. It was discovered that W lived in a flat nearby and a search 
recovered property belonging to three of the complainants.  
 
At trial evidence from a criminal intelligence analyst who monitored crime in the relevant area was 
adduced. She stated that her research showed there had not been any robberies in the area since W's 
arrest. 
 
Wilson submitted that the evidence of the analyst should not have been admitted because it was not 
relevant and was highly prejudicial. 
 
HELD: The evidence of the analyst was probative as it would have been helpful if the jury was 
speculating whether the robberies continued after W's arrest.  
 
The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. The jury were always able to dismiss the evidence and 
decide for themselves that it was not useful. The defence case focused on the differences between 
the descriptions of W. If the jury had accepted those arguments, that would have undermined the 
evidence of the analyst. The jury were able to consider what inference, if any, they could draw from 
the analyst's evidence. The judge did not err in her ruling and there were no criticisms with the way 
she dealt with the evidence in her summing up. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. 
 
64 RELIABILITY 
 
64.1 Although s.78 does not specify that it is underpinned by the reliability principle, that is how it has 
generally been interpreted. 
 
64.2 R. v. Looseley: A-G’s Reference (No.3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2060 
 
During the course of an authorised police operation relating to the trade in class A controlled drugs, 
an undercover police officer was at a public house which was a focus of the operation when he was 
given the defendant's name and telephone number as a potential source of drugs.  
 
The officer telephoned the defendant, who confirmed that he could obtain drugs. After they had agreed 
a price for the supply of heroin, the defendant took the officer to an address where the defendant 
obtained a quantity of heroin and gave it to the officer in exchange for the agreed sum. On two further 
occasions the officer contacted the defendant and bought two more quantities of heroin from him.  
 
The defendant was charged with supplying or being concerned in the supplying to another of a class 
A controlled drug, contrary to section 4 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.  
 
At his trial a voir dire was held on a preliminary issue, and the defence submitted that the indictment 
should be stayed as an abuse of the process of the court or, alternatively, that the officer's evidence 
should be excluded pursuant to the judge's discretion under section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. The judge declined either to stay the indictment or to exclude the evidence. The 
defendant then changed his plea to guilty. The Court of Appeal upheld the judge's ruling on the voir 
dire and dismissed the defendant's appeal against conviction. 
 
HELD:  
 
(1) that the court was required, when exercising its discretion to exclude evidence pursuant to section 
78 of the 1984 Act and its inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings as an abuse of process, to balance 
the need to uphold the rule of law by convicting and punishing those who committed crimes and the 
need to prevent law enforcement agencies from acting in a manner which constituted an affront to the 
public conscience or offended ordinary notions of fairness; that each case depended on its own facts 
and, when identifying the limit to the types of police conduct which were acceptable, the principle to 
be applied was that it would be unfair and an abuse of process if a person had been lured, incited or 
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pressurised into committing a crime which he would not otherwise have committed; but that it would 
not be objectionable if a law enforcement officer, behaving as an ordinary member of the public would, 
gave a person an unexceptional opportunity to commit a crime, and that person freely took advantage 
of the opportunity. 
 
(2) Dismissing the defendant's appeal, that the evidence showed that the undercover officer did no 
more than to present himself as an ordinary customer to an active drug dealer and there was nothing 
in the officer's conduct which constituted incitement; and that, accordingly, the trial judge had been 
entitled to refuse to stay the proceedings as an abuse of the process of the court or to exclude the 
officer's evidence under section 78 of the Act. 
 
“The phrase “fairness of the proceedings” in section 78 is directed primarily at matters going to fairness 
in the actual conduct of the trial; for instance, the reliability of the evidence and the defendant's ability 
to test its reliability. But, rightly, the courts have been unwilling to limit the scope of this wide and 
comprehensive expression strictly to procedural fairness.” per Lord Nicholls at para 12 
 
65  FAIRNESS 
 
65.1 Even if evidence is relevant, and does not fall foul of any of the exclusionary rules, this does not 
guarantee that it is admissible. The court possesses a residual discretion to exclude otherwise 
admissible evidence on the basis of fairness (expressed in various ways) 
 
65.2 It has long been recognised at common law that trial judges have a general discretion in order to 
exclude evidence which is technically admissible if they feel that its prejudicial effect exceeds its 
probative value.27 
 
65.3 As mentioned above, s.78 of PACE extends this discretion. 
PACE 1984, s78: Exclusion of unfair evidence 
 
(3) in any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely 
to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the 
circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
 
(4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence 
 
65.4 ‘Fairness’ traditionally means fairness to the accused, so the court will primarily consider whether 
serious procedural breaches of the rule have occurred that deprive an accused of important rights.  
 
R. v. Nathaniel (1995) 159 JP 419 
 
Lonsdale Nathaniel appealed against conviction for rape. He was not arrested for the offence until four 
years after its occurrence when DNA samples taken from him in relation to another case were matched 
with the previous offence. On arrest, N agreed to a hair sample being taken, but he refused the taking 
of further intimate samples on legal advice. Experts differed as to the impact of the DNA evidence.  
 
The main ground for appeal was that the DNA evidence should have been excluded. The DNA samples 
had been taken in relation to another rape case of which he had been acquitted. Under the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.64 , any samples taken from a person should be destroyed if that person 
is subsequently acquitted. It was conceded by the Crown that such samples included DNA samples. 
 
Held: Appeal allowed. 
 
Although evidence obtained unlawfully can be admissible at the trial judge's discretion under s.78 of 
the 1984 Act, in this case there was not only a breach of s.64 but N had been misled as to the use of 
the samples, and told that they would be destroyed.  
 
 
27 R. v. Sang [1980] AC 402. 
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Despite the hair sample being properly admitted in terms of s.78 of the 1984 Act, the blood sample 
was not and its wrongful admission was fatal to the prosecution's case. 
 
65.5 Alternatively, ‘the fairness of the proceedings’ has been stated to mean ‘both fairness to the accused 
persons and fairness to the public good, as represented by the Crown.’ Taken in this wider sense, in 
exercising its discretion the court naturally inclines to treating reliability as the determining factor. 
 
65.6 R. v. Cooke [1995] 1 Cr App R 318 
 
Stephen Cooke appealed against his conviction of rape and kidnapping. The identification had 
depended on a comparison of DNA taken from semen on the complainant and DNA taken from a hair 
plucked from C's head. This had been taken at a police station without the appropriate consent. C 
argued that the evidence was inadmissible on the basis that the only part of the hair which could 
provide DNA was the sheath around its base which was extracted from the scalp when the hair was 
pulled. C contended that the sheath was an intimate sample and was not covered by the provisions 
relating to the actual hair under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.65. 
 
Held: Appeals dismissed. 
 
A sample of hair plucked from the scalp of a person in police detention without his consent was a non-
intimate sample as defined by section 65 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Accordingly, 
its taking was authorised by section 63(3) of that Act, subject to the statutory procedural requirements. 
Whilst a consultant dermatologist called by the prosecution agreed that a hair and its sheath were 
separate entities, he also said that a plucked hair had cells on its surface within which there was DNA. 
Thus, hair obtained by pulling provided material from which DNA profiles could be prepared. 
Accordingly, the judge had been right to rule as he did.  
 
Further, even if the whole of the sample of hair was not authorised to be obtained by sections 63 and 
65 of the Act, the judge was still right not to exercise his discretion under section 78 of the 1984 Act to 
exclude the evidence which it provided and which resulted from it as there was nothing about the 
method of obtaining the evidence which made it unreliable. 
 
THE DISCIPLINARY PRINCIPLE 
 
65.7 One aspect of fairness might be that the police who have obtained evidence illegally ought to be 
penalized by not having the evidence admitted, even it is otherwise reliable. Although the courts have 
sometimes censured the police for their bad behaviour, it is in fact very unusual for this to be given as 
a reason for disallowing evidence.28 
65.8 R v. Mason (Carl) [1988] 1 WLR 139 
THE FACTS 
The police had reason to suspect that Carl Mason (aged 20) had set fire to Mr. Askew’s car by way of 
throwing an inflammable liquid at it. Before that incident there had been bad feeling between Mason 
and Mr. Askew. Mr. Askew had a daughter who was 18 years of age with whom the appellant had 
been going out. She became pregnant by him. She was not willing to bear his child. She decided to 
have an abortion and she did. She also broke off her relationship with the appellant. He did not take 
that at all well. His erstwhile girlfriend's father and mother did not look upon what had happened with 
any great favour either; nor did they feel any pleasure in seeing Mason any more. They began to 
receive midnight telephone calls. Upon each occasion they answered the telephone, whoever was at 
the other end put the receiver down. They suspected Mason of making those calls.  
 
About 12 hours after the fire, the police visited Mason, who denied all knowledge of the incident. He 
was arrested 9 days later, despite the fact that the police had in their possession no evidence at all to 
associate him with the cause of the fire. However, before the arrest, one or more police officers decided 
to invent evidence and to acquaint Mason of that so-called evidence as though it was genuinely 
possessed. What they decided to do was to tell the appellant that a fingerprint of his had been found 
in a very telling place.  
 
 
28 R. v. Nathaniel (1995) 159 JP 419. 
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As to that, Detective Constable Gunton said: 
“Detective Constable Walton and I set out deliberately to make the defendant believe we had a 
fingerprint on some of the glass fragments from the bottle that was used to perpetrate this crime. I 
agreed with the detective constable to this play-acting and it was a trick. The bottle, or the fragments 
of it, had not even been sent for fingerprint testing at that stage. We set about ‘conning’ the defendant. 
We had a suspicion, but only suspicion against him and we realised that we needed more proof … I 
felt the only way to get the truth from him was to do this.” 
 
Having been told by these police officers, falsely, that a fingerprint of his had been found on a fragment 
of glass from the bottle, Mason saw his solicitor and told him his version of what had happened. The 
solicitor asked D.C. Gunton to confirm the fact, as the police were asserting, that they had found a 
fingerprint upon a fragment of glass at the scene of the crime. He confirmed to the solicitor that that 
was so. That was a deliberate falsehood.  
 
When giving evidence D.C. Gunton said: “My motive … was because if the defendant had had nothing 
to do with this glass bottle there was no way he would produce a confession. If he … knew very well 
he had handled … the bottle and been active in the preparation, of course, he would begin to doubt 
himself and whether or not he was going to be discovered.” 
 
The solicitor, influenced by what he had been told by the police as to the fingerprint, advised the 
appellant to answer their questions and to give his explanation of any involvement he had had in the 
incident. What he told the police as a consequence of that was that he was not present when the car 
was set alight. He had asked a friend, whom he refused to name, if he would do it. This was because 
Mr. Askew had been threatening him, and setting fire to his car would frighten Mr. Askew away from 
repeating conduct of that kind. The only involvement which he (the appellant) had in the incident was 
to fill the bottles which were used, one with petrol and the other with paint thinners. That was done at 
his home. The bottles were then taken away by the friend and the fire started. 
 
The trial judge ruled that, as the appellant was aware of his right to remain silent with the solicitor 
present and chose to answer all the questions, nothing adversely affected the fairness of the 
proceedings. The confession was admitted in evidence, the prosecution adduced no further evidence 
against the appellant, he gave no evidence and he was convicted. His appeal against conviction was 
resisted on the ground that section 78 was inapplicable to confessions because section 76 was 
especially concerned with them. 
 
Held: Appeal allowed. 
 
The word “evidence” in section 78(1) included all the evidence which might be introduced into the trial 
by the prosecution; so that, in considering the admissibility of a confession, the trial judge had a 
discretion under section 78(1) to exclude a confession in the interests of the fairness of the trial, 
regardless of whether the confession fell to be considered under section 76(2) ; and that, in the 
circumstances, since the trial judge had omitted from his consideration the vital factor that the police 
had practised deceit on the appellant's solicitor, the conviction had to be quashed. 
 
“It is obvious from the undisputed evidence that the police practised a deceit not only upon the 
appellant, which is bad enough, but also upon the solicitor whose duty it was to advise him. In effect, 
they hoodwinked both solicitor and client. That was a most reprehensible thing to do. It is not however 
because we regard as misbehaviour of a serious kind conduct of that nature that we have come to the 
decision soon to be made plain. This is not the place to discipline the police. That has been made 
clear here on a number of previous occasions. We are concerned with the application of the proper 
law.” per Watkins LJ at p.144 
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THE RIGHTS BASED PRINCIPLE 
 
65.9 There are rare instances of exclusion under s.78 simply on the basis of the infringement of the 
accused’s rights, even though the breach has no effect on the reliability of the evidence. 
 
65.10 DPP v. Godwin [1991] RTR 303 
 
Section 6 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides: 
 
‘(1) Where a constable in uniform has reasonable cause to suspect – (a) that a person driving … a 
motor vehicle on a road … has alcohol in his body … he may … require him to provide a specimen of 
breath for a breath test … (5) A constable may arrest a person … if … (b) that person has failed to 
provide a specimen of breath for a breath test when required to do so in pursuance of this section and 
the constable has reasonable cause to suspect that he has alcohol in his body …’ 
 
William Godwin, a motorist who was driving on a road, was stopped by a police constable carrying out 
traffic stop checks and was instructed to pull into a lay-by. The constable asked the defendant if he 
had been drinking and he said that he had not.  
 
Godwin failed to provide a specimen of breath for a breath test and was arrested for failure to provide 
the specimen, contrary to section 6(5)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He was cautioned and taken to 
a police station, where he was required, in accordance with section 7(1) of the Act of 1988, to provide 
specimens of breath for analysis, which he did and analysis revealed 96 microgrammes of alcohol in 
100 millilitres of breath.  
 
He was charged with driving in contravention of section 5(1) .  
 
The justices were of opinion that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the constable had no 
reasonable cause to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body before the request for him to take a breath 
test, that his arrest was unlawful and that, albeit the unlawful arrest would not automatically exclude 
evidence of the police station procedure, and although a lawful arrest was not an essential prerequisite 
to a requirement of breath for analysis, they had a discretion, under section 78(1) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to exclude the breath analysis evidence.  
 
In the exercise of their discretion, they excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge. 
 
On appeal by the prosecutor on the ground that the justices' discretion under section 78 of the Act of 
1984 to exclude the evidence should not have been exercised in the absence of bad faith by the police 
or oppressive conduct by the prosecuting authorities: 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
It was unnecessary for the justices to be satisfied that the police or prosecuting authorities had acted 
in bad faith or oppressively for the discretion under section 78 to be exercised, for the statutory 
discretion was phrased in general terms. and that, since the defendant was denied the protection 
afforded by section 6 of the Act of 1988 and the prosecutor had thereby obtained evidence which he 
otherwise would not have obtained, the defendant was significantly prejudiced in resisting the charge 
against him.  
 
The justices were entitled to exclude the evidence in their discretion and having directed 
themselves accurately and correctly in law, the court on appeal could not impugn their decision. 
 
65.11 On that point, notice that even if a confession passes the admissibility tests in s.76, it might still be 
excluded as unfair under s.78.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 R v. Mason (Carl) [1988] 1 WLR 139. 
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66  DISCRETION 
 
66.1 The ‘discretion’ of the judge in this context has a particular meaning. It does not imply an absolute 
freedom on the judge to do whatever he or she thinks best, but it is controlled and reviewable, so its 
exercise may be challenged.  
 
66.2 In particular, if a judge has decided that the admission of an item would reflect adversely on the fairness 
of the proceedings, that evidence must be excluded. It is not a matter of choice – or ‘discretion’ – in 
the usual sense. 
 
66.3 Beghal v. DPP [2016] AC 88 (SC) 
 
“It is to be accepted as a general proposition that reliance on a judicial discretion is not to be equated, 
for a prospective defendant, with the exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination… But 
the section 78 controlling power, vested in the trial judge in criminal proceedings, is not sufficiently 
described as a matter of discretion. It is a matter of judgment. If in practice the outcome of the exercise 
of that judgment is inevitably that the evidence will be excluded, then the real and appreciable risk 
which the privilege against self-incrimination exists to guard against is not present. The circumstances 
in which the evidence was obtained are a central consideration in the exercise of the section 
78 judgment. Evidence obtained from the defendant himself (or his spouse) by means of legal 
compulsion is a classic case of evidence which it will be unfair to admit.” per Lord Hughes at para 66 
 
67 HORRIFIC EVIDENCE 
 
67.1 An example of when a court might exclude evidence on the grounds of its extremely prejudicial effect, 
is when it is gratuitously gruesome or distasteful, such as photographs of murder victims or of children 
being abused. 
 
67.2 R. v. Shankly [2004] EWCA Crim 1224 
 
“The photograph in question shows a very bloodied head of someone wearing a breathing mask. It 
was taken at the A and E department of the hospital while attempts were being made to save the life 
of the deceased. It had been agreed between counsel that the photograph should not go before the 
jury. Two reasons are sometimes given for making such a decision in relation to unpleasant 
photographs of wounds and other injuries. The first is a fear that the photograph may inflame the jury 
against the defendant and the second is that the photographs may subject the jury to an unpleasant 
experience which they need not undergo and which might distract them from the issues they have to 
consider. We are not surprised that this document did not go into the jury bundle of documents, copies 
of which we have, though our conclusion is that the important and underlying reason for that is that 
the photograph simply would not help the jury on an issue in the case.” per Pill LJ at para 21 
 
67.3 R v. D, P and U [2013] 1 WLR 676 
 
 This is a case on the admissibility of bad character evidence.  
 
In three separate cases the defendants were charged with offences involving the sexual abuse of 
children which had occurred over a substantial period. Each defendant denied any sexual contact with 
the children. In each case the judge admitted evidence that the defendant had viewed and/or made 
indecent photographs of children, relying on the bad character provisions of section 101(1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 . All three defendants were convicted. 
 
On the defendants' appeals against conviction— 
 
Held: Appeals dismissed. 
 
Where a defendant was charged with any prohibited sexual activity involving children, evidence that 
he possessed the relatively unusual character trait of having a sexual interest in children made it more 
likely that the allegation of the child complainant was true.  
 
Therefore, evidence that a defendant to such a charge had viewed or collected child pornography was 
capable of being admissible pursuant to section 101(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 as evidence 
which was relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution.  
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Although it did not follow that it was automatically admissible, in all the circumstances of this case, the 
evidence that the defendant had viewed and/or made indecent photographs of children had been 
properly admitted against him pursuant to section 101(1)(d) of the 2003 Act, as demonstrating a sexual 
interest in children. 
 
 On the subject of the admissibility of horrific pictures, Hughes LJ said this: 
 
“In none of the cases before us were the photographs in fact actually shown to the jury. It seems to us 
that that is a sensible practice which should generally be adopted. It is unnecessary that the jury should 
see the photographs and it would carry the risk, if they did, that some at least might find it difficult to 
avoid the effects of distaste. It seems to us likely that in most cases a suitable description of the general 
contents of the photographs which had in fact been found can be agreed and presented to the jury. 
Care should be taken that that description should be as neutral and dispassionate as possible. In one 
of the cases before us the jury was given, by agreement, the descriptions of category of pictures to be 
found in the Combating Paedophile Information Networks in Europe scale (“COPINE”). That is one 
way of doing it, but it seems to us better as a general proposition if what the jury is told by agreement 
is linked to the photographs actually found, rather than to a more generalised description of 
categories.” per Hughes LJ at para 11 
 
68 ENTRAPMENT 
 
68.1 There is no rule in England (as there is in the USA) that evidence obtained by unlawful entrapment or 
undercover operations is inadmissible. However, where the police induce someone to commit a crime 
– rather than simply present them with the opportunity to do so – this can amount to an abuse of the 
court’s process, and the prosecution might be stayed. 
 
68.2 The leading authorities on this are R. v. Looseley and A-G’s Reference (no 3 of 2000), which were 
heard together by the House of Lords in 2001, and which throw some doubt on the decision in R. v. 
Sang. 
 
68.3 R. v. Looseley: A-G’s Reference (No.3 of 2000) [2001] 1 WLR 2060 (see 3.2 above for facts) 
 
The House of Lords laid down the following principles: 
 
• Entrapment is not a substantive defence, but where an accused can show entrapment, the 
court may stay the proceedings as an abuse of the court’s process, or it may exclude evidence 
under s.78. 
 
• As a matter of principle, a stay of the proceedings rather than exclusion of evidence should 
normally be regarded as the appropriate response. A prosecution founded on entrapment 
would be an abuse of the court’s process. Police conduct which brings about state-created 
crime is unacceptable and improper and to prosecute in such circumstances would be an 
affront to public conscience. 
 
• In deciding whether conduct amounts to state-created crime, the existence or absence of a 
predisposition on the part of the accused to commit the crime is not the criterion by which the 
acceptability of police conduct is to be decided, because it does not make acceptable what 
would otherwise be unacceptable conduct on the part of the police or negative misuse of state 
power. 
 
• A useful guide is to consider whether the police did no more than present the accused with an 
unexceptional opportunity to commit a crime, rather than to increase the incidence of crime by 
artificial means. 
 
• Usually a most important factor, though not necessarily decisive, will be whether an officer can 
be said to have caused the commission of the offence, rather than merely providing an 
opportunity for the accused to commit it with an officer. 
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68.4 Nottingham City Council v. Amin [2000] 1 WLR 1071 
 
Mohammed Amin, a taxicab driver licensed by the local authority under section 37 of the Town Police 
Clauses Act 1847, was hailed by two plain-clothes police officers while driving in an area not covered 
by his licence. Although at the time the roof light on his cab was not illuminated, he stopped and took 
the officers to the requested address in return for a fare. An information was laid against him 
under section 45 of Act of 1847 for using his vehicle to ply for hire when he had not previously obtained 
a licence under section 37 of that Act.  
 
At the hearing, the stipendiary magistrate adjourned an application by the defendant for the exclusion 
of the police officer's evidence under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and 
proceeded to hear the case. He rejected the defendant's evidence that he had mistakenly believed 
that he was collecting a pre-arranged hire and had sought to identify the passengers, but ruled that 
having regard to the effect of article 6 of the Convention for the Protection Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms1 the evidence of the police officers, whom he described as agents 
provocateurs, should be excluded under section 78.  
 
He accordingly dismissed the information. 
 
On appeal by the local authority: - 
 
Held: Appeal allowed. The matter was remitted with a direction to convict: 
 
(1) That in describing the officers as agents provocateurs the stipendiary magistrate had wrongly 
treated as a primary fact a central issue for his determination; that entrapment was no defence 
to a criminal charge and, while it was offensive to the concept of fairness that a defendant 
should be convicted and punished in respect of a crime committed solely because he had 
been incited or pressurised to do so by a law enforcement officer, such an officer had a public 
duty to enforce the law and it was unobjectionable if he gave a defendant an opportunity to 
break it in circumstances where the defendant freely did so and would have done the same if 
the opportunity had been offered by another. 
 
(2) That, in exercising the court's discretion under section 78, the court should take account of 
the United Kingdom's international obligations under the Convention; that the fairness of a 
defendant's trial, guaranteed by article 6 , was to be judged by reference to the fairness of the 
proceedings as a whole, not of a subordinate procedure taken in isolation; that by hailing the 
cab the officers could not be regarded as prevailing on, inciting or pressuring the defendant to 
commit the offence, and the admission of their evidence could not be considered as rendering 
the proceedings as a whole unfair; and that, accordingly, the stipendiary magistrate had 
wrongly considered that on the facts found the effect of that evidence would be to deny the 
defendant a fair trial. 
 
“It has been recognised that law enforcement agencies have a general duty to the public to enforce 
the law and it has been regarded as unobjectionable if a law enforcement officer gives a defendant an 
opportunity to break the law, of which the defendant freely takes advantage, in circumstances where 
it appears that the defendant would have behaved in the same way if the opportunity had been offered 
by anyone else.” per Lord Bingham at p.1077 
   
68.5 R. v. John Shannon [2001] 1 WLR 51 
 
John Shannon (also known as the actor, John Alford) was charged 
with supplying drugs to a journalist (Mazher Mahmood), a journalist 
who had worked for the “News of the World”, posing as an Arab 
sheikh in an elaborate stratagem to obtain evidence of drug 
offences against him.  
 
Prior to the trial, the judge held a voir dire to determine an 
application by the defendant to exclude all the prosecution evidence 
on the ground that it was agent provocateur evidence unfairly 
obtained, contrary to section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984, which deprived the defendant of a fair trial guaranteed 
by article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .  
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The judge ruled that the evidence was admissible. The defendant was subsequently convicted of 
supplying small quantities of cocaine and cannabis resin. 
 
On the defendant's appeal against conviction— 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
On an application under section 78 to exclude evidence on the grounds of entrapment, while the facts 
and circumstances of such entrapment might be taken into account and might in an appropriate case 
prove decisive, the principal focus of the judge's attention had to be upon the fairness of the 
proceedings, the nature and reliability of the prosecution evidence and the fullness and fairness of the 
opportunity available to a defendant to deal with the evidence which the prosecution sought to adduce.  
 
There was no general rule requiring a court on grounds of fundamental fairness not to entertain a 
prosecution at all in cases of incitement or instigation by an agent provocateur, regardless of whether 
the trial as a whole could be a fair one in the procedural sense. The judge found correctly that the 
evidence fell short of establishing actual incitement or instigation of the offences concerned and that 
in any event the admission of the evidence would not have an adverse effect on the procedural fairness 
of the trial. 
 
Accordingly, the judge did not err in exercising his discretion to refuse the defendant's application 
under section 78. 
 
“That passage and the authorities therein cited, make it clear in our view that, in the case of 
applications under section 78 to exclude evidence on the grounds of entrapment, while the facts and 
circumstances amounting to such entrapment may be taken into account (and in an appropriate case 
may prove decisive), the principal focus of the judge's attention must be upon the procedural fairness 
of the proceedings, the nature and reliability of the prosecution evidence and the fullness and fairness 
of the opportunity available to the defendant to deal with the evidence which the prosecution seeks to 
adduce. Thus, the question whether section 78 has effectively introduced a defence of entrapment 
into English law is not susceptible of an unqualified answer. It is plain that in R v Smurthwaite [1994] 
1 All ER 898, the court contemplated that an affirmative answer to the question whether the defendant 
was “enticed” to commit an offence was a key consideration for the judge when considering whether 
to exclude the evidence thus obtained. However, it was not in itself sufficient to require exclusion 
without careful consideration of the further questions posed, together with any special considerations 
arising in the particular case which might affect the fairness of the proceedings. The present state of 
English authority remains that the exercise of the judge's discretion is concerned with, and constrained 
by, the effect on the fairness of the proceedings in the procedural sense, bearing in mind that 
entrapment, as such, is not a defence in English law. 
 
“That being so, the ultimate question is not the broad one: is the bringing of proceedings fair (in the 
sense of appropriate) in entrapment cases. It is whether the fairness of the proceedings will be 
adversely affected by admitting the evidence of the agent provocateur or evidence which is available 
as the result of his action or activities. So, for instance, if there is good reason to question the credibility 
of evidence given by an agent provocateur, or which casts doubt on the reliability of other evidence 
procured by or resulting from his actions, and that question is not susceptible of being properly or fairly 
resolved in the course of the proceedings from available, admissible and “untainted” evidence, then 
the judge may readily conclude that such evidence should be excluded. If, on the other hand, the 
unfairness complained of is no more than the visceral reaction that it is in principle unfair as a matter 
of policy, or wrong as a matter of law, for a person to be prosecuted for a crime which he would not 
have committed without the incitement or encouragement of others, then that is not itself sufficient, 
unless the behaviour of the police (or someone acting on behalf of or in league with the police) and/or 
the prosecuting authority has been such as to justify a stay on grounds of abuse of process.”  
per Potter LJ at paras 38 and 39 
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69 BREACHES OF PACE CODES 
 
69.1 Even where Parliament has prescribed a particular method of obtaining evidence, police failure to 
comply with these rules will not necessarily lead to an exclusion of the evidence. The court may need 
to decide if an automatic exclusion was the intention of Parliament (as it is in some confession cases 
under PACE s.76). 
 
69.2 Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland v. Elliott [2013] 1 WLR 1611 (SC) 
 
The defendants, William Elliott and Robert McKee, were arrested in Northern Ireland on suspicion of 
theft of building materials. They were taken to the police station where their fingerprints were taken by 
an electronic device. A fingerprint matching one of the defendant's left thumb was found on the 
packaging of the stolen materials. The defendants were charged with theft.  
 
At the magistrates' court, the prosecution relied on the match of fingerprints and the defendants were 
convicted. Subsequently, the defendants realised that the device used to take their fingerprints had 
not been approved for use by the Secretary of State, as required, at the time, by article 61(8B) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, as inserted, and they appealed to the 
county court. At a preliminary hearing, the judge ruled that the fingerprint evidence was inadmissible. 
The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland allowed the prosecution's appeal, holding that the fingerprint 
evidence was admissible. 
 
On the defendants' appeal— 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
In the absence from article 61(8B) of the 1989 Order of an express provision, for which there was 
ample precedent, that fingerprint evidence should only be admissible if obtained using an approved 
device, it was necessary to consider what Parliament intended to be the consequence of using a non-
approved device. 
 
The article was enacted against the background of the general common law rule, of which Parliament 
had to be taken to have been well aware, that evidence which had been unlawfully obtained did not 
automatically thereby become inadmissible. The clear statutory purpose of preventing the use of a 
device unless it was approved by the Secretary of State was achievable irrespective of the admissibility 
of evidence obtained from an unapproved device and the legislative history did not suggest that 
Parliament intended that inadmissibility should be the consequence of using an unapproved device. 
 
69.3 On the other hand, if there have been significant and substantial breaches of the rules, the court will 
exclude the evidence if it considers that its admission would adversely on the fairness of the 
proceedings. 
69.4 Regina v. Keenan [1990] 2 QB 54 
The appellant was driving a motor car, which he had bought that day, when he was stopped and 
arrested by police officers for motoring offences. Additionally, he was charged with possessing an 
offensive weapon, which had apparently been found in the car when it was searched by police officers, 
and was committed for trial on that offence alone.  
 
At the trial, on a voir dire, objection was taken to the admissibility of certain questions and answers in 
a police station interview, on the grounds of contraventions of the Code of Practice for the Detention, 
Treatment and Questioning of Persons by Police Officers (Code C) in that (i) no record had been made 
during the course of the interview, (ii) no reason for that omission had been recorded in the officer's 
pocket book and (iii) the appellant had not been given the opportunity to read the record of the interview 
and to sign it as correct or to indicate the respects in which he considered it inaccurate. No objections 
or admissions were made as to the truth or fact of the questions and answers at the time the question 
of admissibility was raised. The trial judge ruled that the questions and answers were admissible. The 
appellant was convicted. 
 
On appeal on the grounds that the questions and answers had been wrongly admitted in evidence:  
 
Held: Appeal allowed. 
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There had been plain breaches of Code C and the trial judge had been wrong to assume that any 
unfairness could be remedied by the appellant giving evidence as, not having been apprised of all the 
facts, the trial judge could not have known the effect of admitting the evidence at the time of his ruling.  
 
If the appellant had intended not to give evidence if the questions and answers had been excluded, 
then admitting them unfairly deprived him of his right to remain silent. If the defence was (as it 
transpired) that the evidence was concocted, it was unfair to admit it as that forced the appellant not 
only to give evidence, but also to put his character in issue by attacking the police evidence.  
 
If the defence was that the interview had been inaccurately recorded, it was unfair to admit it as it 
placed the appellant at a substantial disadvantage in that he had had no contemporaneous opportunity 
to correct any inaccuracies nor any contemporaneous note of what he had said.  
 
In all the circumstances, the evidence of the questions and answers had been wrongly admitted and 
that, accordingly, the conviction must be quashed. 
 
Per curiam. Not every breach or combination of breaches of the codes will justify the exclusion of 
interview evidence under section 76 or section 78 . They must be significant and substantial.  
 
“We think that in cases where there have been "significant and substantial" breaches of the "verballing" 
provisions of the code, the evidence so obtained will frequently be excluded. We do not think that any 
injustice will be caused by this. It is clear that not every breach or combination of breaches of the 
codes will justify the exclusion of interview evidence under section 76 or section 78. They must be 
significant and substantial. If this were not the case, the courts would be undertaking a task which is 
no part of their duty: as Lord Lane C.J. said in R. v. Delaney, The Times, 30 August 1988 : "It is no 
part of the duty of the court to rule a statement inadmissible simply in order to punish the police for 
failure to observe the Codes of Practice."  per Hodgson J. at p.69 
 
70 COVERT RECORDING  
 
70.1 Evidence obtained through covert recordings is generally admissible in evidence as long as it is 
voluntary, authentic, probative and relevant. 
70.2 R. v Jason Gregory Bailey, R. v Steven Simon Smith [1993] 97 Cr App R 365 
 
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
 
On July 3, 1991, two appellants were convicted and sentenced as follows:  
 
• Jason Bailey, on each of three counts of robbery, seven years' detention in a young offender 
institution concurrent inter se and concurrent also with a term already being served for 
grievous bodily harm;  
 
• Steven Smith, on a single count of robbery, four years' imprisonment. 
 
Their appeal concerned the admissibility in evidence of a number of highly incriminating remarks, 
tantamount to admissions of guilt, made and tape-recorded during the course of conversations 
between these appellants whilst they were sharing a bugged cell at a police station after being 
arrested, charged and remanded into police custody. 
 
The first robbery, of which both appellants were convicted, took place on May 29, 1990, at the Sun 
Valley Amusement Arcade at Nottingham. The Arcade was raided by four men—identifiable only as 
black and by their clothing—who threatened the employees with an axe and cosh, handcuffed them, 
locked them in the lavatory, rifled the safe and gaming machines, and eventually, when police arrived, 
fled with over £3,000 in cash (another £3,500 being left behind in a holdall), three of the men in a 
stolen car, the fourth, the appellant Smith, on foot to a nearby outhouse where he then hid. 
 
The other two robberies of which Bailey was convicted took place within a quarter of an hour of each 
other on June 4, 1990. Each involved a second, unidentified man as well as Bailey. In each the 
shopkeeper was threatened—in one case with an imitation firearm, in the other the shopkeeper herself 
being kicked and her son punched in the face. Each involved money being stolen from the till—£150 
from the first shop, nearly £4,000 from the second. 
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Apart from the contested tapes, there was a good deal of evidence against Bailey, evidence of various 
kinds including not least his identification by the shopkeeper involved in the second robbery. So far as 
Smith was concerned, the most direct evidence against him was the finding of his fingerprint together 
with items of clothing jettisoned after the amusement arcade robbery in the outhouse nearby. But there 
was other evidence against him too. 
 
THE MAKING OF THE TAPES 
 
Bailey was arrested on June 4, Smith on June 5. On June 5 and 6, both were interviewed at length in 
the presence of their solicitors. Both exercised their right to silence. On the evening of June 6, both 
appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit robberies in the Nottingham area between January 
1 and June 5, 1990. 
 
On the following day, June 7, the officer in charge of the investigation, D.C.I. Warburton, sought and 
obtained from the Deputy Chief Constable permission to install listening equipment in one of the 
remand cells. As Mr. Warburton frankly stated in evidence on the voir dire: “I needed more evidence 
if possible.” 
 
On June 8 the equipment was installed. The same day the appellants appeared at the Magistrates' 
Court. The police asked the Crown Prosecution Service to apply to the court for a remand in police 
custody, the stated object being to put these three men up on identification parades.  
 
Upon the appellants’ arrival back at the police station on the evening of June 8, the police were intent 
upon putting them into the same cell and, understandably, intent too upon allaying any suspicions they 
might have about the cell being bugged. To this end they acted out a scene (a charade as the trial 
judge called it) whereby they pretended that, so far from the investigating officers being anxious to put 
both men into the same cell, this was in fact quite contrary to their wishes and instead forced upon 
them by an uncooperative custody officer. 
 
The scheme worked. Smith's very first words to Bailey when they found themselves together in the 
cell indicated that he had in fact been entirely reassured (fooled) by the police officers' play-acting. 
Lulled as they thus were into a false sense of security, the two accused then embarked upon a series 
of conversations which, all now agree, contained a number of most damning admissions. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
The appellants claimed, inter alia, that the evidence had been obtained illegally (contrary to PACE) 
and as such should not have been admitted as evidence. 
 
Held: Appeals dismissed. 
 
HELD: The stratagem used by the police to obtain admissions, which was not done oppressively or 
so as to render the admissions unreliable, was not in breach of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 or the codes of practice made thereunder, and since the confession evidence was voluntary and 
lawfully obtained, the judge properly exercised his discretion to admit it at the trial. 
 
“Where, as here, very serious crimes have been committed—and committed by men who have not 
themselves shrunk from trickery and a good deal worse—and where there has never been the least 
suggestion that their covertly taped confessions were oppressively obtained or other than wholly 
reliable, it seems to us hardly surprising that the trial judge exercised his undoubted discretion in the 
manner he did.  
 
“If, contrary to our view, evidence of this sort is generally to be regarded as undesirable and 
inadmissible, then in our judgment it is for the Codes to be extended accordingly. As the legislation 
and Codes presently stand, we do not think it unlawful to have obtained, nor unfair to have admitted, 
these taped conversations.”  per Simon Brown LJ at p.375 
 
70.3 Evidence obtained by undercover police acting as contract killers is admissible in evidence, unless the 
manner of obtaining it is so unfair that it ought to be excluded.  
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70.4 R. v. Smurthwaite (1994) 98 Cr App R 437 
 
S and G, in two separate cases, were convicted of soliciting to murder their spouses. In each case, 
the police sent undercover officers to pose as contract killers and secretly recorded the conversations. 
The appellants contended that the police were acting as agents provocateurs and that all the evidence 
obtained by a trick or which included an element of entrapment ought to be excluded under the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78 . 
 
Held: Appeals dismissed. 
 
The judge had no discretion to exclude admissible evidence merely on the ground that it had been 
improperly obtained. The provisions of s.78 did not alter the substantive rule of law that entrapment or 
use of an agent provocateur did not per se afford a defence. The judge had a discretion to exclude the 
evidence if he thought that the obtaining of it would have such an adverse effect on fairness that he 
ought not to admit it. In these cases, the evidence of the secret tapes had been properly admitted  
 
70.5 The fact that evidence has been obtained in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR may be relevant to the 
exercise of the s.78 power, but the effect of the breach turns on its significance to the fairness of the 
proceedings. 
 
70.6 R. v. Khan (Sultan) [1997] AC 558 
 
Khan appealed against the dismissal of his appeal against conviction of being knowingly concerned in 
the importation of a Class A controlled drug, heroin.  
 
The appeal turned on whether criminal evidence amounting to an admission obtained by means of an 
electronic listening device installed by the police was admissible, and if so, whether it should have 
been excluded under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78 .  
 
Khan, who had visited a private house which was under surveillance, argued that, as there was no 
statutory regulation of the use of covert listening devices, statements made during the course of a 
private conversation should not have been admitted, especially in a case where the attachment of the 
device to a private house without the knowledge of its owners or occupiers had given rise to damage 
to property and trespass.  
 
It was further argued that the evidence was obtained in breach of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 Art.8 . 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
There was no right of privacy in English law and relevant evidence remained admissible, despite being 
obtained improperly or unlawfully, subject to the court's discretion to exclude it.  
 
Although an apparent breach of Art.8 of the Convention could be relevant in considering whether to 
exclude evidence, it was not determinative per se, as an appellant's rights were safeguarded under 
s.78 of the 1984 Act which provided for a review of the admissibility of evidence.  
 
A majority of the House of Lords expressed the view that in the instant case it was unnecessary to 
decide whether a right of privacy existed in English law. 
 
70.7 As long as evidence is authentic, probative and relevant, it should not be excluded just because it was 
obtained unlawfully. 
 
70.8 R. v. Chalky and Jeffries (1998) 2 Cr App R 79 
 
The defendants were suspected of planning serious robberies. With the permission of the chief 
constable the police reopened an investigation into a credit card fraud concerning the first defendant 
to enable them to arrest him and install a listening device in his home during his absence. Evidence 
of covert tape recordings of the defendants' conversations thus obtained and of police observation of 
the defendants and their possession of firearms and the paraphernalia of robbery was adduced at their 
trial for conspiracy to commit robbery.  
 
The defendants initially pleaded not guilty, but changed their pleas to guilty after the judge ruled that 
the first defendant's arrest for credit card fraud was not rendered unlawful by the fact that the motive 
158 
 
for it was to enable investigation and/or prevention of other serious offences, and that therefore 
evidence of the tape recorded conversations, the authenticity, content and effect of which the 
defendants did not challenge, had not been unlawfully obtained and ought not to be excluded 
under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 . 
 
On appeal by the defendants against conviction:- 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed. 
 
The authorities showed that the concept of a plea being "founded upon" an erroneous ruling on a point 
of law was to be narrowly interpreted and it could not be applied to the facts of the instant case. 
 
70.9 R. v. P [2002] 1 AC 146 (SC) 
 
The appellants, British citizens, were each charged on three counts of assisting in the United Kingdom 
in the commission of drug offences in European Union countries A and B, contrary to section 20 of 
the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 .  
 
In October 1998, a public prosecutor of country A had obtained an order from a magistrate authorising 
the interception of telephone calls by and to X, a national of that country. Calls made or received by X 
using his mobile telephone could be monitored when he was in England or elsewhere outside country 
A.  
 
The intercepts resulted in tape recordings being made of telephone conversations between X and 
each appellant. The telephone calls were made from country A to the United Kingdom, or from the 
United Kingdom to country A, or when both parties were in either England or country A. In all cases 
the intercepts and recordings were made in country A in accordance with the law of that country.  
 
Pursuant to a request by the English prosecuting authorities, a district court judge of country A made 
an order for release to them of the recordings. The Crown proposed to put the recordings in evidence 
as part of its case at the appellants' trial. It also intended to call X as a prosecution witness.  
 
At a preparatory hearing, the trial judge rejected the appellants' submission that the recordings were 
inadmissible in evidence. He further declined to exercise his discretion to exclude them under section 
78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed 
the appellants' appeal. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
Held: Appeal dismissed.  
 
Although the use made of a telephone intercept could be an "interference" with a person's rights within 
article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, no breach 
of article 8 had been shown since all had been done pursuant to statutory authority and subject to 
judicial supervision.  
 
The criteria to be applied in determining whether a person would have a fair hearing within article 6 of 
the Convention were the same as those to be applied under section 78 of the 1984 Act, where the 
judge had to consider the effect that the admission of the evidence would have on the fairness of the 
trial. It was a cogent factor in favour of admitting the intercept evidence that X was going to give 
evidence at the trial and the judge had been entitled to rule in favour of its admission.  
 
There was no rule of public policy, independently of statute, that intercept evidence should not be used 
at a criminal trial; and where secrecy was not required in the public interest, it was "necessary in a 
democratic society" within article 8(2) of the Convention for all relevant and probative evidence, 
including intercept evidence obtained abroad, to be admissible to assist in the apprehension and 
conviction of criminals and ensure that their trial was fair. 
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70.10 R. v. King [2012] EWCA Crim 803 
 
Joseph King was found guilty of various offences relating to drug dealing and possession of firearms. 
 
The evidence against him included a secretly recorded conversation he had with a co-accused called 
Matthew Newin, whilst they were left ‘alone’ together in the back of a police van. During the 6 minutes 
they thought they were not being monitored, they spoke together in a Romany dialect called Rokker.  
 
Both of them made remarks which implicated them in the supply of drugs. They discussed a cover 
story which both would give to the police, namely that Newin had arrived at Hoath Wood to buy 
chickens from King.  
 
King appealed, inter alia, on the basis that the evidence of the recorded conversation should have 
been excluded under s.78 of PACE. 
 
It was submitted that the investigating officers acted in deliberate breach of their duty under section 
30 of PACE by not taking the suspects to a police station as soon as practicable, but rather deliberately 
locking them in a stationary van, supposedly unobserved, in the hope that they would confess to each 
other – which they did. 
 
That this was the police plan was undoubted, as DI Edward Fox had issued a written policy decision 
before the arrest, which said: 
 
“If Newin meets with an occupant of Hoath Wood both arrested persons will be placed for a period of 
time together in a police vehicle with recording facilities. Should there be more than two persons DS 
McDermott will determine who should be placed in the vehicle with Newin. If Joe King is one of those, 
he will be the priority. They will be left unsupervised and their presence and any conversation will be 
recorded. No police officer will engage in any questioning of either and will not seek to promote any 
conversation between them." 
 
Nowhere did he refer to the s.30 duty, either by way of a reminder or to authorise the delay. 
 
At the trial, DI Fox justified his decision by referring to R. v. Bailey and Smith [1993] 97 Cr App R 365. 
 
The trial judge held that in the complex circumstances, there had not been a breach of s.30; or, even 
if there had, it was not so significant as to have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. 
 
THE APPEAL 
 
Held: Appeals dismissed. 
 
(1) The judge had been entitled to conclude that there had been no breach of s.30. First, there was 
no evidence to indicate that the investigating officers had deliberately delayed for the purpose of 
securing the recording. Second, the geography of the site and the nature of the operation were 
such that there was good reason for the judge to accept the evidence of the officers on the issue 
of delay.  
 
(2) The judge had also been entitled to conclude that, if there had been a breach of s.30, the fairness 
of the proceedings had not been affected. It was true that the policy behind s.30 was to bring the 
suspect, as soon as practicable, within the protection of Code C. The movement of a suspect from 
place to place, or his prolonged detention away from a police station, delayed his entitlement to 
the safeguards provided by Code C. However, the fact alone of a breach of s.30 would not place 
evidence obtained as a result of the delay into a separate category which rendered unfairness a 
presumption.  
 
(3) Each case had to be examined on its own particular facts for an assessment of the fairness of the 
proceedings. The deliberate flouting of a statutory duty for the purpose only of creating an 
opportunity for a covert recording might, depending on the circumstances, result in the exclusion 
of evidence. However, this was not such a case: during the period of an hour while K and N were 
under arrest and awaiting developments, they remained under the supervision of police officers, 
who did not engage them in conversation about their arrest; the placement of K and N in the same 
police car provided no more than an opportunity for them to speak together in the belief that they 
were not being overheard; no trick or subterfuge was practised on them so as to lead them to 
believe that they had to make some response to their arrests.  
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Furthermore, the covert recording took place before interview under caution but that fact placed 
them at no greater disadvantage than if they had been covertly recorded in police custody after 
interview under caution.  
 
71 INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS 
 
71.1 Despite the general rule that logically probative evidence is admissible, there is a specific statutory 
exception relating to evidence gained from the unlawful interception of a communication sent either 
by a public postal service or a public telecommunications service. 
 
71.2 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is the successor to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000; which is itself the successor to the Interception of Communications Act 1985. 
 
71.3 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
 
3 Offence of unlawful interception30 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person intentionally intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by means 
of— 
(i) a public telecommunication system, 
(ii) a private telecommunication system, or 
(iii) a public postal service, 
(b) the interception is carried out in the United Kingdom, and 
(c) the person does not have lawful authority to carry out the interception. 
71.4 Under the normal principles, one would expect that evidence illegally obtained by intercepting a phone-
call etc. would be admissible in evidence, subject to the judge’s discretion to exclude it either at 
common law or under PACE s.78. 
71.5 However, a further section of the Act casts doubt on that idea. 
71.6 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
56 Exclusion of matters from legal proceedings etc31. 
(1) No evidence may be adduced, question asked, assertion or disclosure made or other thing done 
in, for the purposes of or in connection with any legal proceedings or Inquiries Act proceedings which 
(in any manner)— 
(a) discloses, in circumstances from which its origin in interception-related conduct may be 
inferred— 
(i) any content of an intercepted communication, or 
(ii) any secondary data obtained from a communication, or 
 
30 This is the same as s.1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
31 This is the same as s.17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
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(b) tends to suggest that any interception-related conduct has or may have occurred or may be going 
to occur. 
This is subject to Schedule 3 (exceptions).  
(2) “Interception-related conduct” means— 
(a) conduct by a person within subsection (3) that is, or in the absence of any lawful authority would 
be an offence under section 3(1) (offence of unlawful interception)… 
 
71.7 This means that no evidence can be given that would reveal its source as being an intercepted 
communication.  
 
71.8 It is not a prohibition on the evidence itself being given, but in practice it would be virtually impossible 
to use the evidence without revealing its source. Even if the prosecution can introduce the evidence 
without alluding to the intercept, the defendant would almost certainly wish to explore the source of it. 
If he were prevented from doing so under s.56, this would infringe his rights under Article 6 of the 
European Convention. 
 
71.9 Morgans v. DPP [2001] 1 AC 315 
 
Morgans appealed against part of a decision dismissing his appeal against a decision upholding his 
conviction of fraudulently using a telecommunication system under the Telecommunications Act 1984 
s.42 .  
 
The evidence on which the prosecution case was based had been obtained by placing a call logging 
system on Morgans’ telephone line, without obtaining a warrant. Printouts from the system established 
that it had been used to secure access to the computer systems of certain companies, thereby gaining 
unauthorised access to outside telephone lines at the companies' expense. Morgans argued that 
under the Interception of Communications Act 1985 s.9(1) , evidence obtained in breach of s.1 of that 
Act would be inadmissible. Section 1 stated that the intercepting of a communication was an offence. 
It had been held by the Divisional Court that s.9 merely prohibited questions regarding the way in 
which the evidence was obtained, but not its actual admissibility. 
 
Held: Appeal allowed. 
 
s.1 and s.9 of the 1985 Act disallowed the admission of evidence obtained by intercepting 
communications by a person listed in s.9(2), except where that evidence was obtained in accordance 
with s.1(3) of the 1985 Act. The Act preserved the practice of separating acts of surveillance from the 
prosecution of offenders, R. v Preston (Stephen) [1994]  applied. As the intercept had been made 
without a warrant, questioning was prohibited both as to the circumstances surrounding the intercept 
and the evidence obtained as a result. 
 
“Evidence of material obtained by the interception by the persons mentioned in section 9(2) of the 
1985 Act of communications of the kind described in section 1(1) of that Act, except for the purposes 
described in section 1(3), will always be inadmissible. It is not possible to say that section 9(1) of the 
Act provides for this in express language. But, in the context of the Act as a whole, the prohibitions 
which it contains lead inexorably to that result. So, I would hold that it has that effect by necessary 
implication.” per Lord Hope at p.338 
 
71.10 The purpose of this prohibition is inter alia to ensure that the police cannot be quizzed on how they 
carry out covert operations etc. and arose out of a case called Malone v. UK (1984) 7 EHRR 14, a 
case in which the European Court of Human Rights criticised the lack of precision, accessibility and 
formal safeguards in the area of communications intercepts in the UK. 
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71.11  However, the courts have been perplexed by exactly what the section means. 
Regina Respondent v Preston (Stephen) [1994] 2 A.C. 130 
This case concerned the identical provisions of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. 
“If the purpose of Parliament was to allow the intercept materials to become part of the prosecution 
process it is hard to see any point in a provision which would make it wholly or at least partially 
(according to how the section is read) impossible to use them in that process; and if that had been the 
intention it is equally hard to understand why Parliament did not say so in plain language.  
 
“By contrast, on the narrower reading of section 2 there would be no need to make explicit provision 
for the admissibility of materials which by virtue of section 6 would no longer exist, and the purpose of 
section 9 can be seen as the protection, not of the fruits of the intercepts, but of information as to the 
manner in which they were authorised and carried out. Inquiries as to these matters were to be 
confined to the tribunal under section 7, and the defendant was not to have the opportunity to muddy 
the waters at a trial by cross-examination designed to elicit the Secretary of State's sources of 
knowledge or the surveillance authorities' confidential methods of work. Evidently the proscription of 
questioning on the existence of warrants was seen as an economical means of achieving this result.” 
 per Lord Mustill at p.167 
 
72 LIMITATIONS ON THE ACT 
 
72.1 The Act only applies to ‘interceptions’, so does not apply to a recording of a telephone conversation 
other than by tapping the wire. 
 
 R. v. E [2004] 1 WLR 3279 
 
In the course of an investigation into suspected drug dealing police placed in the defendant's car a 
covert listening device which recorded words spoken by the defendant when in the car.  
 
The device recorded the defendant's end of telephone conversations on his mobile telephone but did 
not pick up any speech from the person on the other end of the telephone.  
 
The defendant was charged on indictment with offences of conspiracy to supply controlled drugs. 
 
 It was held that this did not amount to an interception of the call. 
 
“In our view, the natural meaning of the expression “interception” denotes some interference or 
abstraction of the signal, whether it is passing along wires or by wireless telegraphy, during the process 
of transmission. The recording of a person's voice, independently of the fact that at the time he is using 
a telephone, does not become interception simply because what he says goes not only into the 
recorder, but, by separate process, is transmitted by a telecommunications system. That view is 
consistent with the expressions contained in the Act to which we have drawn attention.”  
per Rix LJ at para 20 
 
72.2 It is also not an ‘interception’ to record your own telephone conversation. 
 
 R. v. Hardy and Hardy [2003] 1 Cr App R 30 
 
Brian Hardy and his son Danny Hardy appealed against their convictions for conspiracy to supply a 
Class B controlled drug. At their trial, the judge had ruled that tape recordings of face to face 
conversations and telephone conversations between the appellants and two undercover police officers 
were admissible. The issues raised by their appeals included (1) whether the recordings amounted to 
telephone tapping and (2) whether the conduct of the police officers amounted to surveillance and, if 
so, whether proper authorisation had been given. 
 
Held, dismissing the appeals, that (1) for one party to a telephone conversation to make a tape 
recording of that conversation did not amount to the interception of a communication in the course of 
its transmission by means of a telecommunication system within the meaning of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s.2(2), and (2) whilst the conduct of the police officers did amount to 
surveillance within the meaning of s.26(1)(c) of the Act, proper authorisation had been given. 
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“The position of a telephone conversation which is intercepted and overheard by a third party, unknown 
to one or both of the parties to it, is different. Such a conversation may legitimately be regarded by the 
two speakers as something which could only be revealed by one of them. That is what is separately 
provided for as ‘interception’ for the purposes of the 2000 Act.” para 35 
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TUTORIAL EXERCISES 
 
Exercise One 
 
Barrie is accused of stealing 50 computers to a value of £50,000 from London Metropolitan 
University. 
 
It is alleged that he took them from a store-room in the university over a number of days, concealed 
in various bags and suitcases, and then sold them for £30,000 cash on a stall at Borough Market on 
August 1st 2020. 
 
Consider the type, relevance and weight of the following pieces of evidence. 
 
1. Barrie has worked at the university for 30 years and is a highly trusted member of staff. 
 
2. Barrie’s job has recently been made redundant, so he will have to leave the university in 
October 2020, with no other job lined up. 
 
3. Barrie has not been on holiday for 20 years, but has recently booked an expensive world 
cruise.  
 
4. Barrie has recently deposited £30,000 in his bank account. 
 
5. After 5 hours in a police station with no legal representation, Barrie admitted stealing the 
computers. 
 
6. A witness claims to have seen a man selling computers on Borough Market on August 1st. 
The description he has given of this man generally matches Barrie, but the man in question 
was wearing a beanie hat, so the witness could not see his hair (if any). 
 
7. Barrie’s wife was told by her friend, Mary, that she had bought one of the computers from 
Barrie at Borough Market. 
 
8. Barrie claims he was in Manchester on August 1st watching a play at the Lowry Theatre. He 
has the ticket stub. 
 
9. Barrie was charged with stealing stationery from the university in 2015, but the charges were 
dropped through lack of evidence. 
 
10. In common with all the other university staff, Barrie has easy access to the computer store-
room. 
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Exercise Two 
 
What legal and evidential burdens may arise from this statute? 
 
 
Selfish Disturbances by Audiences Act 2020 
 
An Act to prohibit members of the audiences of live entertainment shows from causing unwarranted 
disturbances to other members of the audience. 
 
s.1 Offence of causing unnecessary disturbances by noise 
 
(1) It is an offence for a person deliberately to wrap, unwrap or otherwise handle any food or drink 
wrappings during the course of a live entertainment if this creates a noise audible to anyone else 
in the audience. 
 
(2) It is an offence for a person deliberately to eat or prepare to eat, drink or prepare to drink anything 
in a live entertainment venue during the course of the event if this creates a noise audible to 
anyone else in the audience or an odour which can be detected by anyone else in the audience. 
 
(3) It is an offence for a person deliberately to speak, whisper, sing or make any other sort of deliberate 
verbal noise in a live entertainment venue during the course of the event unless specifically called 
upon to do so by the performers in the entertainment as part of genuine audience participation. 
 
s.2 Offence of causing unnecessary disturbances by use of devices 
 
(1) It is an offence for a person being a member of the audience at a live entertainment event to switch 
on or to use any electronic device during the event. 
 
(2) For the purpose of subsection 1 of this section, ‘electronic device’ includes, but is not restricted to, 
any device that emits light and/or sound, such as mobile telephones, computers, cameras and 
watches, 
 
s.3 Offence of permitting disturbances by audiences 
 
(1) It is an offence for any person who is managing a live event to permit members of the audience to 
commit the offences in sections 1 and 2 above. 
 
(2) It is an offence for any person who is managing a live event to fail to take reasonable steps to 
prevent members of the audience from committing the offences in sections 1 and 2 above. 
 
s.4 Defences 
 
In any proceedings against any person for an offence under sections 1 and 2 above it is a defence 
for him to show that at the time he made the disturbances he reasonably believed that he had 
cause to do so for either health or safety reasons. 
 
s.5 Penalties 
 
(1) A person guilty of an offence under sections 1 or 2 shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 25 years or to an unlimited fine or both. 
 
(2) A person guilty of an offence under section 3 shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding level five. 
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Exercise Three 
 
Barrie manages a small theatre in London. On an unannounced visit by a local health and safety 
inspector, the inspector claims to have discovered Barrie and four other people smoking cigarettes 
inside the building. 
 
Barrie is charged with offences contrary to the Health Act 2006. 
 
As the Counsel for the Prosecution, explain what evidence you might amass in order to prove the 
case against him, and what issues of relevance, admissibility and weight may arise.  
 
Examine also what burdens and reverse burdens of proof may arise from the statute, and 
how these might be interpreted and handled by the court. 
 
 
Health Act 2006 
 
s.1  Introduction 
 
(1) This Chapter makes provision for the prohibition of smoking in certain premises, places and vehicles 
which are smoke-free by virtue of this Chapter. 
 
(2) In this Chapter— 
 
(a) “smoking” refers to smoking tobacco or anything which contains tobacco, or smoking any 
other substance, and 
(b) smoking includes being in possession of lit tobacco or of anything lit which contains 
tobacco, or being in possession of any other lit substance in a form in which it could be 
smoked. 
 
(3) In this Chapter, “smoke” and other related expressions are to be read in accordance with subsection 
(2). 
 
s.2 Smoke-free premises 
 
(1) Premises are smoke-free if they are open to the public. 
 
But unless the premises also fall within subsection (2), they are smoke-free only when open to the 
public. 
 
(2) Premises are smoke-free if they are used as a place of work— 
 
(a) by more than one person (even if the persons who work there do so at different times, or 
only intermittently), or 
(b) where members of the public might attend for the purpose of seeking or receiving goods 
or services from the person or persons working there (even if members of the public are not 
always present). 
 
They are smoke-free all the time. 
 
(3)  If only part of the premises is open to the public or (as the case may be) used as a place of work 
mentioned in subsection (2), the premises are smoke-free only to that extent. 
 
(4) In any case, premises are smoke-free only in those areas which are enclosed or substantially 
enclosed. 
 
(5) The appropriate national authority may specify in regulations what “enclosed” and “substantially 
enclosed” mean.  
 
(6) Section 3 provides for some premises, or areas of premises, not to be smoke-free despite this section. 
. 
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 (7) Premises are “open to the public” if the public or a section of the public has access to them, whether 
by invitation or not, and whether on payment or not. 
(8) “Work”, in subsection (2), includes voluntary work. 
 
s.3 Smoke-free premises: exemptions 
 
(1) The appropriate national authority may make regulations providing for specified descriptions of 
premises, or specified areas within specified descriptions of premises, not to be smoke-free despite 
section 2. 
 
(2) Descriptions of premises which may be specified under subsection (1) include, in particular, any 
premises where a person has his home, or is living whether permanently or temporarily (including 
hotels, care homes, and prisons and other places where a person may be detained). 
 
(3) The power to make regulations under subsection (1) is not exercisable so as to specify any description 
of— 
(a) premises in respect of which a premises licence under the Licensing Act 2003 (c. 17) 
authorising the sale by retail of alcohol for consumption on the premises has effect, 
(b) premises in respect of which a club premises certificate (within the meaning of section 60 
of that Act) has effect. 
 
(4) But subsection (3) does not prevent the exercise of that power so as to specify any area, within a 
specified description of premises mentioned in subsection (3), where a person has his home, or is 
living whether permanently or temporarily. 
 
(5) For the purpose of making provision for those participating as performers in a performance, or in a 
performance of a specified description, not to be prevented from smoking if the artistic integrity of the 
performance makes it appropriate for them to smoke— 
(a) the power in subsection (1) also includes power to provide for specified descriptions of 
premises or specified areas within such premises not to be smoke-free in relation only to such 
performers, and 
(b) subsection (3) does not prevent the exercise of that power as so extended. 
 
(6) The regulations may provide, in relation to any description of premises or areas of premises specified 
in the regulations, that the premises or areas are not smoke-free— 
(a) in specified circumstances, 
(b) if specified conditions are satisfied, or 
(c) at specified times, 
or any combination of those. 
 
(7) The conditions may include conditions requiring the designation in accordance with the regulations, 
by the person in charge of the premises, of any rooms in which smoking is to be permitted. 
 
(8) For the purposes of subsection (5), the references to a performance— 
(a) include, for example, the performance of a play, or a performance given in connection with 
the making of a film or television programme, and 
(b) if the regulations so provide, include a rehearsal. 
 
s.7 Offence of smoking in smoke-free place 
 
(1) In this section, a “smoke-free place” means any of the following— 
(a) premises, so far as they are smoke-free under or by virtue of sections 2 and 3 (including 
premises which by virtue of regulations under section 3(5) are smoke-free except in relation 
to performers), 
(b) a place, so far as it is smoke-free by virtue of section 4,  
(c) a vehicle, so far as it is smoke-free by virtue of section 5. 
 
(2) A person who smokes in a smoke-free place commits an offence. 
 
(3) But a person who smokes in premises which are not smoke-free in relation to performers by virtue of 
regulations under section 3(5) does not commit an offence if he is such a performer. 
(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that he did not know, 
and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that it was a smoke-free place. 
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(5) If a person charged with an offence under this section relies on a defence in subsection (4), and 
evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to that defence, the court must 
assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is 
not. 
 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
a level on the standard scale specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
 
s.8 Offence of failing to prevent smoking in smoke-free place 
 
(1) It is the duty of any person who controls or is concerned in the management of smoke-free premises 
to cause a person smoking there to stop smoking. 
 
(2) The reference in subsection (1) to a person smoking does not include a performer in relation to whom 
the premises are not smoke-free by virtue of regulations under section 3(5). 
 
(3) Regulations made by the appropriate national authority may provide for a duty corresponding to that 
mentioned in subsection (1) in relation to— 
(a) places which are smoke-free by virtue of section 4, 
(b) vehicles which are smoke-free by virtue of section 5. 
 
The duty is to be imposed on persons, or on persons of a description, specified in the regulations. 
 
(4) A person who fails to comply with the duty in subsection (1), or any corresponding duty in regulations 
under subsection (3), commits an offence. 
 
(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show— 
(a) that he took reasonable steps to cause the person in question to stop smoking, or 
 (c) that on other grounds it was reasonable for him not to comply with the duty. 
(b) that he did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that the 
person in question was smoking, or 
 
(6) If a person charged with an offence under this section relies on a defence in subsection (5), and 
evidence is adduced which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to that defence, the court must 
assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is 
not. 
 
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
a level on the standard scale specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
 
(8) The references in this section, however expressed, to premises, places or vehicles which are smoke-
free, are to those premises, places or vehicles so far as they are smoke-free under or by virtue of this 
Chapter (and references to smoke-free premises include premises which by virtue of regulations under 
section 3(5) are smoke-free except in relation to performers).  
 
. 
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Exercise Four 
 
Paul, Quentin, Rita, Silas and Tammy are arrested for burglary. Each makes a confession which 
they seek to have excluded at trial.  
Advise each defendant on the admissibility of their confessions. 
(a) Paul was told by the police: “We have your fingerprints all over the windowsill.” When he 
heard this, he confessed. However, no fingerprints had in fact been found.  
 
i. Does it make any difference whether his solicitor was present at the interview? 
ii. Does it make any difference if, as a result of the confession, the police searched 
Paul’s house and found some of the stolen items there? 
 
(b) Quentin is a heroin addict. He knew that in a few hours he would begin to get withdrawal 
symptoms, and was therefore desperate to get out of the station as soon as possible.   
However, the police said that they would need several further interviews with him, which 
would take hours, and he confessed to get out earlier.  
 
Does it make any difference whether or not the police knew about his addiction?   
 
(c) Rita asked for a solicitor but the police refused to allow her access to legal advice.  Initially, 
they refused on the basis that other suspects may be alerted (which they may or may not 
have believed), and Rita made some admissions. They then admitted that there was no risk 
of other suspects being alerted, but continued to refuse to allow Rita access to a solicitor. 
She then made a full confession.  
 
i. Does it make any difference that Rita has been a career criminal for 20 years? 
ii. Does it make any difference if Rita was later given access to a solicitor, and made 
the same confession? 
 
(d) After 14 hours of detention without any food, Silas admitted being on the street where the 
burglary happened at the time of the crime, but said this was just to visit his cousin who lives 
in the adjoining house.  
 
(e) Tammy told the police that she was in Italy at the time of the crime, but later admitted to 
being in the street where the burglary took place. 
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Exercise Five 
 
Barrie is charged with murder. It is alleged that on October 29th, he attended a performance of the 
opera ‘The Mikado’ at the Royal Opera House. He was sitting on the second row of the dress circle. 
During the performance, the woman directly in front of him switched on her mobile phone and 
accessed Facebook. He leant forward and asked her to switch the phone off. She refused and stood 
up and turned around infront of him so that he could not see the stage. Barrie pushed her over the 
balcony. His defence is that he was merely trying to grab the phone off her, and she slipped 
backwards. 
 
Discuss the admissibility of the following evidence: 
 
i. Barrie is notorious for his intolerance of people who misbehave in theatres. 
 
ii. Barrie was once forcibly removed from a theatre for swearing at an usher who did not stop 
people from taking photographs during a show. 
 
iii. This is the third time that someone has fallen over the balcony of a theatre where Barrie has 
been present. 
 
iv. Barrie states in the trial that he is an extremely patient and docile person. The prosecution 
wishes to bring evidence refute this. 
 
v. Barrie belongs to a Facebook group called: “Vengeance on Audience Plebs” which shares 
ideas about how to get revenge on inconsiderate theatre-goers. 
 
Exercise Six 
 
“The reforms to the right to silence made by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 have 
given a disproportionate advantage to the prosecution by effectively compelling the defendant to say 
something to establish his innocence.”  
 
Critically examine this statement 
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Exercise Seven 
 
Peter Partridge has been charged with the murder of Simon Seagull. 
 
Peter and Simon used to be best friends. Peter had a girlfriend from Cuba called Roberta Robin, but 
she became frightened of him because of his violent mood swings and found solace in the arms of 
Simon, with whom she started to have an affair. 
 
It is alleged that Peter followed Simon home from the pub one night and stabbed him with a Samurai 
sword in a dark alley. Peter denies having even seen Simon that evening, or having ever owned or 
used a Samurai sword. 
 
Roberta gave a written statement to the police in which she recalled how Simon had told her about 
threats that Peter had made to him, saying that he would get his revenge on him for stealing his 
girlfriend.  
 
Roberta has now returned home to Cuba and has indicated that she is too scared of Peter to come 
back to England for his trial. 
 
Advise the prosecution which wishes to have the following evidence admitted: 
 
Roberta’s written statement. 
 
i. Entries from Simon’s diary in which he mentions the threats from Peter. 
 
ii. A written statement from a witness who claims to have seen Peter at the scene of the attack, 
but whom the police have since been unable to trace. 
 
iii. A letter written to Peter from his mother, stating how disappointed she was that he treated 
Roberta so badly. Peter’s mother has since been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and 
has been certified unfit to give testimony in court. 
 
iv. A text message sent by Simon to Roberta’s phone shortly before he was attacked, saying 
that he thought he was being followed by Peter. 
 
v. A receipt from a specialist weaponry shop in Japan, showing that Peter bought a ceremonial 
Samurai sword when he was on holiday in Tokyo 10 years ago. 
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Exercise Eight 
 
Answer ALL FOUR questions in this part. 
 
Rose Maybud, a professional electrician, has been charged with the murder of her third husband, 
Ash. Ash died from electrocution as a result of faulty wiring in a power drill he was using to erect 
some bookshelves at their home. Rose’s first husband, Hickory, supposedly died as a result of 
electrocution whilst he was shaving with an electric razor which he dropped in the bath, causing it to 
short-circuit. Rose’s second husband, Bramble, supposedly died as a result of electrocution whilst 
using a toaster when he tried to recover some stuck toast from the live mechanism using a metal 
knife. 
 
In the cases of Hickory and Bramble, the coroner recorded a verdict of accidental death, and in both 
cases, Rose was awarded a substantial sum from their life insurance policies. Due to her extravagant 
lifestyle, she had spent all the money by the time she married Ash. However, she stands to benefit 
to the sum of £1,000,000 from the life insurance on Ash. 
 
It is alleged that Rose rewired the power drill so that it would give Ash a fatal electric shock. It is 
Rose’s defence that Ash’s death was as a result of an inherent defect in the power drill, which had 
nothing to do with her. 
 
With reference to cases, statutes and conventions, advise on the admissibility of the 
following evidence at the trial of Rose, including, where relevant, advice on how the judge 
should direct the jury. 
 
QUESTION ONE 
 
Rose was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning. She was given the statutory 
caution and was asked by P.C. Ivy if she wanted to have the services of a solicitor. Rose replied: 
“How could I afford a solicitor? I have no money left!” No solicitor was called for. 
 
Rose was then locked in a police cell for eight hours, before being brought before D.C. Tulip and 
D.C. Daffodil for questioning. Tulip asked her why she had killed Ash, to which Rose replied: “I cannot 
answer that!” 
 
Tulip said: “Well you had better try, or we will be here for a very long time.” 
Daffodil said: “Or we could try some of our special methods to speed things up a bit!” 
 
Daffodil then produced a gory photograph of Ash’s burnt body and shouted at Rose: “Look what 
you’ve done! You’re a monster! Just admit it!”  
 
Rose screamed when she saw the photograph, and said: “How could I have done that? And to the 
man I love!” 
 
QUESTION TWO 
 
Rose’s Peruvian maid, Alstroemeria, told her friend Lily about a conversation she had with Rose a 
week before the death of Ash. Rose was behind in paying Alstroemeria’s wages, but told her: “Don’t 
worry. This time next week, I will be a millionaire!” 
 
Alstroemeria returned to live in Peru immediately after the death, and refuses to come back to 
England to give evidence. The prosecution wishes to call Lily to give testimony of the conversation 
instead. 
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QUESTION THREE 
 
Before arresting Rose, the police had put an unlawful tap on her phone in order to monitor her calls. 
In one call, Ash’s mother, Orchid, had called Rose and said to her: “You have murdered my son, just 
like you did with all the rest! Why don’t you just admit it?” 
 
Rose replied: “Drop dead!” and hung up. 
 
The prosecution wishes to use the recording of this conversation in evidence. 
 
 
QUESTION FOUR 
 
The prosecution wishes to produce evidence relating to the deaths of Rose’s first two husbands. 
 
 
Exercise Nine 
 
With reference to legal and evidentiary burdens of proof, critically discuss whether the 
presumption of innocence is sufficiently protected in English law. 
 
 
 
Exercise Ten 
 
Critically discuss the measures taken under English law to protect a defendant from the 
potential miscarriages of justice which may arise from a false identification. 
 
